The Semantics and Discourse Function of Habitual-Iterative Verbs in Contemporary Czech

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"[T]he conceiving mind cannot, by the very nature of meaning, be tied down to a consciousness which apprehends actualities only, for the implicit content of our concepts includes meaningful assertions about potentialities which reach out beyond that which will ever be actualized. Embodied in the actuality of our conceptual structures as dispositional, then, is a sense of reality which transcends actual occasions of experience."
(Rosenthal 1983: 317)

"The habit does not exist at any one moment, as does a musical note. Like a melodic pattern of notes, the habit spans a succession of momentary occurrences. The habit, unlike an occurrence, is real through memory and expectation. The identity of the habit lies in its pattern of succession, and this structure is repeatable in various materials, at various times, and in varying circumstances. It is, as Peirce says, a 'would-be,' a subjunctive conditional, a tendency. Yet if the actual concrete acctions in which the habit is embodied did not *exist*, the habit would not be *real*."
(Savan 1988: 45)

"[N]o agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a would-be."
(Peirce 1931-5: vol. 5, section 467)

INTRODUCTION

This study is a re-examination of an issue in Czech linguistics that has been the subject of significant controversy, namely, the meaning and function of Czech habitual-iterative verbs of the type *říkávat* (< *říkat* "to say"), *dělávat* (< *dělat* "to do"), *mívat* (< *mít* "to have"), etc.[1] These verbs form a morphologically well-defined class: they are unprefixed verbs derived from their corresponding imperfective simplex forms (*říkat*, *dělat*, *mít*) usually by means of the formant *-va-*.[2] They occur in both the past and present tense and also, marginally speaking, in the infinitive. Various names have been used to designate them: iteratives, frequentatives, non-actual iteratives (*násobená neaktuální slovesa*), quantified states, and habits. It has been said that they express regular, irregular, sporadic, indeterminate, and quantified iteration.

Analysis of this class of verbs has focused on several key questions: how do these verbs differ in meaning and usage from their respective imperfective simplex forms?; what kind of iteration do they express?; and what is the status of the distant-past reading often associated with morphologically past uses of the form? Different analytical approaches to their semantics have also been attempted. The question was originally framed by F. Kopečný (1948, 1962, 1965, 1966), who adopted a feature-based approach that I will call the traditional analysis. The later approaches of A. G. Širokova (1963, 1965), H. Kučera (1979, 1980, 1981), and H. Filip (1993, 1994) move away from a strictly feature-based account and pay closer attention to context. The present study follows the trajectory from Kopečný through the later studies to its logical end.

The subject merits a monograph-length treatment for a number of reasons:

(1) There are few in-depth studies of the semantics of iterative verbs in the Slavic languages. One Polish researcher, writing in 1982, lamented the general lack of literature on the topic: "The literature concerning iteratives in Slavic languages is not rich" (Rudnik-Karwatowa 1982: 7). The situation is only marginally improved today. Those studies of habitual-iterative verb forms that do exist (for example, Barnetová 1956, Ivanchikova 1957, Dunaj 1971, Prokopovich 1982: 182-200, Rudnik-Karwatowa 1982, Monnesland 1984, Khrakovskii 1989: 141ff, as well as those works on Czech cited immediately above) are mostly focused on questions of synchronic derivation and historical development and consequently rarely explore the semantics of the forms in any detail.

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[1] It represents a summary, refinement, and extension of Danaher 1995, 1996, 1999, and forthcoming.

[2] In contemporary literary Russian, verbs of the same type like *govarivat'* (< *govorit'* "to speak"), *pivat'* (< *pit'* "to drink"), *sizhivat'* (< *sidet'* "to sit") and *khazhivat'* (< *khodit'* "to go") are morphologically unproducitve and marginal in usage (Kučera 1981: 177). They are marked for substandard, colloquial speech and do not occupy a unique position in the aspectual system (Vinogradov 1986: 413-4; see also Forsyth 1970's discussion of "frequentatives").

(2) Much of the existing literature on the Czech habitual-iterative is concerned with the theoretical status of the iterative: does it represent a semantic or grammatical phenomenon? If the former, then the iterative expresses manner of verbal action (Aktionsart); if the latter, then it is an aspectual category. The importance of this question in regard to research on Czech iteratives is evidenced by the entry on iterativity (*iterativnost*) in the recent *Encyklopedický slovník češtiny* (*Encyclopedic Dictionary of Czech* 2002: 188-9), which is entirely devoted to it. Unfortunately, preoccupation with this question has not brought us any closer to understanding the meaning or function of the habitual-iterative verb in Czech.

(3) As this study hopes to show, the meaning and usage of habitual-iterative verbs are more interesting and complex than the previous literature on the topic has demonstrated, and the Slavic (Czech) situation can contribute to a general understanding of the nature of habitual iteration in both language and cognition.

(4) Key problems associated with the semantics of Czech habitual-iterative verbs have not been adequately solved; indeed, a whole range of appropriate questions related to their meaning and usage have yet to be asked due primarily to the methodological limitations of earlier studies (see the next two points).

(5) There is a need to bring discussion of Slavic iterative verbs up to date with the literature on habitual/generic propositions in other languages, particularly Brinton 1987 and 1991, Bybee et al 1994, Dahl 1975, Dickey 2000, Fife 1990, Kleiber 1985 and 1986, Langacker 1996 and 1997, Smith 1991, Suh 1992b, and Tyvaert 1987. The cross-linguistic literature indicates which aspects of the meaning and usage of Czech (Slavic) iteratives are generalizable to many different languages and which represent language-specific encoding.

(6) No previous analysis of Czech habitual-iterative verbs takes full advantage of a corpus of examples to examine the form's meaning and function. Most previous analyses have relied on decontextualized sentences, often invented on the basis of the researcher's native Czech intuition (or borrowed from the analysis of another researcher who used the same methodology). As I will show, an approach that is not grounded in a corpus and that ignores the discourse level cannot possibly provide an adequate account of the semantics of the verb form. Note Wallace on this point: "[O]ne does not truly understand the meaning of a linguistic category until one comprehends its function in a text" (Wallace 1982: 201).

In short, there is a need for an analysis of the meaning and function of habitual-iterative verbs in Czech that can account for the insights of previous scholarly treatments but that can also explain the range of other meanings associated with the verb form in discourse contexts. This analysis should be grounded in a corpus of actual examples[3], should take into account the role(s) played by the verbs in discourse, and should attempt to establish,

[3] Every example discussed in this study was additionally tested with at least three (usually more) native speakers of Czech.

using literature on habitual-iterative forms from a variety of languages, the cross-linguistic status of the Czech form.

From a feature-based to a semiotic/cognitive analysis

Traditional analyses of the semantics of Czech habitual-iterative verbs have sought to differentiate the meaning of the habitual-iterative verb from the imperfective simplex form by providing a necessary and sufficient definition of the meanings of both forms using a set of abstract semantic features. The feature analysis is usually carried out within a larger theory of oppositions in the Czech aspectual system. This study demonstrates the inadequacy of the feature-based approach as well as the necessity of looking beyond traditional aspectual notions in order to reach an adequate understanding of the meaning and function of the verbs in question.

As Bybee and Dahl have noted, the meaning of a grammatical form is largely independent of the meaning of the broader grammatical domain, like aspect, in which it functions:

> [W]e do not have to concern ourselves with defining "tense" or "aspect" or the more recalcitrant "mood" as overarching categories, nor with deciding whether perfect is a tense or an aspect, or whether future is a tense or mood. Rather the relevant entity for the study of grammatical meaning is the individual gram, which must be viewed as having inherent semantic substance reflecting the history of its development as much as the place it occupies in a synchronic system. (Bybee and Dahl 1989: 97)

In the spirit of Bybee and Dahl, this study will present a synchronic semantic portrait of the habitual-iterative gram in Czech.[4] It will be concerned primarily with the verb form's "inherent semantic substance" and only secondarily with its value in the Czech aspectual system.

Bybee (1998) has further described the pitfalls of a feature- and opposition-based investigation of grammatical meaning. According to Bybee, a strictly feature-based approach entails the following beliefs: (1) all grammatical oppositions are binary, and a grammatical morpheme takes its meaning from its place in the system of morphemes, that is, grams do not have inherent meaning "but rather are defined by their relation to other members of the opposition" (Bybee 1998: 258); (2) category boundaries are discrete and defined by necessary and sufficient conditions; (3) each gram has one abstract, invariant meaning that is present in all its contextual usages, and any additional meanings associated with the gram are therefore not part of its semantics. Bybee argues that developments in the 1970's and 1980's undermined a feature-based approach to grammatical meaning, and she refutes the consequences of this approach point-by-point: (1) grammatical mophemes do have inherent content that is independent of the

[4] I emphasize that, unlike Bybee and Dahl, I will pursue a synchronic semantic description. I have not investigated in significant depth the historical development of the gram in question.

oppositions they may enter into; (2) boundaries between categories are not discrete, and a gram's senses and usages may be central or marginal so that "not all features that characterize the meaning of a gram have to be present in all of its uses" (Bybee 1998: 261); (3) semantic content is molded into grammatical meaning.[5]

Reductionist by nature, feature-based theories cannot motivate the behavior of linguistic forms across a variety of contexts because the contexts themselves are considered secondary to the establishment of the abstract features. That is, the very function of language — communication in a context — is ignored in a feature-based analysis, and meaning itself is thereby distorted. As Bolinger has written: "When meanings are built up from below with deterministic features, there is no way to get the elasticity that one always finds with meaning" (Bolinger 1976: 11). Anttilla has also noted: "Elements are not there to be combined, but are secondarily abstracted from the whole or totality [...] Totality is the starting point" (Anttilla 1977b: 5). The pitfalls of a bottom-up, feature-based analysis of Czech habitual-iterative verbs will become evident in the pages that follow.

If the meaning and function of Czech habitual-iterative verbs can be better understood outside the context of a feature-based analysis, then this also entails looking beyond traditional aspectual categories and the methodology underlying them. Much work on aspect attempts to explain merely by naming or categorizing. The question of the ontological status of the names or categories that are used to describe the meaning and function of an aspectual form is generally sidestepped, and often the mere act of labelling comes to be perceived as an adequate explanation for the phenomenon. While reading literature on aspect, I am occasionally reminded of an anecdote told by William James in his book Pragmatism (James 1890: Lecture VII):

> At a surgical operation I heard a bystander ask a doctor why the patient breathed so deeply. "Because ether is a respiratory stimulant," the doctor answered. "Ah!" said the questioner, as if relieved by the explanation. But this is like saying that cyanide of potassium kills because it is a "poison," or that it is so cold tonight because it is "winter," or that we have five fingers because we are "pentadactyls." These are but names for the facts, taken from the facts, and then treated as previous and explanatory.

Likewise, merely saying that a past-tense imperfective verb in Russian is used in a given context because it exemplifies the "general-factual meaning of the imperfective" does not provide an explanation of why the Russian imperfective can, in fact, be used there. Nor does labelling a morphological form "iterative" and then defining its meaning simply as [+ iterative, - actual] represent an adequate attempt to explain either the meaning of the morphological form or, for that matter, the label "iterative" itself.

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[5] Note also this statement from Bybee et al (1994: 1): "We do not take the structuralist position that each language represents a tidy system in which units are defined by the oppositions they enter into and the object of study is the internal system the units are supposed to create. Rather, we consider it more profitable to view languages as composed of substance — both semantic substance and phonetic substance. Structure or system, the traditional focus of linguistic inquiry, is the product of, rather than the creator or, substance. Substance is potentially universal, but languages differ as to how it is shaped because it is constantly undergoing change as language is used."

In the present study, I make use of work in semiotics of language and cognitive linguistics to avoid the pitfalls inherent in the traditional feature-based framework and to go beyond traditional approaches to aspect in an attempt to avoid analysis with ad hoc labels.[6] Roman Jakobson (1965) was the first linguist to apply the semiotic categories of the American scientist and philosopher Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) to the study of language; this line of research has been pursued by, among others, M.Shapiro (1969, 1980, 1983, 1990, 1991), H. Andersen (1973, 1979, 1986, 1991), and R. Anttilla (1977a, 1978, 1989, 1991). Work in the cognitive tradition that I use in this study includes Langacker 1987 and 1990, Lakoff 1987, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Fauconnier 1985 and 1997, and Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996.[7] Research in both these lines is productive, and the frameworks are largely compatible.[8]

It is a guiding principle of both a semiotic and cognitive linguistics that language does not represent an autonomous conceptual system but is related to other forms of human cognition, and that it therefore cannot be adequately described without reference to extra-linguistic conceptual structures. Wallace, for example, criticizes linguists who analyze linguistic categories by hypothesizing abstract semantic features because they tend to do so "without attempting to achieve some broader perspective on how the posited semantic components or contrasts fit into an overall view of human behavior and cognition" (Wallace 1982: 201). Just as context is necessary to meaning in communication, so a broad understanding of human experience is necessary to linguistics. How we perceive the world and how we understand it is reflected in the way in which we think and talk about it, that is, in our use of language and in the structure of language itself. Experience seems particularly relevant to the study of a habitual-iterative gram since, as cross-linguistic research has shown, many grammaticalized habitual morphemes have lexical sources which profile life experience: for example, "living," "knowing," and "being accustomed to" (Bybee et al. 1994: 160).

The thrust of this study is on "re-cognizing" the semantics of the habitual-iterative gram in Czech. The various meanings and forms of behavior associated with the verb form will be shown, in the spirit of language construed as a semiotic and cognitive system, to be coherently related to each other given what is involved in the conceptualization of a habit. I will argue that the linguistic expression of habituality can be productively viewed as a token of a larger type of cognitive evaluation that can be termed "habitual." Habitual evaluation, which operates pre- and extra-linguistically, provides a cognitively plausible mechanism for understanding the meaning of the Czech verb form and its use in specific discourse contexts. Indeed, without relying on habit as a mediating representation, it is impossible to motivate the full range of meanings associated with the verb form or to capture the mechanism behind the semantic

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[6] Bybee's work is carried out in a functionalist/cognitive framework.

[7] See Laura Janda's thorough bibliography of research on Slavic cognitive linguistics (as of 2000) at <http://www.indiana.edu/~slavconf/SLING2K/pospapers/janda.pdf>. Janda's article also as an introduction to cognitive linguistics with Slavic linguists specifically in mind.

[8] There is, however, little cross-fertilization between the fields. Danaher 1998 explores this compatibility in terms of approaches to metaphor. Other articles that explicitly treat both approaches include Haley 1999 and Janda 1999.

"elasticity" of the verb that becomes evident upon close examination of the contexts in the corpus.

Division of chapters

The study is divided into 6 chapters. Chapter 1 presents an overview of the corpus (method and data). Chapter 2 surveys previous scholarly treatments of the semantics of Czech habitual-iterative verbs and briefly critiques them based on the data in the corpus; it is shown that analyses of the meaning of the Czech habitual-iterative gram have tended to focus less on abstract features and more on habit as a conceptual structure, and it is this line of research that will be carried to its logical endpoint here. Chapter 3 outlines a semiotic and cognitive approach to the linguistic expression of habitual iteration and tests the validity of this approach on a portion of the data. Grounded in the framework proposed in chapter 3, chapter 4 clarifies the status of the distant-past meaning associated with morphologically past instances of habitual-iterative verbs and discusses conceptual distancing in both its temporal and metaphorical realizations. Chapter 5, which makes use of the notion of conceptual distancing outlined in chapter 4 along with Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces, provides a unifying account of the verb form's discourse functions. Chapter 6 proposes a typology of iteration that is then used — along with the analytic tools introduced in the previous chapters — to treat a series of other questions raised both in the previous literature on Czech iterative verbs as well as by the data in the corpus.

Note on terminology

As noted above, Czech habitual-iterative verbs have been discussed under various names. In this study, I refer to them most often as "habitual" verbs, a decision I defend and qualify somewhat in chapter 1.

Chapter 1

An Overview of the Corpus

A general description of the corpus

The analysis I present in this study is based on a corpus. Throughout the study, I demonstrate why analysis of a corpus of examples taken from actual discourse is essential to making sense of the semantics of habitual verbs in Czech. Most previous studies of the semantics of this verb form (see chapter 2) have reached conclusions based solely on invented examples that were evaluated by the researchers themselves (as native speakers of Czech) and/or borrowed from other studies using the same methodology.[9] In a corpus-based study, the data guide the analysis: the full range of meanings associated with the verb form, as well as the relative value of each of those contextualized meanings, can be determined, and usage of the form can be examined in actual contexts at various levels of language, including the discourse-level, and not merely in isolated, intuited sentences that provide little information — or skewed information — about the verb form's function. The analysis presented here is not theory-driven, but data-driven: certain theoretical frameworks were chosen on the basis of their ability to account adequately for the range of meanings found to be associated with the verb form in the contexts in the corpus.

The examples used in this study are drawn from a corpus of 376 habitual verbs gleaned from sources in contemporary literary Czech. The sources represent a spectrum of genres: essays (Havel 1989b, 1990a, and 1990b; Škvorecký 1988), fiction (Bělohradská 1992, Čapek 2000, Jirotka 1964 and 1999, Kundera 1967, Rybakov 1987), memoirs (Čapek 1990a), journalistic prose (including *Lidové noviny*, *Mladá Fronta Dnes*, and *Respekt*), and scholarly writing (Hraba et al 1999 and others).[10]

This chapter presents an overview of the data. It sets the stage for the survey of relevant literature in chapter 2 by anticipating certain issues of theoretical importance and by giving a sense, which only contextualized data can provide, of the range of meanings associated with the verb form. Since previous studies of the semantics of the verb form have been radically decontextualized, it is worthwhile to emphasize contextual analysis at the start.

The data are presented in tables and through a minimal number of examples taken from the corpus. References to detailed analyses in later chapters that treat individual questions raised by the data are also provided.

Distribution of the data by tense and mood

[9] Širokova's work (1963 and 1965) is an exception to the extent that it is based on a large corpus drawn from nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature. See chapter 2.
[10] Rybakov 1987 is a translation into Czech from Russian.

The 376 examples in my corpus can be divided into morphologically present, morphologically past, and infinitival forms:

Table 1: Tense/mood distribution

Tense/mood	Occurrences	Percentage of examples
Past	241	64.1%
Present	129	34.3%
Infinitive	6	1.6%

No morphologically future or imperative examples were found, although, at least according to Czech grammars, they are theoretically possible. Since infinitival forms represent only a very small part of the total corpus, they will be ignored in this study.

By analyzing the discourse contexts in which the 241 morphologically past examples occur, they can be subdivided into situations that held in a distant or remote past, situations that are ambiguous with regard to a distant-past reading, and situations that can be said to have held in a more or less recent past. These data will be used to establish an empirical basis (the first attempt to do so) for a discussion of the distant-past meaning often associated with this verb form. Table 2 indicates that while a majority of morphologically past uses of the verb refer explicitly to a distant past, more than one-third of all examples do not explicitly report a distant past and almost 10% seem to refer to a situation that held in a recent past.

Table 2: Degrees of pastness

Status of reading	Occurrences	Percentage of examples
Distant past explicit	127	52.7%
Distant past not explicit	91	37.8%
Recent past	23	9.5%

This division is almost entirely subjective, a point that will be taken up in detail in chapters 2 and 4. A few examples of each category will suffice as illustrations.

An explicit distant-past reading follows from the larger discourse context. A typical case would be an adult speaker reminiscing about his or her childhood. Sometimes a distant-past reading is signalled by the presence of the adverbial *kdysi* or *kdysi dávno* ("once long ago"); this is true of 10 of the distant-past examples in the corpus. Typical distant-past contexts are represented by the following (habitual verbs and their translations are in bold print):

(1) Navrhl, abychom odešli; abychom se dali polní cestou oklikou k městu, tak jak jsme kdysi **chodívali**, kdysi dávno. (Kundera 1967: 309)
(1) "He suggested we leave, take a path to town through the fields, the way we **used to go** long ago." (Kundera 1982: 264)

(2) Tak co bych vám měl říci? Jako student jsem **hrával** kulečník a hrál jsem jej velmi špatně. (Jirotka 1999: 205).
(2) "What can I say? When I was a student, I **used to play** pool, and I played it very poorly."[11]

In the first example, the distant-past reading of the habitual form *chodívat* (< *chodit* "to go") is made explicit by the phrase *kdysi dávno* (" a long time ago"). In (2), the speaker is reminiscing about his days as a student some 20 years before the moment of speech (*hrávat* < *hrát* "to play").

Examples that do not refer explicitly to a distant past include the following:

(3) Lidstvo ještě nezapomnělo na světovou válku, která zmařila deset miliónů životů. Napadení Sovětského svazu? Copak by to světová dělnická třída dopustila? A Rusko je dnes jiné, než **bývalo**. Magnitka a Kuzněck vyrábějí železo, ve Stalingradě a Charkově zahájily provoz továrny na traktory. (Rybakov 1987: 35)
(3) "Mankind still hasn't forgotten the World War that wiped out ten million lives. An attack on the Soviet Union? Would the working class of the world allow that? And Russia today is different than it **used to be**. Magnitka and Kuznetsk produce iron. Stalingrad and Kharkov have begun production of tractors."

(4) Byla to moje první hra, která byla napsána v době zakázanosti, kterou jsem tedy nejen nemohl vidět na českém jevišti, ale kterou jsem si hlavně na něm nemohl prověřit, respektive ji v průběhu zkoušek dotvořit, jak jsem to **dělával** u her dřívějších. A tak jsem neměl onu základní kontrolu, na niž jsem byl zvyklý. (Havel 1990b: 235)
(4) "It was the first play written since I was banned, the first play that I not only could not see performed on the Czech stage, but also that I could not check there or rather put the finishing touches on during rehearsals like I **used to do** with earlier plays. And so I didn't have the crucial element of control that I had been used to."

In (3), the narration takes place shortly before World War II. Russia is characterized as different than it used to be (*bývalo* < *být* "to be") at a previous time, presumably before industrial modernization, but the temporal reference cannot be termed explicitly distant past. In (4), with a form of the habitual verb *dělávat* (< *dělat* "to do"), the time period separating Havel's earlier plays from his first play after being banned cannot be more than five years, which can hardly be termed objectively distant.

The fact that morphologically past habitual verbs in Czech can also be used, although considerably less frequently, to report a more or less recent past has yet to be

[11] Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine. In addition, some of the attributed translations have been modified to elucidate the questions under discussion here.

noted in the scholarly literature.[12] Recent-past contexts in my corpus include the following:

(5) 'Přijde toho vždycky hodně najednou,' řekla a vyfoukla neobratně kouř nosem. 'Táta má infarkt.'

'Infarkt?'

'Prý malý, daří se mu celkem slušně. Ale na mě je toho moc. **Bývala** jsem zvyklá, že rozhodoval všechno za mě, nikdy jsem se nemusela o nic starat, a teď...' (Bělohradská 1992: 86)

(5) "'Everything always happens at once," she said and awkwardly blew smoke out of her nose. "My father has had a heart attack.'

'A heart attack?'

'Apparently a small one, he's doing okay. But it's too much for me. I **had been** used to him deciding everything for me. I never had to worry about anything. But now...'"

(6) 'Teď jsem na jeho místě a všechno leží na mně. Zvykám si na to velmi pomalu (trvalo to měsíc, než jsem se jen osmělil usednout na židli v čele stolu, kde **sedával**).' (*Lidové noviny*)

(6) "'Now I'm in his place and everything is in my lap. I'm slowly becoming accustomed to it (it took me a month before I even dared to sit in the chair at the desk where he **used to sit**).'"

Example (5) reports that a daughter has lost the support of her father since his heart attack, and the heart attack occurs explicitly in the recent past: note the use of the present tense form *má* (< *mít* "to have") to make the incident especially vivid. In example (6), which is taken from a newspaper interview with the new head of the Russian Orthodox church in the Czech Republic, the period of time when his predecessor "would sit" (*sedávat* < *sedět* "to sit") in the chair came to end, due to his predecessor's death, slightly more than a month prior to the statement.

The distribution of the data in the corpus both by tense and degree of temporal remoteness will prove important in chapter 2 when previous studies of the semantics of Czech habitual verbs are reviewed and again in chapter 4, which presents a new explanation for the tendency of these verbs to express a distant past without considering this tendency absolute.

Quantified and non-quantified contexts

Kučera (1980, 1981, and 1983) and Filip (1993 and 1994) have made clear that verbs of this type generally report quantification over one or more elements in the sentence (a plural subject, the predicate verb, a temporal adverbial, an adverbial clause,

[12] Writing on the use of iterative verbs in nineteenth-century Russian, Ivanchikova notes that, although they prototypically express a distant past, a recent-past meaning is possible in certain contexts (Ivanchikova 1957: 264).

and possibly a plural object). In their analyses, both Kučera and Filip focus on contexts in which the verb cannot be said to report quantification (as in examples (3) and (5) here). Analysis of the corpus provides a clear picture of the relative functional value of quantified and non-quantified usage.

Table 3: Distribution of quantified and non-quantified contexts

Status	Occurrences	Percentage of examples
Quantified	338	89.9%
Non-quantified	38	10.1%

Non-quantified contexts are atypical in the corpus, representing only a small number of all examples. As Kučera and Filip note, all non-quantified contexts are in the past. The significance of this distribution is discussed in chapters 2 and 4, and an explanation of the non-quantified contexts is presented in chapter 6.

Distribution by type of quantification

Analysis of the corpus also allows for a determination of the types of quantification that typically occur (non-quantified contexts are not relevant for this distribution):

Table 4: Distribution by type of quantification

Type	Occurrences	Percentage of examples
Predicate quantification	261	77.2%
Temporal adverbial quantification	64	18.9%
Plural subject quantification	31	9.2%
Plural object quantification	4	1.2%
Clausal quantification	2	0.6%
Quantification over 2 elements	24	7.1%

The distribution reflects the predominance of habitual statements (which favor quantification over the predicate) over generic statements (which favor quantification over the subject).[13] The percentages total more than 100% because of the existence of contexts where quantification can be posited over more than one element of the sentence, as in (7):

[13] For an explanation of these terms, see Table 7 below.

(7) Ve Vídni jsem četl Vrchlického a jiné, ale nejvíc se mi líbil Mácha. V Akademickém spolku **bývaly občas literární besedy**, ale to nestačilo. Více mě literárně nabádalo obcování s rodinou profesora Šembery. (Čapek 1990a: 93)
(7) In Vienna I read Vrchlický and some other poets, but my favorite of them all was Mácha. In the academic club there **were literary gatherings from time to time**, but that was not enough. A more stimulating influence came from my association with the family of Professor Šembera. (Čapek 1934: 131)

In this example, quantification can be assumed either over the plural subject (there were literary (*literární*) and other kinds of gatherings (*besedy*) at the club) or over the temporal adverbial *občas* (literary gatherings were held "from time to time"). In no case in the corpus does dual quantification seem to result in ambiguity of meaning.

Typical contexts exhibiting quantification over a plural subject, a temporal adverbial, a plural object, and a clause are the following:

(8) Já jsem vypozoroval, že **americké děti mívají** k učitelům a učitelkám daleko kamarádštější poměr než u nás — a že Američané po celý život rádi vzpomínají na své učitele a na školy. (Čapek 1990a: 19)
(8) "I noticed that American children are on terms of greater camaraderie with their teachers, both male and female, than the children here — and that all their lives Americans retain pleasant memories of their teachers and schools." (Čapek 1934: 25)

(9) Minulý týden ležel doma s chřipkou každý padesátý český občan. Lékaři upozornili veřejnost, že se jedná o počínající epidemie. Podle statistiky ministerstva zdravotnictví však letošní situace není horší než loni. Chřipka překvapila pouze tím, že přišla tak pozdě: **někdy bývá** už o vánocích. (*Respekt*)
(9) "Last week one out of every fifty citizens of the Czech Republic stayed home in bed with the flu. Doctors advised the public that it looks like the start of an epidemic. However, according to statistics provided by the Ministry of Health, this year's situation is no worse than last year's. This year's flu has been surprising only in its late arrival: **sometimes** it **is** already here at Christmas."

(10) Mně jako dlouholetému privátnímu učiteli se brzy vnucoval problém onannie u hochů. Zvěděl jsem o této chlapecké neřesti na reálce a pak na gymnáziu a brzy jsem **míval žáky**, některé až chorobně oddané tomu zlu. (Čapek 1990a: 58)
(10) "As a private tutor of many years I soon came into contact with the problem of self-abuse among boys. I got to know of this boyish vice at the school [in Hustopeč] and later at the high school, where **some of my pupils** had made such a habit of it that they were really ill." (Čapek 1934: 85).

(11) Mám sbalený jakýsi "pohotovostní balíček", v němž jsou cigarety, kartáček na zuby, pasta, mýdlo, nějaké knihy, trička, papír, a ještě pár dalších drobností, už si přesně nevzpomínám, co jsem tak ještě dal. Ten balíček mám stále u sebe, přesněji řečeno, **mívám ho s sebou, když opouštím dům**. (Havel 1990b: 225)
(11) "I have a kind of "ready-bag" packed up, that contains cigarettes, a toothbrush, toothpaste, soap, some books, t-shirts, paper, and a few other small things — I don't

recall precisely what I put in there. I constantly have this bag with me, or more precisely, I **[tend to] have it with me when I leave the house**."

In (8), the habitual phrase *mívají nějaký poměr* (< *mít nějaký poměr* "to have a certain relation to, be on certain terms with") triggers quantification over the plural subject "American children": Masaryk asserts that not all children in America are on friendly terms with their teachers, but that many are. In (9) quantification occurs over the temporal adverbial *někdy* ("sometimes"). In (10), Masaryk recalls having had pupils (*mívat žáky* < *mít* "to have"), some of whom were inveterate onanists: quantification occurs here over the plural object *žáky* ("pupils") since some, but not all, of them exhibited this so-called sickness. This is made clear by the English translation, which makes the pupils the subject of the sentence and qualifies the subject with the quantifier "some." Finally, in (11), quantification occurs over the clause *když opouštím dům* ("when I leave the house"): Havel takes the bag with him when he is not home, but probably not on every trip. Note that Havel's self-correction (he corrects *mám stále* to *mívám*) reinforces this interpretation.[14]

Despite the fact that the notion of quantification has been a major focus of the literature on the semantics of this verb (see chapter 2), the type of quantification exhibited by the verb does not play a signficant role in a general account of the verb's semantics. It is enough to concur with Langacker (see below) that the various contexts all fall under the rubric of "general validity predications" and to assume that, in typical usage, quantification will be present over some element of the sentence.

Specifications of Frequency of Iteration

Another significant theme in the literature on Czech verbs of this type has been the kind of iterativity they express. As noted in the Introduction, these verbs have been said to express regular, irregular, sporadic, and indeterminate iteration. I will discuss this issue more specifically in chapter 2. It is worthwhile to note here that the great majority of examples in the corpus do not explicitly specify any degree of iteration (no frequency adverbial modifies the verb): in other words, the exact degree of iteration associated with a verb is derived solely from the larger pragmatic context.

Table 5: Specification of frequency of iteration[15]

Status	Occurrences	Percentage of Examples
Explicit specification of frequency	79	23.4%

[14] When questioned about this example, one native informant noted that the habitual form *mívat* in combination with the following clause reports that "sometimes he had the bag, sometimes he didn't because sometimes he would forget it at home" whereas *mám stále u sebe* ("I constantly have it on me") means unequivocally that he takes it with him every time he leaves.

[15] Non-quantified contexts are not relevant here.

No explicit specification of frequency	259	76.6%

In the quantified examples already introduced, only (7) and (9) specify, somewhat vaguely, the degree of iteration. This vagueness of frequency specification is an issue discussed in chapter 3.

Explicitly specified degrees of iteration

The 79 quantified contexts in which a degree of iteration is explicitly specified exhibit the full range of frequency adverbials, from *vždycky* ("always") to *nikdy* ("never"). The specifications include one overtly spatial adverbial phrase (*tu a tam*) that is used in a temporal sense.

Table 6: Explicit specification of frequency

Frequency Adverbial	Occurrences	Percentage of Examples
často ("often")	11	13.9%
denně ("daily")	1	1.3%
každý den ("every day")	1	1.3%
každý rok ("every year")	2	2.5%
každý víkend ("every weekend")	1	1.3%
málokdy ("rarely")	2	2.5%
někdy ("sometimes")	11	13.9%
nikdy ("never")	1	1.3%
občas ("from time to time")	12	15.2%
obyvkle ("usually")	6	7.6%
pravidelně ("regularly")	1	1.3%
téměř vždy ("almost always")	1	1.3%
tolikrát ("so many times")	1	1.3%
tu a tam ("here and there")	1	1.3%
týdně ("weekly")	1	1.3%
většinou ("for the most part")	1	1.3%
vzácně ("rarely")	1	1.3%

vždy ("always")	14	17.7%
vždycky ("always")	9	11.4%
zpravidla ("as a rule")	1	1.3%

Filip (1993: 133 and 1994: 161) has claimed that Czech verbs of this type cannot combine with adverbs like *vždycky* ("always") that report absolute quantification, and yet the adverbs *vždycky*, *vždy*, and *nikdy* comprise almost a third (30.4%) of all examples in the corpus that explicitly specify frequency. These examples include the following:

(12) Mládež ve Vídni se zabývala Hebblem — já jsem **vždycky býval** skeptický k takovým módním proudům. (Čapek 1990a: 57)
(12) "Viennese youth were all reading Hebbel — I **was always** sceptical about these fashionable influences. (Čapek 1934: 82)

(13) Teď si nejsem jistý, kde se píší velká a kde malá písmena. Nedávno totiž nějací chytráci změnili český pravopis a mně teď není nic platné, že jsem **vždycky míval** z češtiny výborné známky.[16]
(13) "Now I'm unsure where to write capital and where to write lower-case letters. Recently some smart-alecks changed Czech spelling and now the fact that I **always used to get** excellent grades in Czech no longer means anything."

An explanation for the seemingly puzzling combination of specifications of absolute quantification with a verb form that inherently reports non-absolute quantification is provided in chapter 3.

Generics and Habituals

Langacker has noted that there is a continuum between expressions of habituality proper and genericity proper, and he argues that both habitual and generic statements can be productively analyzed together, at least in English, under the class of "general validity predications" (see Langacker 1996 and 1997). Data in my corpus confirm this argument for Czech by providing examples of prototypical generic statements, prototypical statements of habit, and instances of generic/habitual blending. Following Langacker, I classify generalizations over a whole class of entities as generic, attributions of customary actions to individual entities as habitual, and cases where limited generic classes are ascribed habitual attributes (or one entity in a generic class is ascribed a habitual attribute and serves to stand for the whole class) as illustrations of blending. The resultant distribution in the corpus is as follows:

Table 7: Generics, habituals, and generic/habitual blends[17]

[16] A handful of examples in the corpus, including this one, were gleaned from personal communications.

Classification	Occurrences	Percentage of Examples
Generic proper	79	23.4%
Habitual proper	240	71%
Blended context	19	5.6%

Example (14) is prototypically generic, (15) illustrates habituality proper, and (16) is a blended context.

(14) Západní návštěvníci **bývají** šokováni, že Černobyl a AIDS tu nejsou zdrojem hrůzy, ale námětem vtipů. (Havel 1989b: 118)
(14) "Western visitors **are** shocked that Chernobyl and AIDS are not sources of terror here, but the subject matter of jokes."

(15) 'Jaké **míváte** sny?'
'Většinou dobře. Zvykl jsem si na zdejší vzduch — nemůžu spát v Praze, když tam přijedu.' (Havel 1990b: 248)
(15) "'What kind of dreams do you **have**?"
"'For the most part, good ones. I've gotten used to the air here — I can't sleep in Prague when I go there.'"

(16) Člověk **se** k stáru **měnívá**. (Čapek 2000: 290)
(16) "A man **changes** as he grows old."

In example (14), the verb *bývat* (< *být* "to be") implies that a quantified portion of the whole generic class of Western visitors is shocked. In (15), which is excerpted from an interview, the form of the verb *mívat* (< *mít* "to have") queries the dreaming behavior of a single subject (Havel), which illustrates the class of habitual statements proper. Example (16) is a blended predication that describes a generic class (people) by metonymically profiling the change (*měnívat se* < *měnit se* "to change") of a typical entity in the class (one person stands potentially for everyone).

Since approximately 71% of the examples in the corpus represent habitual statements proper, it is reasonable to refer to Czech verbs of this type as "habitual" verbs. However, two points should be kept in mind, however. First, Czech verbs of this type denote "general validity predications" and that all three predicational types are amenable to the same analysis. Second, Czech habitual verbs do not and cannot report habituality that is completely regular. For example, the sentence "She is a (habitual) smoker" cannot be expressed in Czech by the habitual form *kouřívá* (< *kouřit* "to smoke): the habitual verb here implies occasional and non-regular smoking because, as will become clear, use of the habitual form in Czech explicitly allows for the possibility of counterexamples to

[17]Non-quantified contexts are not relevant for the generic/habitual distribution. In practice, exact distinctions between generic and habitual statements are difficult to make, which is further evidence favoring Langacker's proposal for a unified analysis.

the proposition. For details on these points, see the discussions of Filip in chapter 2, Langacker in chapter 3, and chapter 6.

Contexts under negation

Negated contexts provide interesting evidence for the argument that habitual verbs cannot report absolute quantification. No previous study has considered contexts under negation, which is probably due to the fact that they are atypical and thus not the contexts that immediately present themselves to native-speaker intuition. Note example (17) below Table 8.

Table 8: Distribution of contexts under negation

Status	Occurrences	Percentage of Examples
Not negated	353	93.9%
Negated	23	6.1%

(17) **Nebývá** mým zvykem polemizovat s těmi čtenáři, kteří nesouhlasí s tím, co píši. Mají samozřejmě na to právo, nejednou mají i pravdu. Jestliže dnes činím výjimku, pak je to ze dvou důvodů... (*Lidové noviny*)
(17) "It **is not** my habit to polemicize with those readers who do not agree with what I write. They of course have the right to do so and more than once they have even right in doing so. If, however, I make an exception today, I do so for two reasons..."

The significance of negated contexts for my analysis is discussed in chapter 3.

Distribution by verb

Not all unprefixed imperfective verbs can serve as bases for derived habitual forms. As Filip (1994: 163ff) has noted, only verbs capable of expressing a contingent or temporary state are amenable to habitual formation. In practice, and as evidenced in the corpus, the range of imperfective simplex forms with derived habituals is rather small and largley limited to certain semantic and pragmatic classes.

Table 9: Distribution by verb

Verb	Occurrences	Percentage of Examples
bavívat se (< *bavit se* "to be amused")	1	0.3%
běhávat (< *běhat* "to run")	1	0.3%
bývat (< *být* "to be")	139	37.1%
čekávat (< *čekat* "to wait")	1	0.3%
čítat (< *číst* "to read")[18]	1	0.3%
dělávat (< *dělat* "to do")	6	1.6%
hájívat (< *hájit* "to defend")	1	0.3%
hladívat (< *hladit* "to caress")	1	0.3%
hrávat (< *hrát* "to play")	17	4.5%
chodívat (< *chodit* "to go by foot")	23	6.1%
jezdívat (< *jezdit* "to go by vehicle")	11	2.9%
jídat/jídávat (< *jíst* "to eat")	3	0.8%
končívat (< *končit* "to end")	3	0.8%
kouřívat (< *kouřit* "to smoke")	1	0.3%
léhávat (< *ležet* "to lie [position]")	1	0.3%
měnívat se (< *měnit se* "to change")	1	0.3%
mívat (< *mít* "to have")	67	17.8%
mluvívat [se] (< *mluvit* "to speak")[19]	2	0.5%
myslívat [se] (< *myslit* "to think")	4	1.1%
nosívat [se] (< *nosit* "to carry, wear")	2	0.5%
páchávat (< *páchat* "to commit")	1	0.3%
patřívat (< *patřit* "to belong")	1	0.3%
pívat (< *pít* "to drink")	2	0.5%
platívat (< *platit* "to pay")	1	0.3%

[18] Some verbs exhibit exceptional habitual forms without the -*va*- suffix. In my corpus, the following exceptional forms occurred: *čítat* < *číst* "to read", *jídat* < *jíst* "to eat", *sedat* < *sedět* "to sit", *slýchat* < *slyšet* "to hear", *vídat* < *vidět* "to see". Other possible forms include *léhat* < *ležet* "to lie [position]". Most irregular forms have regular doublets with no change in meaning: *čítat*/*čítávat*, *jídat*/*jídávat*, *sedat*/*sedávat*, *slýchat*/*slýchávat*, *vídat*/*vídávat*, *léhat*/*léhávat*. See chapter 6 for a discussion of the doublet-forms.

[19] The [*se*] indicates that the verb occurred in both reflexive/passive and non-reflexive forms. Verbs with *se* (not in brackets) occurred only with the reflexive particle.

psávat [se] (< *psát* "to write")	10	2.7%
ptávat se (< *ptát se* "to ask a question")	1	0.3%
radívat (< *radit* "to give advice")	1	0.3%
recitovávat (< *recitovat* "to recite")	1	0.3%
říkávat [se] (< *říkat* "to say, tell")	12	3.2%
sedat/sedávat (< *sedět* "to sit")	16	4.3%
sledovávat (< *sledovat* "to follow")	1	0.3%
slýchat/slýchávat (< *slyšet* "to hear")	3	0.8%
snívat (< *snít* "to dream")	1	0.3%
spávat (< *spát* "to sleep")	9	2.4%
střílívat (< *střílet* "to shoot")	1	0.3%
tápávat (< *tápat* "to grope one's way")	1	0.3%
trpívat (< *trpět* "to suffer")	2	0.5%
tvořívat (< *tvořit* "to create")	1	0.3%
vařívat (< *vařit* "to cook")	1	0.3%
večeřívat (< *večeřet* "to eat dinner")	1	0.3%
věřivat (< *věřit* "to believe")	1	0.3%
vídat/vídávat [se] (< *vidět* "to see")	17	4.5%
volávat (< volat "to call")	1	0.3%
vracívat se (< vracet se "to return")	2	0.5%
zlobívat se (< zlobit se "to get angry")	1	0.3%
znávat (< znát "to know")	1	0.3%

It is interesting to note that slightly over 80% of all verbs found in the corpus fall into one of three semantic/pragmatic verbal classes: verbs of existence/possession ('to be" and "to have"), verbs of speaking/thinking/communicating, and verbs of sensory perception ("to see" and "to hear").[20] The potential significance of this distribution for the semantics of Czech habitual verbs will not be pursued here.

It is also interesting to compare the inventory of verbs in the corpus with the standard habitual forms as listed in the1998 *Slovník spisovné češtiny* (SSČ). The SSČ is conservative in its listing of standard habitual forms, citing common habitual formations from only 13 imperfective simplex verbs (as compared to 46 formations found in the

[20] Širokova (1963: 74-5) has also noted that these verbal classes productively yield habitual forms.

corpus). Of these 13 verbs, 11 overlap with verbs in the corpus: *běhávat*, *bývat*, *čekávat*, *hrávat*, *chodívat*, *jídat*, *léhat*, *mívat [se]*, *říkávat*, *sedat*, and *vídat*. 3 verbs are listed in the SSČ, as in the corpus, as having regular doublet forms: *léhat/léhávat*, *sedat/sedávat*, and *vídat/vídávat*; the SSČ does not acknowledge the *jídat/jídávat* doublet. 2 verbs are claimed to have regular formations with a reduplicated *-va-* formant: *bývat/bývávat* and *chodívat/chodívávat*; no reduplicated forms occurred in the corpus, which is probably due to the fact that the corpus is limited to literary Czech. The 2 verbs cited in the SSČ that are not found in the corpus are: *scházívat se < scházet se* "to get together" and *zvedávat (zdvihávat/zdvíhávat) < zvedat (zdvihat/zdvíhat)* "to raise".[21] Although the stated goal of the SSČ is not to provide a comprehensive description of the contemporary Czech lexicon that includes all possible grammatical derivations, data from the corpus indicate that at least some habitual formations merit adding to the list of standard occurrences: for example, *dělávat*, *jezdívat*, *mluvívat [se]*, *myslívat [se]*, *psávat [se]*, *říkávat [se]*, and *slýchat/slýchývat*.[22]

Summary

The data presented in this chapter will serve as the basis for the analyses of individual questions of the semantics of Czech habituals that follow in the remainder of the book. In chapter 2, the prominent literature on the topic will be reviewed and the conclusions reached in the literature reexamined in light of the distribution of data in the corpus (Tables 1-6). Chapter 3 presents a new analysis of quantification and iteration along with a discussion of negative contexts and absolute quantifiers (Table 3 and Tables 5-8). Chapter 4 is devoted to the distant past meaning strongly associated with the verb (Tables 1 and 2). Chapter 5 treats the discourse function of the habitual forms, and chapter 6 examines a range of other meanings associated with use of the verbs in certain contexts (data for these chapters will be discussed in the chapters themselves).

[21] The different possibilities for *zvedat < zvedávat* encompass a range of acknowledged variants.

[22] I do not include *spávat* here, despite its relatively high frequency, since most examples of this verb occurred in only one of the sources.

Chapter 2

The Scholarly Context: Kopečný, Širokova, Kučera, and Filip

Goals of the chapter

This chapter examines the most signficant scholarly treatments of the semantics of Czech habitual verbs in light of the data presented in chapter 1. The discussion here establishes how analysis of the corpus points to weaknesses in previous work and suggests new directions of thought that serve as background for the analytic framework to be presented in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Specific attention is paid to the degree of iteration the verbs express (Tables 5 and 6), the status of non-quantified contexts and other issues related to quantification (Tables 3 and 4), and the status of the distant-past meaning in past-tense usage (Tables 1 and 2). The work of four scholars is considered: František Kopečný, A. G. Širokova, Henry Kučera, and Hana Filip.

Kopečný's traditional analysis

František Kopečný, in his work *Slovesný vid v češtině* (1962) as well as in a series of later articles polemicizing on Czech aspect with Ivan Poldauf, put forth what could be viewed as the standard analysis of habitual verbs in the Czech linguistic tradition.[23] Kopečný claimed the existence of two basic aspectual oppositions in Czech: the primary (*základní*) opposition perfective/imperfective and the opposition imperfective/non-actual iterative (*neaktuální násobenost*) (Kopečný 1962). Imperfective simplex forms like *říkat* ("to say"), *dělat* ("to do"), and *nosit* ("to carry") differ from their corresponding iterative forms *říkávat*, *dělávat*, and *nosívat* in that the latter are marked for the features of iterativity (*násobenost*) and non-actuality (*neaktuálnost*). Whereas simple imperfectives can express iterativity, as in *Každý den ti to* ***říkám*** *několikrát* ("Every day I **tell** you this several times"), and non-actuality, as in *Pavel pořád* ***kouří*** ("Paul **smokes** constantly"), verbs of the *říkávat* type must express both features simultaneously.

What, according, to Kopečný, is non-actuality? A verb marked for non-actuality cannot be used to answer the question *Co to tu děláš?* ("What are you doing right now?") (1948: 153, 1962: 15). That is, one could respond with an imperfective form, like *psát* "to write": *Zrovna teď* ***píšu*** *dopis* ("Right now I **am writing** a letter"), but not with a non-actual iterative, like the verb *psávat* (< *psát*): **Zrovna teď* ***psávám*** *dopis.* The situation reported by a non-actual iterative form does not and cannot consist of one specific action (at time-zero or another point in time), although it presupposes the existence (real or believed) of a succession of such actions. Kopečný offers up the following story in his argument for the feature of non-actuality:

[23] See also Kopečný 1948, 1965, and 1966. For Poldauf's contribution to the polemic, see Poldauf 1949, 1964, 1966a, and 1966b.

> Once on a train I pointed out a meadow along the Morava river to a little boy with the words "Cows graze [*pasou se* < *pást se* "to graze", imperfective simplex] there." At his objection that there weren't any cows there, his mother answered: "They do graze [*pásávají se* < *pásávat se* "to graze", iterative form] there, but now they aren't there." (Kopečný 1948: 152)

Non-actuality is therefore "the impossibility of using a present form of such a verb to indicate an action that is in the process of occurring" (Kopečný 1966: 259) or "the inability of the iteratives of the *dělávat* class to express an actual present meaning" (Kopečný 1965: 24).[24]

Kopečný's analysis represents a bottom-up, feature-based approach that necessarily and sufficiently defines the semantics of these verbs in terms of two abstract features, non-actuality and iterativity. The problem with this kind of analysis is not that it is, at least from a certain perspective, incorrect, but that it is ultimately rather uninformative and cannot be extended to motivate the range of meanings exhibited by the verb form it attempts to define. Difficulties already arise in trying to account for exactly what kind of iteration non-actual iterative verbs express. Širokova, for example, has found inconsistencies in Kopečný's own judgements on the degree of iteration expressed by iterative verbs, nor are other scholars always consistent on this point (Širokova 1965: 75). According to Kopečný, "*psávat* is distinguished from *psát* in that we can render *psávat* as "to write [*psát*] often" or sometimes as "to be in the habit of writing [*psát*]", [and] *chodívá (do kina)* ["to go (to the movies]"), compared to *chodí*, expresses a nuance of an irregular action that repeats from time to time" (Širokova 1965, 75). Such varying degrees of iteration ("often" versus "irregular" iteration) do not in any way follow from Kopečný's definition based on the features of iterativity and non-actuality.

In other words, Kopečný's feature analysis does not explain or motivate the corpus data captured in Tables 5 (Specification of frequency of iteration) and 6 (Explicit specification of frequency). Why do some verbs co-occur with the adverb *často* "often" and others with *vzácně* "rarely", and why is an explicit specification of frequency absent in the overwhelming majority (over 76%) of examples? Why are seemingly absolute specifications of frequency, both positive and negative, possible? The data indicate that the degree of iteration may be of secondary importance in a discussion of the semantics of the verb form; the iterated situations, and how often they do or do not repeat, are not the focal point of the meaning of the verb, as Kopečný's analysis suggests, but seem to be background to it.

In a similar manner, the feature-based treatment fails to fully define and motivate the distant-past reading generally attributed to these verbs, which Kopečný calls a tendency to express a "distant-past nuance in meaning" (Kopečný 1962: 65). The connection between non-actual iterativity and a distant-past meaning, presuming there is one, is never explained.

Other Czech linguists have expressed views similar enough to Kopečný's to justify labelling the feature-based approach the traditional analysis. For example, Havránek and Jedlička, while avoiding the concept of non-actuality altogether, classify

[24] Trnková (1969) has noted that Kopečný uses the term *neaktuálnost* in several different, and not necessarily compatible, senses.

Kopečný's non-actual iterative verbs as marked iterative (*násobené*) forms (Havránek and Jedlička 1960: 231).[25] As obligatorily iterative forms, they "express only iterative actions that are repeated frequently or regularly, like *mívá (pravdu)* ["he tends to be (correct)"] and *mluvívá (mnoho)* ["he talks (a lot)"]" (Havránek and Jedlička 1960: 232). In the past tense, the feature of frequent or regular repetition is coupled with a distant-past nuance: "Their past forms [...] tend also to express the notion of an emotionally colored recollection of the distant past" (Havránek and Jedlička 1960: 232).

Havránek and Jedlička's notion of frequent and regular repetition can be contrasted with Němec's view of the degree of iteration expressed by what he calls "frequentative" verbs: "the iteration expressed by frequentatives [...] seems rather to be an irregular and occasional iteration (cf. *náš brankař* ***chytává*** *lépe* ["our goalie **tends to keep goal** better"] and *náš brankař* ***chytá*** *lépe* ["our goalie **keeps goal** better"] (Němec 1958: 197). Disagreeing directly with Havránek and Jedlička in characterizing the iteration of frequentative forms as irregular and occasional does not prevent Němec from agreeing with them on the meaning of the past forms: "in the past [they express] iteration that is temporally remote, distant-past" (Němec 1958: 197). Like Kopečný, neither Havránek and Jedlička nor Němec makes any attempt to place the degree of iteration hypothesized for the verbs in a larger analytical framework and to unite the feature of iterativity with a distant-past nuance in meaning.

In its general outline, the traditional analysis survives in contemporary grammars of Czech. The most recent Czechoslovak Academy Grammar asserts that the feature of iterativity necessarily combined with the feature of non-actuality is "the characteristic feature [*specifikum*] of verbs of the *chodívat* type" (Mluvnice 1986: 185); in the past, the verbs "have a special connotation of the distant past" (Mluvnice 1986: 184). The Academy Grammar's discussion of the meaning of non-actual iterative verbs veers from the traditional approach only in its suggestion that "[t]he iterative meaning of non-actual iterative verbs often becomes one of usualness [*uzuálnost*], habituality [*obvyklost*]" (Mluvnice 1986: 184).[26] It is this line of thought that will be pursued, to a limited extent, in Kučera's work and, to its logical end, in this study.

In the traditional analysis, emphasis is placed on distinguishing these verbs from their imperfective simplex counterparts by the features of non-actuality and iterativity. This line of research must be seen as unproductive because actual usage of the verb form, as illustrated in the corpus, cannot be motivated or even well understood through a focus on these two abstract features. The varying degrees of iteration that naturally co-occur with verbs of this type cannot be accounted for in the traditional framework, nor can this approach be used to adequately describe the status of the distant-past meaning associated with the verb.

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[25] Havránek and Jedlička group them with other semantically iterative (imperfective simplex) verbs, such as *vracet* "to return", *zavírat* "to close", and *dávat* "to give", which may or may not contextually express iteration (Havránek and Jedlička 1960: 231).

[26] Compare also the limited discussion of iterative forms in the 1996 *Příruční mluvnice čestiny* (sections 300, 493, 494, and 496). The treatment mostly focuses on derivational morphology and on the feature of non-actuality. Semantically speaking, iterative verbs are said to denote a "repeated event, a habitual [*uzuální*] event (section 300). No mention of the distant-past meaning is made.

Širokova's indeterminate iterativity

Unlike Kopečný and other scholars who have worked on the semantics of *říkávat* verbs, Širokova (1963 and 1965) does base her analysis on a corpus.[27] One of her main objectives is to establish the basic meaning (*osnovnoe značenije* or *Grundbedeutung*) of the verb form (which she refers to by the Russian term *mnogokratnyje glagoly*), and she attempts to do so by looking at those contexts where the meaning will be "maximally bared [*maksimal'no obnaženo*]", that is, where the meaning is signalled by the verb form itself (Širokova 1965: 76). According to Širokova, this would be the most minimal real context possible (Širokova 1965: 76). Thus, although her work is technically a corpus-based study, it does not take full advantage of the analytic potential of a corpus since she restricts her discussion to the least complex and most stripped contexts. Moreover, while she refers to and cites examples from her corpus, she does not provide, as I have done in chapter 1, an overview of the corpus data.

One of the unique contributions of Širokova's work is an examination of the potential of imperfective simplex verbs for iterative formation. Although she notes that the iterative form in Czech is "unusually productive" (Širokova 1963: 62), analysis of her corpus permits her to reach conclusions about limitations on the productivity of the form. She divides factors affecting derivational potential into four groups: semantic, structural (relating to the particularities of the imperfective stem), grammatical (for a few verbal classes), and the degree to which a borrowed root has become domesticated. Details can be found in Širokova 1963 (63ff). Filip (see below) also points out a more general pragmatic constraint on the productivity of the form that seems to account for many of Širokova's semantic factors. Given the thoroughness of Širokova's treatment, I will not pursue this issue further here.

Širokova has persuasively argued that the degree of iteration expressed by Czech iteratives depends entirely on context: "As a rule, iterative verbs [...] are used with the most varied indicators of iteration; they therefore can express those nuances of iteration that are provided by context" (Širokova 1965: 81). That is, the verbs are capable of expressing regular, irregular, frequent, occasional, and sporadic repetition. The degree of iteration expressed by a particular verb can be specified by adverbial modifiers or can be made pragmatically clear in the larger context.

Examples from my corpus clearly support Širokova's argument. As Table 5 demonstrates, in over 75% of all examples the degree of iteration is not specified and must, if it is relevant for the interpretation of the passage, be inferred from the larger context. Moreover, as Table 6 makes clear, in contexts where an explicit frequency is provided, the verbs co-occur with a full range of frequency adverbials. The data support Širokova's claim that frequency specifications are widely variable, which suggests that degree of iteration is of secondary importance in an analysis of the verbs' semantics.

On the basis of this observation, Širokova posits a basic meaning of indeterminate iterativity (*neopredelennaja mnogokratnost'*) for *říkávat* forms (Širokova 1965: 79). In

[27] The corpus consists of 2,000 examples taken from nineteenth- and twentieth-century literature as well as from contemporary journalistic sources (Širokova 1963: 62).

highlighting indeterminate iterativity instead of simple iterativity and non-actuality, Širokova takes a significant step away from the traditional analysis by attempting to motivate, however abstractly, the varying degrees of repetition that verbs of this type can express.

Širokova takes a further step away from the traditional analysis in her discussion of the distant-past meaning. Like degree of iteration, a distant-past meaning is also context-dependent:

> The meaning of removal of the process to a distant or remote past is not an inherent feature of the past-tense forms of iterative verbs [...] This meaning, as a rule, either arises from the particular context [...] or is specified by the general situation. (Širokova 1965: 83)

Although Širokova does not divide her morphologically past examples into contexts that support an explicit distant past and otherwise, the data provided in Table 2 and the examples that follow it can be used to illustrate her claim. In my corpus, the distant-past examples, which can only be established pragmatically or by the presence of the adverb *kdysi* ("once long ago"), represent slightly over half of the past-tense examples; contexts that are ambiguous with regard to remoteness (which seem to evoke, in a temporal sense, Širokova's feature of "indeterminateness") comprise over a third of all examples; and contexts that seem to report a recent past, a possibility that Širokova does not explicitly mention, make up almost ten percent. A more detailed discussion of these degrees of pastness will be found below in commentary on Kučera's analysis.

Širokova's conclusions regarding a distant-past meaning and iterative verbs go beyond the traditional analysis in two ways. In the first place, she correctly rules out an inherent distant-past meaning. In the second place, unlike Kopečný and others, she does attempt to motivate the tendency for iterative verbs to express a distant-past meaning by relating a remote-past reading to her feature of indeterminate iterativity: "The meaning of indeterminateness is easily connected in the mind of a speaker with a meaning of greater duration and distance [*otdalennost'*]" (Širokova 1965: 84). Although a hypothetical and conceptually natural connection is assumed, the exact nature of the connection remains unelaborated.

Kučera's understanding of habit

Following Vendler and in the framework of his semantic model of verbal aspect (Kučera 1983), Kučera argues that Kopečný's "non-actual iterative verbs" are state terms and that non-actuality in Kopečný's sense of the term naturally results from the stativity of the verbal expression.[28] Consider, for instance, the sentence *Maminka* ***sedává*** *na pavlači* ("Mother **sits** on the porch"), which contains the habitual form *sedávat* (< *sedět* "to sit") (Kučera 1981: 181 and 1983: 182-3). Kučera comments:

[28] Kučera defines stativity in terms of Vendler 1957. States cannot answer the question *Co teď dělá?* or "What is s/he doing now?" (Kučera 1983: 182), they last for a period of time (Vendler 1957: 147), and they cannot be done deliberately or carefully and indeed cannot be "done" at all (Vendler 1957: 149).

> Obviously, the proposition [..] has a truth value at t_0 [time-zero or the moment of speaking]. But what is asserted is NOT an activity at t_0, but rather a STATE[...] It seems clear to me that the principal characteristic of Czech iteratives is that they represent states, not activities. (1981: 181)

Activities can occur at time-zero, but states can only have a validity or truth value at the moment of speech. The above sentence does not deny the possibility that *Maminka zrovna teď **sedí** na pavlači* ("Mother **is** right now **sitting** on the porch"), but as a stative term the verb form *sedává* "simply provides no information about any activity at the moment of speech" (Kučera 1980: 20). Kopečný's feature of non-actuality is therefore subsumed under Kučera's broader notion of stativity. After all, it is by definition true that states cannot express activities occurring at the moment of speech; in other words, they cannot report "actuality" in the same way that an activity verb can.

Kučera further maintains that iterative verbs do not express simple states, but usually express *quantified* states (Kučera 1980: 31; 1981: 182; 1983: 182-3). Quantification may occur over the predicate: *Petr mi **psával*** ("Peter **used to write** me"), in which the habitual predicate *psával* (< *psát* "to write") is the quantified term. It may occur over the temporal adverbial: *V sobotu Petr **sedává** v hospodě* ("On Saturdays Peter **sits** in the pub"), in which *sedává* (< *sedět* "to sit") reports quantification over the adverbial *v sobotu* (on some, but not all, Saturdays). It may occur over the plural subject: *Ruští generálové **umírávají** v mladém věku* ("Russian generals **[tend to] die** young"), in which the habitual form *umírávají* (< *umírat* "to die") triggers quantification over the plural subject *ruští generálové* (some, but not all, Russian generals). It is also theoretically possible to have quantification over the object of the verb, and Kučera suggests the following sentence: *V té době Čapek **psával** romány* ("At that time Čapek **wrote** novels"), in which the habitual form *psával* (< *psát* "to write") triggers a quantified reading of the object (he wrote novels as well as other forms of literature).[29] Quantified states, Kučera remarks, do not naturally combine with points in time or with time-zero:

> Because a quantified state must extend over an interval of time of sufficient length to accomodate the notion of habituality [...], it is by definition incompatible with any specification of temporal scope that consists of only a moment (Kučera 1981: 183).

The assertion of a quantified state therefore presupposes a non-actual reading.

The distribution of quantified terms in the corpus was given in Table 4. All of Kučera's quantificational types were found, although certain types occurred considerably more frequently than others. Predicate quantification predominates (over three-fourths of all examples), followed distantly by quantification over an adverbial phrase (18.9%). Surprisingly, quantification over a plural subject occurred less than 10% of the time. Object quantification occurred rarely. To Kučera's list can be added clausal quantification, which, however, occurred in only two examples. While data from the corpus in general confirm Kučera's analysis, they also show that not all types of quantification occur frequently enough to be described as typical, a point that Kučera's methodology necessarily misses.

[29] This sentence makes sense given Čapek's well-known proclivity to write in many genres.

Since it is not grounded in a corpus, Kučera's analysis also cannot establish the relative value of the non-quantified contexts reported by the verb form, a question to which he devotes more attention in his treatment than it may, in fact, deserve. Table 3 indicates that the great majority of contexts in the corpus (almost 90%) do exhibit some form of quantification. Non-quantified contexts comprise only a small portion of the data; they therefore represent a non-typical, marginal usage of the habitual-iterative form. All non-quantified contexts are in the past tense. Kučera discusses the following examples (Kučera 1981: 179):

(1) ***Stával*** *tam dům.* ("A house **used to stand** there.") *stávat* < *stát* "to stand"
(2) ***Mívala*** *ho ráda.* ("She **used to like** him.") *mívat rád* < *mít rád* "to like"
(3) ***Znával*** *jsem ho dobře.* ("I **used to know** him well.") *znávat* < *znát* "to know"

The "iteratives" here (*stávat*, *mívat ráda*, *znávat*) all derive from basic state terms.[30] In examples like these, there is no implication of an iterated situation. In the present study it will be assumed that they represent non-prototypical forms of usage, and an explanation for the use of the iterative form to express this meaning will be offered in chapter 6.

Kučera has also stressed that iterative verbs that do express quantification cannot combine with a specification of definite quantification: the sentences *Pavel mi* ***psával*** *z Prahy* ("Paul **used to write** me from Prague") is grammatical, but the sentence **Pavel mi dvakrát* ***psával*** *z Prahy* (*"Paul **used to write** me twice from Prague") is not since the second sentence contains an adverbial implying definite quantification (*dvakrát* "twice"). The sentence *Pavel mi* ***psával*** *z Prahy dvakrát týdně* ("Paul **used to write** me from Prague twice weekly") is, however, grammatical because "the presence of the adverbial *týdně* "weekly, per week" allows the habitual reading" (Kučera 1980: 26). A definite specification of the number of occurrences of the event gives way to the interpretation that the event occurred repeatedly over an indefinite number of weeks.

In past contexts, as became clear through native speaker testing, habitual-iterative forms can imply that the time period over which the proposition held was of substantial duration; thus use of the habitual in the past can imply considerable experience (whether actually true or not) with the topic under discussion. Corresponding imperfective simplex verbs in the same contexts did not evoke this durative component without additional lexical qualification. This is demonstrated in (4):

(4) Je pravda, že jsem **měl**$^{\textbf{impf}}$**/míval**$^{\textbf{hab}}$ rád železnice; ale přestal jsem je mít rád, když je zasvinila válka, přestal jsem je mít rád, když jsem na nich organisoval sabotáž, a nejvíc jsem je přestal mit rád, když jsem přišel do ministerstva. (Čapek 2000: 289)
(4) "It is true that I **liked/used to like** the railways; but I could not like them any longer when they were messed up by war, when I organized sabotage against them, and chiefly when I came to the Ministry."

[30] Note that *stát* is stative only in combination with certain inanimate subjects: *Stával tam dům* ("A house used to stand there") versus *Stával tam voják* ("A soldier used to stand there"). The latter sentence could be successfully analyzed as asserting iteration over the predicate because the verb would typically be read as reporting an activity.

In this example, the past-tense imperfective simplex *měl rád* (< *mít rád* "to like") is interpreted as expressing a statement unto itself: he liked his job in the railways but does not feel the need to comment on the details of his experience. According to native speakers, the better verb in this context, and the one used by Čapek in the original text, is the habitual form *míval rád* because it implies a much longer time period and therefore greater experience with the railways than *měl rád* would without qualification. Emphasis on a longstanding association with the railways is more coherent with the commentary that immediately follows.[31]

The fact that some Czech iterative forms do not seem to express iteration at all and that, as a rule, verbs of this type cannot combine with definite specifications of iteration leads Kučera to the following conclusion: "We clearly are not dealing with simple iteration. Instead, what we have in this case are verbal forms that denote HABITS, not simply a series of activities" (Kučera 1980: 26). Kučera was the first to introduce the notion of habit in regard to Czech verbs of this type. Mazon noted the same thing in regard to the morphologically similar class of Russian iteratives (*govarivat'* < *govorit'* "to speak", *sživat'* < *sidet'* "to sit", *xaživat'* < *xodit'* "to go"):

> The meaning common to all these examples is of being in the habit of doing this or that action. Without a doubt, this notion of habit entails repetition of the action, but it [habit] also supercedes repetition [*elle la domine*] in the sense that all the acts constituting the habit appear as a mass, as a sum [*comme une masse, comme une somme*].[32] (Mazon 1908: 69-70 and 1914: 200)

A habit presupposes an indefinite number of occurrences which, in turn, presupposes a non-actual reading: "Clearly a habit viewed as consisting of an indefinite number of repetitions of an activity or of an event can never be reconciled with any adverbial denoting an atomic moment in time" (Kučera 1980: 27). The indefinite number of repetitions required in the expression of a habit can easily account for Širokova's feature of indeterminate iterativity discussed earlier, and, as will be argued in the rest of this study, a full understanding of habituality can provide a conceptually natural framework within which to motivate usage of iterative verbs in their full range of contextual realizations.

As for the distant-past meaning associated with iterative verbs, Kučera argues that it is obligatory in non-quantified contexts. Thus, in examples (1) through (3), there is neither iteration nor quantification implied and a distant-past meaning is necessarily communicated: "What these [...] three sentences do designate is a state asserted to exist over an extended duration in the DISTANT past" (Kučera 1981: 179-80).

Kučera extends this line of thought by hypothesizing a segmentation of the past continuum in Czech: "When no quantification [...] is possible, Czech iteratives thus signal the digitalization of the past continuum: The state is asserted to be true in some

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[31]Contexts like this one, where the habitual form serves as an invitation to further commentary, are examined in more depth in the treatment of the form's discourse function in chapter 5.

[32] Mazon was writing at a time when there seems to have been a high level of interest in the notion of habit in scientific (especially psychological and neurological) circles. See, for example, James 1890.

distant past" (Kučera 1981: 183). He notes that division of the past continuum into a recent past and a distant past is not unknown in other languages. He compares Czech to Kikuyu as a language in which "distinct tense forms exist not only for remote past and near past but also for remote future and near future" (Kučera 1981: 183). Kučera's claim in this regard is a strong one that is subject to empirical testing. As the data in chapter 1 imply, his treatment of the distant-past meaning — the most extensive treatment of it in the literature to date — is flawed in a number of respects.

In the first place, distant-past readings frequently occur in cases where quantification is also present, and these cases are not explicitly motivated in Kučera's analysis (see examples (1) and (2) in chapter 1). More significantly, there are non-quantified contexts that fail to signal an explicit distant past or come close to reporting a recent past. Examples (3) and (4) from chapter 1 illustrate this point, as do the following:

(5) Milá Olgo, těžko si lze představit radikálnější STŘÍH, než jaký znamenala má nedávná změna působiště: po sedmi měsících samoty, klidu, tepla, nic-nedělání, najednou takový kolotoč [...] Má duše si už na tu změnu jakž takž zvykla, mému tělu to asi bude trvat delší dobu: včera mne přepadla nějaká nemoc, snad chřipka nebo co [...] Trochu se ozývali hemoroidy, jsem všude trochu opruzen (zvlášť tam, kde **bývaly** vlasy a fousy), atd. atd. atd. (Havel 1990a: 55)
(5) "Dear Olga, it would be difficult to imagine a more radical CUT than my recent change of workplace: after seven months of solitude, quiet, warmth, indolence — suddenly such a flurry of activity [...] My mind has more or less adjusted to the change, my body will likely take quite a while. Yesterday I came down with what may be the flu [...] My hemorrhoids are acting up again and my skin is raw and slightly chafed (especially where there **used to be** hair and whiskers), etc. etc. etc." (Havel, 1989a: 68)

(6) Ranní hlášení se odehrávalo jako obvykle v bývalé nemocniční kapli. Už řadu let to byla jakási malá jednací síň. Zapomněla jsem už vlastně, že to **bývala** kaple. Až teď, asi proto, že mě slunce přitahovalo k zaprášenému oválnému oknu, jsem si na to vzpomněla. (Bělohradská 1992: 62)
(6) "Morning announcements took place as usual in the hospital's former chapel. For a number of years now it has been used as a small conference hall. I had forgotten really that it **used to be** a chapel. Only now, as the sun drew my eyes toward the dust-covered oval window, did I remember."

In example (5) here, Havel is describing to his wife a recent move to another prison and the changes that accompany the move. As the larger discourse context of the letter makes clear, one change is the shearing of his hair and moustache at the new prison. His appearance before the shearing is introduced with a form of the verb *bývat* (< *být* "to be"). The time frame is explicitly recent past, and no quantification over any element of the sentence seems possible. In (6) the conference room used to be a chapel "a number of years" (*řada let*) ago; the time reference does not unambiguously evoke a temporally distant past.

As the examples demonstrate, Kučera's treatment of the distant-past reading is incomplete and unintentionally misdirected. It motivates a small portion of the corpus of distant-past examples, although even some non-quantified contexts have been found that

do not explicitly refer to a temporally remote past. Moreover, since it is not based on a corpus of examples, Kučera's analysis overstates the importance of those non-quantified contexts that it can successfully motivate. By focusing his analysis on an arguably marginal subset of all possible contexts, Kučera's treatment improperly partitions the data and does not lead to an elucidation of the general case.

Examples from the corpus also raise the question of just exactly what the term "distant past" means. How past is distant past? If the Czech past continuum is divided into a recent past and a distant past by the usage of iterative verbs in certain contexts, then it is reasonable to assume that an adequate specification of what period of time in the past a distant past refers to might be determined. On the contrary, no such adequate specification is forthcoming in an examination of the past-tense contexts in the corpus. I would even argue that, in most cases, the exact degree of temporal remoteness reported by the iterative verb from the moment of speech is not even relevant for a meaningful interpretation of the passage. A close analysis of all past-tense examples in the corpus indicates that the concept of a "distant past" is highly subjective and, as Širokova argued, heavily dependent on context.

Despite the differences in their analyses of the distant-past meaning, both Širokova and Kučera sense a connection between some form of (quantified) iteration and a tendency to express a temporally remote past (recall that over half of the past-tense examples in the corpus do pragmatically denote a temporally distant situation). Širokova and Kučera are also alike in their inability to elaborate on the nature of that connection. As Kučera remarks: "I cannot present as yet an entirely satisfactory explanation of why the same verbal form may assume both functions" (Kučera 1981: 183-4).

Filip's analysis: "hedging" and modality

Filip's treatment (Filip 1993 and 1994), the most recent in-depth analysis outside of the present framework, undertakes a formal repackaging of Kučera's quantification function and extends his insights in a number of significant respects.

In the first place, she claims that iterative forms can only be used to express contingent, temporary, or non-essential properties; they are "unacceptable in sentences expressing exceptionless, unchangeable states of affairs" (Filip 1994: 148). This one constraint effectively summarizes the list of semantic limitations on iterative formation outlined earlier by Širokova (1963). Consider the following examples:

(7) *??Země* ***se točívá*** *kolem slunce.* ??"The Earth **tends to revolve** around the sun."
(8) *??Valčík* ***bývá*** *ve tříčtvrtečním taktu.* ??"The waltz **tends to be** in three-four time."
(9) *Pluto* ***bývá*** *inteligentní.* "Pluto **is [tends to be]** intelligent."

In (7) and (8), the iterative forms *točívat se* (< *točit se* "to revolve") and *bývat* (< *být* "to be") are unacceptable because they report episodic or non-essential properties; this conflicts with a pragmatic assessment of the Earth's movement around the sun (it always does revolves in this way) and the waltz's tact (it is defined partly by its three-four time). Example (9), however, is not necessarily ill-formed if it reports that Pluto's intelligence is

manifested episodically: on occasion he can act intelligently, but this is not one of his defining properties.

Filip further argues that generic sentences of this type (which she terms "characterizing" sentences) cannot contain expressions of universal quantification.[33] As noted in the first chapter, there are examples in the corpus that disprove this claim, although they do not undermine, as I will explain in chapter 3, the spirit of Filip's argument. Another way of understanding this claim is that characterizing sentences must express generalizations that allow for exceptions or counter-examples (Filip 1994: 163), a point that I will return to in later chapters. In general, Filip argues that Czech iteratives function as "hedging" devices or as "sentential modal operator[s] that [indicate] uncertainty or vagueness of the speaker with regard to the factual content of the utterance" (Filip 1994: 144). The speaker may use a verb of this type because he or she "lacks adequate evidence for making a stronger claim" or because the stronger statement is known to be false (Filip 1994: 163). Filip's insight into the modal potential of Czech habituals will also be examined in further detail in chapters 5 and 6.

Filip is in general agreement with Kučera in regard to the analysis of the meaning of past-tense forms, and her treatment is therefore subject to the same criticisms as Kučera's. For example, she erroneously notes: "All the past tense VA-sentences[34], regardless of whether they have a quantificational interpretation, assert that the denoted state of affairs holds in the distant past" (Filip 1994: 169). Like Kučera, she does not adequately define the term "distant past" and instead merely associates it with the adverb *kdysi* ("once long ago"). She makes a stronger claim than Kučera in asserting that the verbs in question cannot report a recent past, although in doing so she defines a recent past solely in terms of the verb's potential to combine with the adverbial phrase *až do včerejška* ("up until yesterday") (Filip 1994: 169). Unlike Kučera, she does not posit a digitilization of the Czech past continuum, although it could be argued that such a segmentation is implicit in her analysis.

Like both Širokova and Kučera, Filip senses a connection between the characterizing nature (and inherent vagueness) of the verb form and its distant-past meaning. Unlike them, however, Filip offers an explanation for the connection. She writes:

> It is much harder to justify the connection between the inherent vagueness of the operator *VA* and the "remote past" meaning. It is possible to speculate that the remote past reference is derivable from the combination of the two meaning components present in the past tense VA-sentences: the past tense and the vagueness inherent in the modal operator VA. (Filip 1993: 138-9)

That is, the modal nature of the verb form (its inherent expression of vagueness, uncertainty, and possibility) is realized temporally as a distant past since a temporally

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[33]Filip does note that specifications of universal quantification are possible in non-quantified past-tense contexts: ***Býval*** *jsem tam* ***vždycky*** *včas* ("I **used to always be** there on time") (Filip 1993: 138).

[34] Instead of using the term "habitual" or "iterative," Filip chooses the term "VA-sentence", which refers to the derivational suffix governing iterative formation. This allows her to avoid committing to a term which necessarily implies quantification.

remote situation is "more likely to be a situation for which the speaker may lack adequate evidence and consequently, it is a situation about which s/he makes weaker claims" (Filip 1994: 170-1); the more remote the situation is in time from the speech event, "the less can it be vouched for by the speaker" (Filip 1994: 171). The discourse data in my corpus do not seem to support this argument; although a modal meaning is often associated with use of the verb form, modality does not appear to be the most natural explanation for the behavior of the verbs in the past tense. In chapter 4, I offer a different interpretation of this puzzling connection, one that adequately accounts for the range of degrees of pastness exhibited by the verbs and that can be considered more natural and less tenuous than Filip's claims of an unmediated modality/tense interface.

Analysis and summary

The progression from Kopečný to Filip generally illustrates increasing concern with finding a framework that motivates and explains the behavior of iterative verbs in various contexts. A bottom-up, feature-based approach to semantic analysis gradually gives way to a top-down approach in which isolated parts of meaning are accounted for within the framework of a larger gestalt structure.

Kučera's and Filip's work go farther in this respect than Širokova's in that Kučera and Filip shift the focus of the discussion away from iterativity. In Kučera, the shift in focus is reflected in a shift in terminology: non-actual iteratives (Širokova's *mnogokratnye glagoly*) are redesignated as habits. With Filip, the expression of iterativity follows from the verb's status as a modal sentential operator. Neither Kučera nor Filip, however, push their arguments to their logical conclusions, perhaps because they lack a corpus of examples on the basis of which to explore the consequences of their claims.

A recurring focus in scholarly treatments has also been on finding an explanation of the verbs' semantics that provides an integrative account of their behavior across tense forms. Širokova argues that indeterminateness can be easily associated on a cognitive level with a remote-past meaning, and Kučera echoes her while admitting that he cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the intuited connection. Filip is concerned with the same problem and proposes a tentative solution. All three scholars recognize that the key to understanding the general semantics of the verb form seems to lie in elaborating a connection between iterativity and a distant-past meaning.

No previous treatment suggests a cognitively plausible (pragmatically meaningful) framework in which to understand the semantics of the verb form, even if this may be largely because theoretical considerations did not require conceptual naturalness in the analysis. In chapter 3, I describe an analytical framework that can successfully motivate the range of behaviors previously noted, as well as other usages of the verb that have not been discussed elsewhere, and that is not simply an artificial construct imposed on the data for purposes of theoretical convenience, but a cognitively-based model of the relations that actually exist between the verb's various meanings. As a top-down approach to semantic analysis, the framework continues the observed trends in research by exploring Kučera's and Mazon's notion of habit from a broader perspective. A deeper examination of the semiotic and cognitive status of habituality

results in a clearer understanding of the meaning of Czech iterative forms, an understanding that also subsumes Filip's discussion of modality. In chapter 4, this same framework is used to account for the connection between iterativity and a tendency to express a distant-past meaning.

Chapter 3

A Semiotic and Cognitive Approach to the Linguistic Expression of Habituality

Introduction

This chapter proposes a theoretical framework that will be used to explain the data in the corpus by arguing that the expression of habituality in language is a token of a broader type of evaluation implicit in semiotic and cognitive notions of habituality. The framework draws on work in Peircean semiotic theory and cognitive linguistics. It is a pragmatically meaningful framework to the extent that it accounts for the range of uses of the verb form by appealing to facts of conceptual organization that are independent of language and not by mistaking ad hoc labels for satisfactory explanation.

After the framework has been fleshed out, the chapter concludes by looking at the behavior of Czech habitual verbs in two contexts: in combination with seemingly absolute specifications of frequency and under negation. The behavior in these contexts elucidates the verb form's general semantics and can be coherently accounted for within the semiotic and cognitive framework.

The Peircean semiotic habit

Habit, as a semiotic type with different system-specific realizations, is central to Peirce's semiotic in a number of respects, and I will limit my discussion of it here to those elements of a definition that bear directly on a Peircean model of iteration.

Peirce defined habit as a generalizing tendency (CP 1.409, 6.204, 7.515) or general law, "such that on a certain kind of occasion a man will be more or less apt to act in a certain general way" (CP 2.148).[35] All things have a tendency to take habits (CP 1.409), and habit-formation is not limited to human semiosis (CP 5.492). Savan aptly summarizes Peirce's habit in the following words:

> A habit is formed as a general pattern of action and emerges over a period of time out of actions which are irregular, random, and without design. For example, the habit of smoking a cigaret after dinner may develop out of occasional and infrequent acts. The habit, once it is real, is not a single entity, like the cigaret. Nor is it a specific act, like lighting a cigaret [...] Nor yet is it a particular finite series of such acts. (Savan 1988: 11-2)

As the citation from Savan brings out, a habit is a type that depends upon specific (actual) tokens to instantiate it, although as a type it is more than the mere sum of its individual tokens; the tokens are taken as background for the foregrounded assertion of a general rule.

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[35] Reference to Peirce's Collected Papers (hereafter, CP) is conventionally made by volume number and section (1.409 is to be read as volume 1, section 409).

A person cannot have acquired the habit of smoking without some real experience with cigarettes. On the other hand, being a smoker implies much more than just some limited experience smoking cigarettes: the habit, as a general tendency, depends upon, but is not sufficiently defined by, a number of concrete instantiations of its general principle. In this regard, Peirce wrote:

> [E]very habit has, or is, a general law. Whatever is truly general refers to the indefinite future; for the past contains only a certain collection of such cases that have occurred. The past is actual fact. But a general (fact) cannot be fully realized. It is a potentiality; and its mode of being is *esse in futuro*. The future is potential, not actual. (CP 2.148)

Peirce makes the same argument in associating habits with the subjunctive conditional "would-be." Conditional propositions are not limited to actual instances (tokens): "[N]o agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning of a 'would-be'" (CP 5.467; see also 2.664, 2.667, 5.400, 5.510). To return to the example of a smoker: "Even if the habitual after-dinner smoker were to die this afternoon, it must be true that s/he *would* have, probably, smoked a cigaret after dinner" (Savan 1988: 12).

A general rule states that something would occur given certain circumstances; it defines with regard to the indefinite future. Actual occurrences of the event have probably already taken place, and these are the tokens that support the generalization to habit. This is another way of saying that a habit is alive through its instantiations, although it is not reducible to a finite set of them: "[I]f the actual concrete actions in which the habit is embodied did not exist, the habit would not be *real*" (Savan 1988: 45). As Peirce notes, the number of tokens necessary to support a habit need not be large, and habits can vary in strength and endurance depending on how often they are instantiated (CP 5.477). The general character of habits also implies that they need not be entirely stable to be real: "[E]ven when a habit is stable, it usually permits exceptions and deviations, provided these do not become themselves further habits" (Savan 1988, 12).

The two levels implied in the complex structure of a habit (the type and its tokens) echo Peirce's phenomenological categories of Secondness and Thirdness. Secondness is associated with actual occurrence (CP 1.358), the here and now without regard to generality or the future (CP 1.23, 1.419, 6.455), reality and experience (CP 1.324-5, 1.342). It is anti-rational since it "consists in arbitrary brute action upon other things [and] to rationalize it would be to destroy its being" (CP 6.432). Thirdness is being in general or law as potential that goes beyond a mere collection of facts (CP 1.420, 6.20), and, as such, its essence is in the future (CP 5.93-6). Since Peirce's phenomenological categories are hierarchically structured, Thirds contain Seconds (CP 1.353), and a habit as Third therefore states that future facts of Secondness will take on a general character. As Shapiro has written:

> Habits are tendencies to act in this or that manner under specifiable conditions; they are thus at one remove from the realm of the here and now or Secondness. Habits govern — in the manner of leading principles — activities, which are Seconds [...] and this regulative relation has built into it the attainment of some goal. (Shapiro 1983: 68)

Hierarchization also implies a potential for growth from Seconds into Thirds or from actual occurrence(s) into a general tendency to occur.

The distinction between Secondness and Thirdness is also reflected in the distinction Peirce makes between efficient and final causation. Habits "operate in complete agreement with Peirce's concept of final causation" (Shapiro 1991: 39) in the sense that the whole calls out its parts or the parts are perceived through the filter of the whole (CP 1.211, 1.220). The instantiations of the habit are understood via the general rule that defines the habit. Efficient causation, on the other hand, operates when the mere sum of the parts is equivalent to the whole (CP 1.212, 1.220). The whole is merely potential, and the individual parts — not yet perceived as even being parts — are evaluated merely as they are.

If we turn back to language and apply Peirce's general definition of habit, we understand any habitual proposition as a general assertion (an abstract law) that presumes the real or believed existence of a number of concrete instances for which the general assertion is valid. Iterated situations can therefore be evaluated on two distinct levels: on the level of the actual, definite events that are isolated from one another and not viewed "as a mass" or on the more abstract level of habit where the individual situations are viewed as constituting one cognitive unit. In other words, it is possible, on the one hand, to assert the repetition of a certain series of acts without explicitly asserting that these repeated acts constitute a habit (a pattern). On the other hand, the assertion of a habit presupposes the existence of a number of acts, that is, of instantiations or replicas of the habit: being a smoker minimally implies having smoked some cigarettes. The acts themselves exist in the framework of the habit as a whole; in and of themselves, they are not the focus of the assertion, but are necessary to it.[36]

Repeating situations evaluated without reference to an overarching pattern could be termed cases of simple iteration. Situations evaluated with regard to the pattern may be called cases of habitual iteration. In the latter, one interprets the iteration of a situation as necessary background to the assertion of a general rule that systematizes, and thereby gives meaning to, the repetition. To assert a habit is therefore an attempt to make sense of some repeating circumstance on a higher evaluative level.[37]

Peirce's understanding of habit is compatible with recent work carried out on the logic of habitual propositions in French and English. Tyvaert, for example, has sketched "a linguistic definition of habituality" (Tyvaert 1987: 152) that is complementary to the Peircean approach (see also Kleiber 1985). He considers the habitual reading of the phrase "Paul walks to school" as a "representation of a collection of event-phrases that express, with temporal or spatial variations [...], the same state of fact" (Tyvaert 1987: 152). The collection of event-phrases could be exemplified by the following propositions: "He is walking to school today," "He walked to school yesterday," "He will walk to school tomorrow." In Peirce's terms, the event-phrases represent concrete instances of the general rule denoted by the habitual proposition. Note that Tyvaert

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[36] An everyday example of the distinction between these two levels is the difference between having repeated sexual encounters with one person (the whole is merely the sum of the individual acts) and having an intimate relationship (where acts of sexual intercourse are not the sum total of the whole relationship).

[37] The relationship between simple and habitual iteration is explored in more detail in chapter 6.

includes a future statement in the collection of event-phrases, which corresponds to the "would-be" status of habit in Peirce's treatment.

A cognitive account of general validity predications

The account of habituality within the framework of cognitive linguistics proceeds along similar lines. In cognitive terms, the difference between simple and habitual iteration is a matter of how a given set of repeating situations is construed. Langacker has defined construal in the following way:

> People have the capacity to construe a scene by means of alternative images, so semantic value is not simply received from the objective situation but instead is in large measure imposed on it [...] Two linguistic expressions can therefore designate the same objective situation yet differ substantially in their semantic import because they structure it through different images. (Langacker 1990: 35)

In other words, in habitual iteration, the repeating situations are construed as being related through the existence of a general rule; the rule itself is semantically profiled.[38]

Langacker has provided the most detailed account of habitual and generic propositions within cognitive linguistics (Langacker 1996 and 1997), and his argument parallels Peirce's and Tyvaert's in key respects.[39] According to Langacker, habituals and generics represent two distinct kinds of "general validity predications," that is, predications that do not profile individual instances but rather the "higher-order relationship (of genericity/habituality) that they constitute or manifest" (Langacker 1996: 292). Habitual statements proper, like "My cat stalks that bird every day," describe activities that are customary and they distribute across events, while generics proper, as in "Cats stalk birds," ascribe a general property to all members of a class and distribute across participants. Interpretations of habitual and generic statements therefore differ only because of a shift in "mental scanning" along the event or participant dimension (Langacker 1997: 195).

In attempting to motivate the conceptual structure implicit in general validity predications, Langacker makes a distinction between "actual" and "structural" forms of knowledge, arguing that this distinction "represents a well-entrenched idealized cognitive model (at least in our culture)" (Langacker 1997: 205). Actual (or phenomenal)

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[38] "[P]rofiling amounts to nothing more than the relative prominence of substructures within a conceptualization, and is inherently a matter of degree" (Langacker 1990: 208). In habitual iteration, the general rule is more prominent than its instantiations.

[39] Langacker also explores the difference between general validity predications and "repetitives" ("The boy kicked the dog three times"), although the details of his argument in this respect are not relevant here. For an insightful application of Langacker's principles to the aspectual expression of habituality across Slavic languages, see Dickey 2000, pp. 49-94. As Dickey has noted, Langacker's model of iteration in language is similar to Timberlake's (1982); see also Stunová 1987: 486 and 1993: 40. Fife 1990 looks at the aspectual system of Welsh, including the expression of habituality, also from Langacker's cognitive perspective.

knowledge provides a description of what things happen in the world, as in the statement "The engine isn't smoking anymore;" it is not necessarily reducible to reality since a situation can be actual without being real. Structural (or non-actual) knowledge is a description of how the world is made that such things can happen in it, as in the statement "This engine doesn't smoke anymore;" its basis is a model of how the world is structured. He argues that general validity predications profile a higher-order process that resides in the structural plane (Langacker 1997: 210): a generic statement like "Cats stalk birds" "summarizes over *arbitrary* instances in the structural plane" whereas habituals ("Alice stalks that bird") refer to one trajector ("Alice") and one landmark ("that bird") also in the structural plane. Generics and habituals ("The boy kicked the dog three times a day every day") differ in this respect from repetitives ("The boy kicked the dog three times") in that the latter profile a higher-order process residing in the actual plane: they describe what actually happened and do not imply that this is part of the inherent structure of how the world works.

Langacker's definition of what qualifies as a general validity predication includes statements of absolute regularity, as in "Kittens are born blind" (Langacker 1997: 196). As Filip and others have shown, such contexts in Czech do not support use of a habitual verb since Czech habituals necessarily report a lack of absolute regularity; they can only be used in contexts that report contingent properties. This suggests that the Czech form reports a kind of encoding not specifically addressed in Langacker's discussion.[40] Langacker has also suggested that general validity predications might not need a series of actual events, or any real events, to support their assertion; in other words, assertion of habituality may be possible "in the absence of actual instances" (Langacker 1997: 198). His example for this argument is the statement "The door opens to the inside," which "implies that the door is constructed and mounted in such a way that, if it is to be opened, it will swing to the inside rather than to the outside" (Langacker 1997: 198). I would argue, however, that real experience does underlie this statement, even if the experience consists merely in general familiarity with doors and how they work as well as in the abstract mental effort one makes, perhaps unconsciously so, when confronted by such a

[40] As is well known, iteration can be expressed in Czech by habitual forms as well as by both imperfective simplex and perfective aspectual forms. In the third case, aspectual selection in Czech is said to operate at the micro-level of the individual subevent: a singular event denoted by a perfective verb serves as a token of the larger iterated type, as in the sentence *Vypije* [< *vypít*, perfective] *jednu skleničku vodky denně* ("He drinks one shot of vodka every day"). Although perfective singularization of the subevent is a possible way of expressing iteration in Czech, there is not necessarily a connection between the productivity of a morphologically habitual or frequentative form and the phenomenon of perfective singularization. For relevant articles on perfective singularization and other related questions to aspectual encoding of iteration in Czech, see Kresin 2000, Stunová 1993, Chung and Timberlake 1985, and Monnesland 1984. Dickey 2000 (chapter two) provides a comparative discussion of habitual aspect in Slavic languages and offers a tentative explanation (Dickey 2000: 88) of the function of the three alternative construals in Czech (see a partial discussion of Dickey's argument at the end of the next chapter).

door in order to picture, based on its construction and one's previous experience with doors of this type, how this particular door swings.

Peirce noted that habits can be real even when grounded in the most minimal number of real instances:

> It is noticeable that the iteration of the action is often said to be indispensable to the formation of a habit, but a very moderate exercise of observation suffices to refute this error. A single reading yesterday of a casual statement that the "shtar chindis" means in Romany "four shillings," though it is unlikely to receive any reinforcement beyond the recalling of it, at this moment, is likely to produce the habit of thinking that "four" in the Gypsy tongue is "shtar," that will last for months, if not for years. (CP 5.477)

Data in the corpus suggest that, at least as far as Czech habituals are concerned, minimal experience, real or believed, with the situation is necessary for the assertion of the general predication; the verbs necessarily report some form of personal acquaintance with actual instances, and this experience serves as the basis for a broader generalization.

Gestalt structure

Langacker argues that the "higher-order relationship" profiled by general validity predications manifests itself in language not only in verbs (relations), but also in nouns (things):

> Clearly, we are able to construe a number of component things as collectively constituting a higher-order thing that functions as a unitary entity for linguistic purposes: such an entity functions, for example, as the profiled referent of terms like *group*, *stack*, *pile*, etc. (Langacker 1996: 290)

In other words, the "emergence and profiling of higher-order entities represents a pervasive and familiar linguistic phenomenon" (Langacker 1997: 199). In this respect, habituals and generics can be considered "verbal analogs" of collective nouns (Langacker 1997: 199). Brinton made the same point earlier than Langacker:

> [A] habitual situation results from the repetition of individual situations on different occasions; however, these multiple situations are also considered as an aggregate or unit, indeed what is termed a "habit" or a "series." A habit thus has a complex structure [...] The nominal category most closely analogous to habit is, of course, collective, which denotes a single unit made up of multiple individual things: a *crowd*, *audience*, or *group* of people, a *flock* of sheep, a *herd* of cows, an *army* of soldiers, or a *committee*, *club*, or *team* or members.[41] (Brinton 1991: 59-60)

A collective noun, as in *faculty* or *orchestra*, is a gestalt consisting necessarily of parts, although the whole is more than the simple sum of those parts. The faculty of a

[41] Recall Mazon's earlier statement that the acts comprising a habit appear "as a mass, as a sum." In Vendler's model, states are equivalent to mass nouns and events to count nouns (see, for example, Mourelatos 1978: 424ff).

university is a grouping of all the real professors of that university, but as a collective the faculty has considerably greater power than the sum of the isolated bits of influence that each individual faculty member has. An orchestra is a collective grouping of individual musicians acting as a single unit.

In other words, a habit is a gestalt with conceptual structure. According to Lakoff:

> Gestalts are at once holistic and analyzeable. They have parts, but the wholes are not reducible to the parts. They have additional properties by virtue of being wholes, and the parts may take on additional significance by virtue of being within these wholes. (Lakoff 1977: 246)

Lakoff contrasts gestalt structure with building-block structure, in which "the meaning of the whole is a function of the meaning of the parts" (Lakoff 1987: 284). A gestalt is "a whole that we humans find more basic than the parts" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 70).

Savan illustrates the difference between building-block and gestalt structure by analogy to the relationship between individual (isolated) musical notes and a melody:

> The habit does not exist at any one moment, as does a musical note. Like a melodic pattern of notes, the habit spans a succession of momentary occurrences. The habit, unlike an occurrence, is real through memory and expectation. The identity of the habit lies in its pattern of succession. (Savan 1988: 45)

The melody is created not by the individual notes themselves, but by the relations between them. Anttila has in fact noted that in a gestalt "the relations are not contained in the parts of the whole, but obtain between them" (Anttila 1991: 35), making the gestalt configuration much more than the sum of its parts.

Roughly the same description of the melody-as-habit applies to habituality in language: the asserted habit represents a focus on the relations obtaining between the presupposed actual instances that comprise it. Habitual verbs in Czech therefore report the existence of a system (a whole) that assumes the existence of a series of repeating situations (the parts of the whole). The habitual form interprets the iteration of a situation as necessary background to the assertion of a general rule that profiles the relations between the tokens of the habit by patterning or systematizing their repetition.

Advantages of the semiotic and cognitive framework for habituality

A semiotic and cognitive approach to habituality provides a conceptually real framework for examining the linguistic encoding of habit. It does not rely on ad hoc theoretical notions that may or may not account for the linguistic expression of habitually in a conceptually plausible way, and it allows for explicit parallels to be drawn between the everyday notion of habit and the structure of habitual propositions in language.[42] To that extent, it also explains why habituality is manifested not just in verbs, but also in

[42] Peirce intended his semiotic account to go beyond even human behavior and to be universally applicable for all sign systems. He wrote, for example: "Empirically we find that some plants take habits. The stream of water that wears a bed for itself is forming a habit" (CP5.492).

nouns: as a representation of gestalt structure, habit is a fundamental principle of conceptual organization that is, not surprisingly, pervasive in cognition and language.

Peirce's semiotic treatment of habit communicates this point better than the more limited cognitive accounts. The Peircean distinction between the levels of Secondness and Thirdness in a habit subsumes Langacker's notion of the actual and structural planes of knowledge. In proposing his model, Langacker is attempting to independently motivate the observed linguistic behavior of general validity predications and repetitives; he is essentially trying to recreate Peirce's general description of sign behavior by extrapolating from a limited set of linguistic data.[43] The result is a somewhat awkward framework that is not wholly generalizable to the Czech data: the structural plane implies knowledge of "how the world works", but this is hardly relevant, as Dickey has pointed out, to past-tense habitual situations that are arguably much more actual. Moreover, the fact that Czech habitual verbs seem to report generalizations grounded solidly in personal experience also falls somewhat outside the category of "how the world works." Peirce's analysis is both broader than Langacker's and more flexible. The distinction between Secondness and Thirdness that is implicit in habituality provides a necessary conceptual (semiotic) structure for mediating between the different kinds of linguistic encoding of habit and habits in human behavior.

As a framework for analyzing the meaning and behavior of Czech habitual verbs, the semiotic and cognitive approach accounts for all the facts reported by previous analyses and is able to go beyond these facts to account for other, equally important, meanings associated with the verb that have not been mentioned in earlier treatments. The semiotic and cognitive approach is, in fact, an outgrowth of earlier treatments in that it completes the shift from a bottom-up to a top-down semantic description by subsuming prior claims in a broader discussion of the notion of habituality.

The two meanings present in all usages of the verb, Kopečný's features of non-actuality and iterativity, follow necessarily from the larger framework of habituality. The feature of non-actuality is understood as a consequence of a habit being defined over a number of different occasions with a view toward the indefinite future. Czech habitual verbs, as assertions of a general rule (located in the "structural" plane), provide no information regarding the moment of speech (in the "actual" plane). The same is true of everyday habits: if someone is a smoker, this does not imply that the person is necessarily smoking at any given moment. As for the feature of iterativity, for a habit to be real it must be supported by actual or believed instances or replicas. These instances are taken as representative samples of a larger type. The habit itself is embodied in the type.

The semiotic and cognitive framework also motivates the varying degrees of iteration, along with Širokova's feature of indeterminate iterativity, that occur with these verbs. A habitual proposition represents a general rule that is inferred from a number of instantiations. The general rule is not necessarily dependent on the existence of a large number of tokens, and the focus of a habitual proposition is on the level of the rule (the higher-order relationship on the structural plane), not on the actual replicas of it. It is therefore not surprising that most habitual verbs in Czech occur in contexts without

[43] Danaher 1998 argues that the same is true for Lakoff and Johnson's attempts to philosophically ground conceptual metaphor theory.

explicit specifications of frequency: degree of iteration is of secondary importance in the general semantic description of the verb form since the actual instances that comprise the habit are backgrounded in the habitual gestalt.

The status of Kučera's and Filip's quantification analysis can also be clarified within the present approach. Quantification is not itself a sufficient explanation for the verb form's semantics, but ought rather to be seen as a necessary component of habitual evaluation. To focus a semantic analysis on the quantification function itself merely begs the question of what motivates quantification in the first place, and this question can only be answered by understanding the role of quantification in habitual construal. The question of the status of non-quantified forms requires more explanation and will be discussed in chapter 6. This leaves unmotivated only Filip's claims about hedging and modality, which I will revisit to a certain extent in this chapter and then contextualize within the semiotic and cognitive framework in the chapters that follow.

This chapter concludes with a more detailed application of the semiotic and cognitive framework to two specific issues: contexts where a habitual verb co-occurs with a seemingly absolute specification of frequency and the behavior of habituals under negation.

The scope of adverbials denoting universal quantification

The fact that habituals evaluate iteration on a higher level than simple iteration has a curious effect on the meaning of frequency adverbials that co-occur with them: the meaning of the adverbs is often devalued. Most contexts in the corpus (over three-fourths of all examples) do not include explicit frequency specifications, which also indicates that adverbs of frequency do not typically co-occur with habitual forms and that the exact strength of the general tendency reported by the habitual form is not usually relevant to communicative intent.

Filip has suggested that habitual verbs in Czech can combine with specifications of absolute frequency ("always") only in non-quantified past-tense contexts, yet, as I noted earlier, contexts with specifications of absolute frequency ("always" and "never") account for almost a third of all examples in the corpus where degree of frequency is made explicit, and a number of these are morphologically present usages. Filip's claim, as stated, does not hold, but the spirit of her argument does to the extent that absolute specifications of frequency in combination with habitual forms do not express universal quantification, but rather serve as a measure of the habit's overall strength. Peirce wrote: "Habits have grades of strength varying from complete dissociation to inseparable association [...] The habit-change often consists in raising or lowering their strength of a habit" (CP 5.477). When explicit specifications of frequency co-occur with habitual verbs in Czech, they indicate the strength of the general rule reported by the verb; their scope does not extend to the individual subsituations that are backgrounded in the habitual assertion. In combination with habitual forms, seemingly absolute frequency specifications denote an intensification of the habit's strength.[44]

[44] Kučera has suggested (personal communication) that in these contexts the absolute frequency adverbial is itself quantified.

Note the following four contexts, which all contradict Filip's claim about co-occurrence with *vždycky* ("always"). The first two are morphologically present, and the last two are morphologically past (but quantified) contexts:

(1) Ruka v ruce se skepsí k utopismu kráčí pochopitelně i skepse k různým druhům a projevům ideologičnosti. Absolvoval jsem za život dost politologických debat, takže bych měl být v tomto směru na leccos zvyklý. Přesto i já — přiznám se — **bývám** vždy znovu zaražen tím, jak hluboce jsou mnozí západní lidé propadlí ideologií, oč víc než my, kteří žijeme v tomto skrz naskrz proideologizovaném systému. (Havel 1989b: 77)
(1) "Hand in hand with a skeptical attitude toward utopianism understandably goes a skeptical attitude toward various types and manifestations of ideological thinking. During the course of my life I have participated in enough political-science debates, so in this regard I should be accustomed to all kinds of things. In spite of this, I have to admit that even I **am always** again and again struck by how deeply addicted to ideology many people from the West are, even more so than those of us who have lived in this thoroughly ideologized system."

(2) Později jsme se už znali lépe, občas jsme se vídali, ale já se před ním nemohl zbavit určitého ostychu, který mi chronicky ztěžoval styk s lidmi, kterých si příliš vážím. **Bývám** před nimi **vždycky** v křeči, jaksi se trvale stydím, nevím přesně za co, snad za všechno: že nejsem tak vzdělaný, nebo tak přesný v myšlení, že jsem ještě tak málo udělal, že se těším nezasloužené pozornosti. (Havel 1990b: 153)
(2) "Later we already knew each other better and saw each other from time to time, but around him I was never able to get rid of a certain feeling of embarrassment, which has always made it difficult for me to associate with people whom I respect greatly. Around them I **am always** somehow cramped up, I am continually embarrassed, without knowing quite why, maybe for everything: that I'm not as educated, or not as precise in my thinking, that I have accomplished so little, that I enjoy undeserved attention."

(3) Má pochybovačská nálada není vskutku ničím víč než právě jen náladou — ve větší či menší míře ji zná snad každý a já ji **míval vždycky**, teď má jen vzhledem k mému současnému postavení vděčnější podmínky. (Havel 1990a: 160)
(3) "My self-doubting mood is really nothing more than that — a mood. Everyone is familiar with this mood to a greater or lesser extent, and I **have always had** it off and on; it's just that now, in my present situation [in prison], conditions are more conducive to it." (1989a: 169)

(4) Občas ji zavolal, pozval ji do kina nebo do kavárny, přišel, když se sešla celá parta [...] Několik dní čekala, že ji zavolá, a když se nedočkala, zavolala ho sama, jen tak, jako **si vždycky volávali**. Hlas měla klidný, snažila se zřetelně vyslovovat koncovky. (1987: 29)
(4) "He called her from time to time, to invite her to the movies or to a cafe. He showed up when everyone got together [...] For several days she waited for him to call and, when he didn't, she called him, casually, just like **they always used to call each other**. Her voice was quiet and she tried to pronounce all her endings clearly."

In example (1), the habitual form *bývám* (< *být* "to be") asserts that Havel generally has such an impression of Westerners; the adverb *vždy* modifies the verb not in terms of absolute quantification, but by emphasizing that this is a strong recurrent feeling. Similarly, in (2), *vždycky* does not report that he is, absolutely speaking, always "cramped up" before these people, but that he has a definite tendency to be so and it happens quite often. In example (3), the verb *míval* (< *mít* "to have") in combination with the adverb *vždycky* ("always) does not denote that Havel has always been in a doubting mood. The adverb itself modifies the higher level of habit: Havel has always had a strong disposition to be in a doubting mood. Finally, in example (4), *vždycky* ("always") modifies the general rule expressed by the habitual verb *volávali si* (< *volat si* "to call one another"). The adverb serves to strengthen the general rule established by the habitual verb. Asked to respond to the substitution of the corresponding imperfective simplex verb for the habitual (*volali si* for *volávali si*), native speakers said that the emphasis would fall more on an impression of regularity: "They call each other absolutely every day."[45]

The intensification produced by *vždycky* in combination with a habitual form is like the effect produced by "always" in the following sentence: "You always say that." In this sentence, the speaker is not suggesting that every time the person says something, he says that (whatever that is), but rather that the person has a strong habit of saying that particular thing on a given occasion. Note example (5):

(5) Matka se zamilovala a v roce 1950 si vzala svého manžela přesto, že rodiče sňatku nepřáli. S půjčkou od rodiny si otec Josef v roce 1946 pořídil vlastní obchod. Krátce nato, komunistický stát zkonfiskoval jak tento obchod, tak majetek jejích rodičů. Protože Josef byl manželem dcery kdysi bohatého sedláka, byl přinucen pracovat v zemědělském družstvu. Matka Zdislavy tak zůstala sama se svými nemocnými rodiči a s manželem, který o práci v zemědělství neměl ponětí. "Maminka o těch časech nerada mluvila, a když musela, tak se slzami v očích." Její matka **vždy říkávala**: "Tatínek mě musel mít moc rád, když to všechno musel se mnou vytrpět." (Hraba 1999: 86)
(5) "Her mother fell in love and in 1950 she married her husband against the wishes of her parents. In 1946, with a loan from his family, her father Josef opened up his own business. Soon after, the communist state confiscated his store as well as her parents' estate. Because Josef was married to the daughter of a once rich farmer, he was forced to work in a farming collective. Zdislava's mother was thus left with her sick parents and with a husband who had no desire to work in farming. "Mother doesn't like to talk about those times, and when she has to, she has tears in her eyes." Her mother **always used to say**: "Seeing everything he had to go through with me, Dad must really love me.""

[45] Evaluations of contextualized usage, sometimes contrastive between habitual and imperfective simplex forms, are based on the results of interviews conducted with native speakers of Czech. For the contrastive evaluations (which are used most extensively for the analysis in chapter 6), speakers were presented with a choice of an imperfective simplex or habitual form in the given context and were asked to evaluate which form was more acceptable. If both forms were acceptable, speakers were asked to say how the meaning of the sentence changed if one form was used instead of the other.

This example also contradicts Filip's claim on technical grounds (it is a past-tense quantified context), but not in spirit since *vždy* here reports not absolute quantification, but intensification of the habit.

Not only expressions of seemingly absolute frequency, but also expressions that would seem to deny all frequency can combine with habitual verbs:

(6) "Pan docent tu není?" zeptala jsem se nepohotově.

Pomocnice mě okamžik pozorovala laskavýma, vyboulenýma očima, od kterých se vějířovitě rozbíhalo moře vrásek [...]

"Chtěla jsem mu uklidit stůl," zahučela rozvážným altem. Podívala se na mě znova zkoumavě, pak mi naznačila rukou, abych za sebou zavřela dveře. "Je to divný," pokračovala pak rychlým a věcným šepotem, "jeden šuplík má zamčenej, a **nikdy** ho **nemívá** zamčenej. A nepasuje mi do něj žádnej klíč." (Bělohradská 1992: 88)

(6) ""Is the head doctor here?," I asked, unprepared.

The cleaning woman observed me for a brief moment with her tender, swollen eyes from which ran, fan-like, a sea of wrinkles [...]

"I wanted to straighten up his desk," she murmured in a deliberate alto. She looked at me once again searchingly, then indicated to me with her hand to close the door. "It's strange," she continued in a quick and matter-of-fact whisper, "one of his desk drawers is locked and he **never has** it locked. And none of my keys fit the lock."

The meaning of the adverb *nikdy* ("never"), in combination with the habitual phrase *nemívá* (< *mít* "to have") *ho zamčenej*, is distorted. The verb reports that, as a rule, the doctor does not lock the drawer. The adverb *nikdy* intensifies the strength of the rule; in combination with the habitual verb, however, it cannot report that on every possible occasion the rule did not hold. After all, to report that the drawer is absolutely never locked would be a blatant untruth because the drawer is in fact locked at the moment of speech. Replacing the habitual form with an imperfective simplex (*nikdy ho **nemá** zamčenej*) shifts the scope of the adverb from the higher level of habit to the individual instances of simple iteration: the imperfective simplex sentence tends to be read as an absolute negation of all possible instances, that is, as a statement of absolute fact.

Evidence from the behavior of habitual verbs under negation

Another way of demonstrating that habitual verbs in Czech profile a higher level of evaluation of an iterative situation is to examine the entailments of negated contexts. As example (6) indicates, the actual instances of iteration are backgrounded in habitual evaluation and do not therefore fall directly within the scope of negation. As with absolute specifications of frequency, negation of a habitual form reduces either the overall strength of the affirmative habit or the intensity of the event reported by the verb. In other words, the negation is processed in such a way that it does not conflict with the requirements of habitual construal. Habitual verbs report a state that is composed of a sereis of individual sub-situations, and negation of all possible sub-situations would mean that the habit itself could not persist. In negated contexts, the existence of the habit as a general tendency is qualified, but not denied.

In my corpus there are 23 examples of negated habitual verbs, which represent only 6.1% of all examples. No previous analysis of the semantics of Czech habitual verbs has considered contexts under negation. An examination of these contexts provides important evidence for a general semantic analysis of the verb form, evidence that is consistent with an approach grounded in the semiotic and cognitive framework. To the extent that the verb under negation cannot negate absolutely, an examination of these contexts also indirectly confirms Filip's intuition that habitual verbs in the affirmative must leave room open for counter-examples and provides direct evidence supporting Filip's claims that habitual verbs can represent "sentential modal operators" or hedging devices.

Consider the following examples illustrating the differences in scope of negation for habitual verbs and corresponding imperfective simplex forms in the same contexts:

(7) Slíbil ve svém spise of psychologii důkazy pro nesmrtelnost, ale v přednáškách, pokud vím, o tom blíž **nemluvil**$^{\textbf{impf}}$**/nemluvíval**$^{\textbf{hab}}$. (Čapek 1990a: 94)
(7) "In his writing on psychology he promised proof of immortality, but in his lectures, as far as I know, he **didn't speak** more closely about it."

(8) Pak zvonil telefon ještě jednou, ale nikdo se v něm neozval, slyšela jen čísi dech. Několikrát volali k telefonu Galju, jejich sousedku, dřív **neměla**$^{\textbf{impf}}$**/nemívala**$^{\textbf{hab}}$ tolik hovorů. Galja odpovídala neurčitě, zaobaleně, a když zavěsila, skopila oči a rychle odešla. (Rybakov 1987: 80)
(8) "Then the telephone rang once more, but no one answered. She only heard someone breathing. Several times Galya, their neighbor, was phoned. Before she **didn't used to get** so many calls. Galya would answer uncertainly, ambiguously. When she hung up, she would lower her eyes and quickly leave."

In (7), the past-tense habitual form *nemluvíval* (< *mluvit* "to speak") yields the reading, according to one native speaker, that "he mentioned [the proof of immortality] from time to time, but he didn't analyze it, he didn't analyze it in depth." This reading works well with the adverb *blíž* "more closely". When the corresponding imperfective simplex form *nemluvil* is substituted, however, the most natural reading is that the lecturer "didn't mention it at all." In other words, all possible situations are negated: the subject was never touched upon. In example (8), Galja did receive phone calls before, but not as many. Native speakers reported that the sentence with the imperfective form (*neměla*) would tend to mean *vůbec neměla* ("she never got any"). For imperfective simplex forms in iterative contexts, the scope of negation typically covers all possible moments at which the situation might have held, and the situation is explicitly denied at all these moments. For habitual verbs, however, the validity of the situation is not denied across the board: the lecturer did mention it on occasion, but not in any significant way, and Galja did receive calls, just not so many. The scope of the negation is not the existence of occasions at which the situation held, but rather the quality of the state asserted by the habit.

The different construals resulting from negation of habitual verbs and imperfective simplex forms in the same context are analogous to the difference in entailments between the statements "He is not an alcoholic" and "He doesn't drink

alcohol." The first statement negates a habit while the second negates an assertion of simple iteration. In the first statement, he may very well drink on occasion, but the individual instances of drinking have not been unified into a pattern of abuse. The habit is denied, but not every occasion of drinking that could potentially result in a habit. In the second statement, the natural reading is that all possible occasions of his drinking alcohol are denied.

In this respect, negated habitual forms are naturally used in contexts where something is asserted to be generally untrue, but, at the same time, true in a particular instance that the speaker then goes on to describe. The negated habitual, because it does not report absolute negation, can be used to imply the existence of counter-examples. Recall example (17) from chapter 1, in which a journalist initially states, with the negated habitual form *nebývá* (< *být* "to be"), that he is not in the habit of polemicizing with disgruntled readers, but then goes on to immediately contradict his habit by engaging in a polemic. Example (9) below is similar:

(9) Týž večer jsem byl zadržen a odvezen na okrsek VB v Krakovské ulici, kde mi dva příslušníci StB připomněli to, co mi v Praze sdělili jiní už při mé minulé návštěvě: že když hned neodjedu zpátky na Hrádeček, budu zavřen /obvinění je prý už připraveno/. **Nebývá** sice **zvykem** policie radit lidem, aby před svým zavřením unikali odjezdem na svou chalupu, přesto tato varování z různých důvodů nepodceňuji. Těmto pánům jsem nicméně řekl, že pokud jsem na svobodě, budu se také svobodně rozhodovat o svých pohybech. (Havel 1990b: 319)
(9) "That same evening I was stopped and taken to the district police station on Krakovská Street, where two agents of the State Police reminded me of what others had already informed me of during my last visit to Prague: that if I don't go immediately back to Hrádeček, I will be arrested (they said that the arrest warrant had already been prepared). It is true that it **is not the habit** of the police to advice people to flee for their country homes before being arrested; despite this, and for various reasons, I do not underestimate such warnings. Nonetheless, I told these gentlemen that while I was still a free man, I would decide freely about my movements."

Here Havel uses the negated habitual phrase *nebývá zvykem* (< *být* "to be") to emphasize the irony of having been advised by the police to flee the city before being arrested. The fact that this is not generally how police operate does not prevent the Czech police from deviating from this established norm in their relations with Havel.

Given these considerations, it is easy to see how a negated habitual can be understood, in certain contexts, as a hedging device or as an assertion that denies absolute commitment to the validity of the statement without denying the truth of the statement in general terms. The next three examples clearly illustrate the potential for hedging:

(10) Mé názory o socialismu vyplývají z mého pojmu demokracie; revoluce, diktatura může někdy rušit špatné věci, ale **netvoří**^{impf}**/netvořívá**^{hab} dobrých a trvalých. (Čapek 1990a: 126)
(10) "My opinions of socialism are derived from my ideas of democracy. Revolution or dictatorship can sometimes abolish bad things, but they **don't create** good and lasting things." (Čapek 1934: 182)

(11) Berjozin kormidluje k Sašovi Pankratovovi. Má Jura všechno zmlčet? Žádné přátelství mezi nimi nebylo, bylo to nepřátelství. Bydleli v jednom domě, byli stejně staří, a tak spolu chodili do školy.

"Víte," řekl Jura a pečlivě promýšlel každé slovo, "**my se** vlastně už **nevidíme**[impf]**/nevídáme**[hab]. I dřív jsme vídali jen náhodně — jak se potkávají lidi z jednoho domu. A teď jsme se rozešli na všechny možné strany." (Rybakov 1987: 315)

(11) "Berjozin is steering toward Sasha Pankratov. Should Jura keep quiet? After all they weren't friends; if anything they were enemies. They lived in the same building, they were the same age, and so they went to school together.

"You know," Jura said and carefully considered his every word, "**we** really **don't see each other anymore**. Even before we only saw each other now and then because we lived in the same building. And now we've gone in completely different directions.""

(12) Celou tu cestu se prakticky v každé vesnici staví a přestavují. To také **není**[impf]**/nebývá**[hab] příznak krize. (*Lidové noviny*)

(12) "The whole way, practically in every town, people were building and remodeling. This also **isn't** a sign of a crisis."

In (10), revolution does create something, but it does not necessarily create something good and lasting. Native speakers reported that the imperfective simple *netvoří* would mean that it is simply not true and that there was nothing more to discuss; it would be read as a strong statement of negation. The habitual form *netvořívá* is less certain because not all possible cases to the contrary can be ruled out. The habitual verb is used to make the point, but not unequivocally.[46] In example (11), native informants report that the negative habitual form *nevídáme se* (< *vidět se* "to see one another") works well with the adverb *vlastně* ("really") because the adverb implies that they do still see each other now and then. The imperfective *nevidíme se* would tend to mean that they don't see each other at all, that their friendship has ended. In the original context, the habitual form is used, which is perfectly consistent with Jura's desire to tell the truth to the investigator (it could be easily established that they saw each other from time to time), but at the same time to avoid creating the impression that he knows Sasha too well. Example (12) is taken from a newspaper article recounting a trip across the Czech Republic on a bicycle, which the journalist took ten years after the Velvet Revolution. Although most people he talked to spoke of the country as being in a state of crisis, the journalist notes that the construction and reconstruction going on all along his route did not support claims of an economic crisis. Here the journalist does not want to make a strong statement denying the purported crisis, and instead uses the habitual form in his denial, perhaps to lightly ironize such overdramatic claims. Native speakers reported that the imperfective simplex *není* would indicate that this is definitely and unambiguously not a sign of a crisis; the habitual form means *může to být ale nemusí* ("it could be but it doesn't have to be"). By using the latter form, the journalist hedges his assertion to allow for the possibility that his interviewees may have been telling the truth.

[46] The original context contained the habitual form.

In all of these examples, the scope of negation is the general rule or law asserted by the habitual verb. To this extent, the negated contexts are parallel to contexts with seemingly absolute specifications of frequency: the scope of the adverbial does not cover the individual subsituations. In other words, negated habitual verbs cannot report the total absence of occasions on which the proposition defined by the verb holds.

In considering the effect of combining absolute specifications of frequency and negation with habitual verbs, it is helpful to return to the analogy made between habitual construal and the structure of collective nouns. In conceptualizing habitual situations and collective nouns, it is possible to distinguish two levels: the level of the individual unit of the collective (the individual subsituation or the individual subject entity of the general validity predication) and the level of the gestalt. The distinction between a professor and the faculty or a first violinist and the orchestra is conceptually correlative to the distinction between a subsituation or a subject entity and a general validity predication. The habit cannot exist without the individual entities that comprise it just as an orchestra cannot exist without musicians, but the habit is more than the sum of its subentities just as the orchestra is more than a mere grouping together of musicians. Implicit in the structure of a collective noun is a scope of assertion that extends to the collective grouping as a whole and not to individual units of which the collective is necessarily composed. This is equivalent to the scope of evalution exhibited by adverbials and the negative particle in combination with habitual verb forms in Czech. In the statement "The faculty at Harvard is accessible to undergraduates," the scope extends to the faculty considered as a gestalt. If one faculty member happens to be aloof and disdains involvement with undergraduates, the assertion itself is not contradicted. Similarly, given the statement "The orchestra did not play at all well," it is still possible that some individual musicians within the orchestra played extraordinarily well, but that the general performance of all the musicians considered as a single mass was poor. The scope of the assertion extends only to the aggregate units just as the scope of negation with habitual verbs extends only to the habit considered as a single conceptual unit.

Summary

In this chapter, I have proposed a framework to be used to make sense of the data in the corpus. The semiotic and cognitive framework is not merely an attempt to account, somehow, for the patterning of the data, but to motivate the observed patterns in the data in a pragmatically meaningful way. To do so requires stepping outside of language and attempting to understand habituality in more general terms. In this respect, the semiotic and cognitive approach is a logical outgrowth of previous research trends that have moved steadily away from a narrow, feature-based treatment to a top-down account that relies on more broadly cognitive notions like modality and habituality.

The present approach can account for the phenomenon of habitual construal not just in verbs, but also in nouns and not just in language, but in behavior in general. In the semiotic and cognitive approach to habituality, the linguistic expression of habit is viewed as a token of a larger semiotic or cognitive type. Langacker calls this type the profiling of a higher-order relationship on the structural plane, other cognitive linguists

speak of gestalt (versus building-block) structure, and Peirce, most broadly of all, characterizes it as a general principle of sign systems.

Chapter 4

Habitual Verbs and Conceptual Distancing

Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to examine in detail the semantics of Czech habitual verbs in past morphology in light of the framework introduced in the previous chapter. It will be recalled from the first and second chapters that traditional analyses focus on the distant-past meaning associated with the verb form. Kopečný mentions the "distant-past nuance in meaning" (1962: 65) expressed by the verbs, although its exact status cannot be clarified in the context of his feature-based analysis. Following Kopečný, other Czech linguists have attributed a distant-past reading to morphologically past instances of these verbs. Havránek and Jedlička (1960: 232), for example, note: "Their past forms […] tend to express the notion of an emotionally colored recollection of the distant past."[47] Similarly, Němec writes (1958: 197): "In the past [they express] iteration that is temporally remote, distant-past." Kopečný's analysis survives even in the most recent Czechoslovak Academy Grammar, which asserts that the verbs "have a special connotation of the distant-past" (*Mluvnice*: 184).

As discussed in chapter 2, A. G. Širokova and H. Kučera have both attempted to clarify the status of the distant-past meaning. Širokova (1965: 83) argues that a distant-past reading is dependent on context. Taking the analysis one step further, she links the distant-past tendency to the feature of indeterminate iterativity that she claims is fundamental to the verb form: "The meaning of indeterminateness [indeterminate iterativity] is easily connected in the mind of a speaker with a meaning of greater duration and temporal distance" (1965: 84). Kučera has approached the question more systematically. It is enough to recall here that Kučera reaches the conclusion that the past continuum in Czech can be divided into a recent and a distant past. He compares Czech to Kikuyu as a language in which "distinct tense forms exist [...] for remote past and near past" (1981: 183). Like Širokova, he also senses a connection between some form of iterativity and a distant past, although he remarks: "I cannot present as yet an entirely satisfactory explanation of why the same verbal form may assume both functions" (1981: 183-4).

In this chapter, I will argue that, in order to provide a "satisfactory explanation" for the connection between iterativity and a distant past, the question must be approached from a broader perspective, in which the various meanings associated with the verb form are viewed as coherently related to each other. My intent is twofold: (1) to examine new data that shed significant light on the behavior of these verbs in past morphology, and (2) to demonstrate just how the tendency for these verbs to express a distant past, like other contextual meanings associated with the form, follows naturally from an understanding of these verbs as expressions of habituality.

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[47] The emotional coloring often associated with habitual verbs seems to be an implicature. See chapter 6 for discussion of this point.

New data

Of the 376 examples in my corpus, 241 or approximately 64% are morphologically past:

Table 1: Tense/mood distribution in 376 examples of habitual verbs

Tense/mood	Number of occurrences	Percentage of examples
Past	241	64.1%
Present	129	34.3%
Infinitive	6	2%

An analysis of the discourse contexts of these 241 morphologically past examples establishes the relative value of the distant-past meaning associated with the verb form (Table 2). Of the 241 morphologically past examples in my corpus, only 127 or 53% can be classified as unambiguously distant past; 91 occurrences or 38% remain ambiguous with regard to a distant-past reading. Most significantly, 23 examples or about 10% of the total number of morphologically past examples occur in contexts in which a distant-past reading is clearly not possible; the verb form is used to describe a situation valid in the recent past.[48]

Chart 2: Distant-past reading in 241 past examples of habitual verbs

Status of reading	Number of occurrences	Percentage of examples
Distant past explicit	127	53%
Distant past not explicit	91	38%
Recent past	23	10%

Prototypical examples of a distant-past meaning include the following (examples (1) and (2) are reprinted from the first chapter):

(1) Navrhl, abychom odešli; abychom se dali polní cestou oklikou k městu, tak jak jsme kdysi **chodívali**, kdysi dávno. (Kundera 1967: 309)
(1) "He suggested we leave, take a path to town through the fields, the way we **used to go** long ago." (Kundera 1982: 264)

(2) Tak co bych vám měl říci? Jako student jsem **hrával** kulečník a hrál jsem jej velmi špatně. (Jirotka 1999: 205)
(2) "What can I say? When I was a student, I **used to play** pool, and I played it very badly."

[48] Categorization with regard to pastness is a subjective undertaking, a point I return to below.

(3) Ta sebevražda byla možná z rodu sebevražd, jaké **páchávali** pruští důstojníci, zanechaní v pokoji sami s revolverem. (Jirotka 1964: 99)
(3) "The suicide was perhaps the kind of suicide **committed** by Prussian officers left alone in a room with a revolver."

(4) Na reálce mně malování jaksi nešlo, kreslení lépe; později jsem na gymnáziu měl rád deskriptivu, té nás mimořádně učil profesor matematiky Adam. Byl jsem slušný matematik, **hájíval** mě na konferencích v těch mých potyčkách s jeho kolegy. (Čapek 1990: 25)
(4) "In school I somehow wasn't very good at painting, I was better at drawing. Later, at the gymnasium, I liked geometrical drawing, which was taught as a special class by our mathematics professor, Adam. I was a decent mathematician, and he **used to defend** me at staff meetings in my disputes with his colleagues." (Čapek 1934: 35)

In example (1), the distant-past reading of the habitual verb *chodívat* (< *chodit* "to go") is made explicit by the phrase *kdysi dávno* ("a long time ago"). In (2), the speaker is reminiscing about his student days some 20 years before the moment of speech. In (3), the distant-past reading is made clear by the historical reference to Prussian generals. In (4), Masaryk is reminiscing about his childhood and a distant-past reading is therefore natural.

Examples that do not refer explicitly to a distant past, which represent more than one-third of the total number of examples, include the following (see also examples (3) and (4) from chapter 1 and example (6) from chapter 2):

(5) Perníková srdce na hrudích koní! Tuny papírových pentlí nakoupených ve velkoobchodě! Dřív **bývaly** kroje také barevné, ale prostší. (Kundera 1967: 264)
(5) "Gingerbread hearts on the horses' chests! Reels of paper ribbons bought in a department store! The costumes **used to be** colored before, but plainer." (Kundera 1982: 225)

(6) Byla jsem první Češka, kterou viděli. Vzhledem k tomu, že jsem **hrávala** závodně volejbal, mají pocit, že dobrý smeč je něco jako česká národní vlastnost. (*Lidové noviny*)
(6) "I was the first Czech they had ever seen. And since I **had played** volleyball competitively, they thought that being able to spike the ball well was something like a Czech national trait."

(7) [T]eď si nejsem jistý, kde se píší velká a kde malá písmena. Nedávno totiž nějací chytráci změnili český pravopis a mně teď není nic platné, že jsem vždycky **míval** z češtiny výborné známky. (Personal communication)
(7) "[N]ow I'm not sure where to write a small or a capital letter. A short while ago some smart-alecks changed Czech spelling rules and now it doesn't matter that I always **used to have** good grades in Czech in school."

In example (5), the present-day costumes in a traditional festival are described in ghastly terms, and it is noted that earlier the costumes were simpler; the meaning of the word *dřív*

("before/earlier") in this context is, however, ambiguous. In (6), it is clear from the larger context that the woman played competitive volleyball in her mid- to late-teens, which can hardly be termed objectively "distant" from her early twenties. Finally, in (7), the habitual verb *míval* (< *mít* "to have") is used to characterize a time period that may or may not have been in the objectively distant past.

The fact that morphologically past habitual verbs can also be used, although considerably less frequently, to report a more or less recent past has yet to be noted in the scholarly literature. Recent-past contexts in my corpus include the following (examples (8), (9), and (11) are reprinted from earlier chapters):

(8) "Přijde toho vždycky hodně najednou," rekla a vyfoukla neobratně kouř nosem. "Táta má infarkt."

"Infarkt?"

"Prý malý, daří se mu celkem slušně. Ale na mě je toho moc. **Bývala** jsem zvyklá, že rozhodoval všechno za mě, nikdy jsem se nemusela o nic starat, a teď..." (Bělohradská: 86)

(8) "Everything always happens at once," she said and awkwardly blew smoke out of her nose. "My father has had a heart attack."

"A heart attack?"

"Apparently a small one, he's doing okay. But it's too much for me. I **had been used** to him deciding everything for me. I never had to worry about anything. But now..."

(9) Milá Olgo, těžko si lze představit radikálnější STŘÍH, než jaký znamenala má nedávná změna působiště: po sedmi měsících samoty, klidu, tepla, nic-nedělání, najednou takový kolotoč [...] Má duše si už na tu změnu jakž takž zvykla, mému tělu to asi bude trvat delší dobu: včera mne přepadla nějaká nemoc, snad chřipka nebo co [...] Trochu se ozývaly hemoroidy, jsem všude trochu opruzen (zvlášť tam, kde **bývaly** vlasy a fousy), atd. atd. atd. (Havel 1990a: 55)

(9) Dear Olga, It would be difficult to imagine a more radical CUT than my recent change of workplace: after seven months of solitude, quiet, warmth, indolence — suddenly such a flurry of activity [...] My mind has more or less adjusted to the change, my body will likely take quite a while. Yesterday I came down with what may be the flu [...] My hemorrhoids are acting up again and my skin is raw and slightly chafed (especially where there **used to be** hair and whiskers), etc. etc. etc. (Havel, 1989a: 68)

(10) Denně hodinu až dvě chodím nebo si vyjedu na koni; snesu teď v sedle dobře dvě až tři hodiny, ale před několika léty jsem **jezdíval** i pět hodin. (Čapek 1990: 203)

(10) "I have one or two hours' exercise on foot daily, or else I go riding. I can stand two to three hours in the saddle now; a few years ago, I **could ride** for five." (Čapek 1934: 288)

(11) Teď jsem na jeho místě a všechno leží na mně. Zvykám si na to velmi pomalu (trvalo to měsíc, než jsem se jen osmělil usednout na židli v čele stolu, kde **sedával**). (*Lidové noviny*)

(11) "Now I'm in his place and everything is in my lap. I'm slowly getting used to it (it took a month before I even dared to sit in the chair at the desk where he **used to sit**)."

All the habitual verbs in these examples refer to situations that were arguably valid in the recent past. Example (8) reports that a daughter has lost the support of her father since his heart attack, and the heart attack occurs explictly in the recent past: note the use of the present tense form *má* (< *mít* "to have") to make the incident especially vivid. In (9), Havel describes a very recent move to another prison and the changes that accompany the move. In example (10), the context makes it clear that the habitual verb *jezdíval* (< *jezdit* "to ride") characterizes a period of time just a few years earlier. Finally, in example (11), which is taken from a newspaper interview with the new head of the Russian Orthodox church in the Czech Republic, the period of time when his predecessor "would sit" (*sedával* < *sedět* "to sit") in the chair came to end, due to his predecessor's death, slightly more than a month prior to statement.

Before reaching general conclusions about the behavior of Czech habitual verbs in the past, it will prove instructive to recall Kučera's treatment of the question. Kučera discusses the status of the distant-past meaning in his analysis of habitual verbs as quantified states. According to Kučera, habitual verbs generally report quantification over various elements of a sentence, but not all uses of habitual verbs exhibit quantification in this sense of the term. He illustrates this contention with the following examples (reprinted here from chapter 2):

(12) **Mívala** ho ráda.
(12) "She **used to like** him."

(13) **Znával** jsem ho dobře.
(13) "I **used to know** him well."

Here the habitual forms are derived from basic state terms, and there is no implication of quantification over any element of the sentence. According to Kučera, morphologically past instances of Czech habitual verbs without the possibility of quantification necessarily communicate a distant-past meaning, and this leads him to posit that the Czech past-tense continuum can be divided into a distant and non-distant past (Kučera 1981: 183).

As noted, however, in chapter 2, Kučera's treatment of the behavior of Czech habitual verbs in the past tense is incomplete. As examples in the corpus demonstrate, a distant-past reading quite frequently occurs in cases where quantification is, in fact, present, and these cases are not explicitly motivated in Kučera's approach. More significantly, not all examples of non-quantified habitual verbs in my corpus explicitly signal a distant past. Verbs of this type account for 38 examples in my corpus. Of these 38 examples, only 13 or 34% are explicitly distant past; of the remainder, 20 or 53% are ambiguous with regard to a distant-past reading and 5 or 13% report a more or less recent past. Since it is not based on a corpus of examples, Kučera's analysis unintentionally overstates the importance of those non-quantified contexts that it can successfully motivate. By focusing his analysis on an arguably marginal subset of all possible

contexts, Kučera's treatment improperly partitions the data and does not lead to an elucidation of the general case.[49]

As argued in chapter 2, these examples also raise the question of just exactly what the term "distant past" means; examination of the corpus leads to the conclusions that this question cannot be answered objectively. The inherent subjectivity of a distant-past reading is further exemplified in the results of a survey given to native speakers of Czech. The speakers were asked to evaluate the following statements, all containing the past-tense habitual *chodívali* (< *chodit* "to go") on the basis of their acceptability (perfectly acceptable, mostly acceptable, marginally acceptable, or unacceptable) and then to explain the rationale behind their evaluation[50]:

(14) V dětství jsme často **chodívali** k babičce.
(14) "As children, we often **used to visit** grandmother."

(15) Loni jsme často **chodívali** k babičce.
(15) "Last year, we often **used to visit** grandmother."

(16) Minulý měsíc jsme často **chodívali** k babičce.
(16) "Last month, we often **used to visit** grandmother."

(17) Minulý týden jsme často **chodívali** k babičce.
(17) "Last week, we often **used to visit** grandmother."

The time references in these sentences move from a pragmatically distant past (childhood) to a recent past (last week). The first three statements were judged to be perfectly acceptable by all speakers, but the last statement was considered only marginally acceptable or completely unacceptable. A similar test was carried out with variations on the statement ***Hrával*** *jsem často tenis, když jsem bydlel v Praze, ale už tam nebydlím 10 let* ("I often **used to play** tennis when I lived in Prague, but I haven't lived there for 10 years"). The sentence contains the past-tense habitual form *hrával* (< *hrát* "to play"), and time periods ranged from 10 years to one month ago. All statements were judged to be perfectly acceptable by all informants. These surveys suggest that verbs of this type are not inextricably associated with a distant-past reading in the minds of Czech speakers and that pragmatic context (grandmothers or tennis) influences acceptability judgements.[51]

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[49] An analysis of the behavior of non-quantified habitual verbs in the past tense is presented in Chapter 6.

[50] The sentences in the survey were intermixed with other sentences not containing a habitual form and were not presented in a discernibly patterned way.

[51] A survey of native English speakers was conducted with examples similar to the Czech ones above. Habitual verbs were rendered with the verbal paraphrase "used to": "We used to visit our grandmother often when we were little" and "When I lived in DC, I used to play tennis a lot, but I left DC for good 10 years ago." Speakers generally accepted "used to" in statements with temporal distance of a year or more, and statements reporting temporal distance of only a month were marginally acceptable for most

If degree of pastness is a matter of subjective construal and strongly dependent on pragmatic context, on what basis can an analysis of the past-tense behavior of Czech habitauls proceed? What do all the morphologically past examples in the corpus have in common, if anything, and is there a cognitively natural framework in which we can understand the behavior of habitual verbs in past morphology as coherent with their behavior in present morphology? A close analysis of the examples in the corpus yields the following conclusion: not all the past examples in the corpus report a *temporally* distant past, but all do report a *conceptually* distant past. Temporal remoteness is, in other words, just one possible — if quite natural — realization of conceptual remoteness.

A semiotic and cognitive account of conceptual distancing

> Broadly speaking, Peirce defined habit as:
> a specialization [...] of the nature of a man, or an animal, or a vine, or a crystallizable chemical substance, or anything else, that he or it will behave, or always tend to behave, in a way describable in general terms upon every occasion (or upon a considerable proportion of the occasions) that may present itself of a generally describable character. (Peirce: 5.538)

Two levels are involved in any habit thus formed: there is the level of the real or actual instances of the habit — the replicas or tokens of the habit — and the more abstract level of the habit itself, the habit as a law or "generalizing tendency" (Peirce: 1.409 and 6.204).

For example, a person cannot have acquired a drinking habit (cannot be an alcoholic) without some real experience with alcohol. On the other hand, being a habitual drinker implies much more than just some limited experience drinking alcohol. As argued in the last chapter, the habit itself is a general tendency that depends upon, but is not sufficiently defined by, a number of concrete instantiations of its general principle. It can be supposed, for example, that an alcoholic *would* have a drink given the opportunity to do so. In other words, a habit is a gestalt with complex structure: a number of more or less identical tokens is interpreted as exemplifying a general tendency or law, the validity of which is not actual ("is now") but potential ("would be"). Applying this Peircean understanding of habit to language, we can understand any habitual proposition as a general assertion that presumes the real or believed existence of a number of instances at which the general assertion proves to be valid. The replicas or instances of the habit are understood through the mediation of the general rule.

As we saw earlier, the account of habituality within the framework of cognitive linguistics follows this same broad outline. In cognitive terms, habituals are gestalt structures: they have parts, but the whole cannot be reduced to its parts. In Langacker's treatment, generics and habituals represent two distinct kinds of "general validity predications," that is, predications that do not profile individual instances but rather the "higher-order relationship (of genericity/habituality) that they constitute or manifest"

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speakers. Statements with temporal distance of a week were unacceptable to all speakers in the grandmother context and marginally acceptable to most speakers in the tennis context.

(Langacker 1996: 292). Langacker also notes that the "emergence and profiling of higher-order entities represents a pervasive and familiar linguistic phenomenon" (Langacker 1997: 199), and he therefore considers habituals and generics "verbal analogs" of collective nouns (Langacker 1997: 199).

Although they differ significantly in their scope and details, these approaches to habit all clearly demonstrate, each in its own terms, the indefinite and generalizing nature of habitual conceptualization. Taking the forest for the trees means engaging in a form of habitual construal; profiling the individual trees over the forest they comprise is a non-habitual mode of conceptualization. The distinction between habitual conceptualization and non-habitual conceptualization is strongly reminiscent of the "multiplicity-to-mass" image-schema transformation discussed in cognitive linguistics (see, for example, Lakoff 1987: 428-9, 440-4). This transformation is:

> natural in conceptual systems. In general, we find a systematic relationship between multiplicities and masses [...] Such a relationship is based on the commonest of everyday experiences: a group of similar individuals standing near each other looks like a mass when viewed from a distance. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 145)

Note also Gibbs and Colston: "Imagine a group of several objects. Move away (in your mind) from the group until the cluster of individuals start to become a single homogenous mass. Now move back down to the point where the mass once again turns into a cluster" (Gibbs and Colston 1995: 350-1). In this regard, we might also consider the view of a city from an airplane. The city is not temporally remote from the person in the plane, but the vantage point allows for the city to be viewed from a distance. Owing to her distanced perspective, the airline passenger is able to see the city as a single entity, as a gestalt, which is not at all the same thing as seeing the city from the ground, on foot, and in the middle of it. Spatial remoteness of this sort is essential to the adoption of a well-defined perspective.

The key point here is that, like the multiplicity-to-mass transformation and the air traveller's perspective, habitual forms of conceptualization encode construal *from a distance*. In the assertion of a habit, we take a metaphorical step backward from a set of actual events (considered in isolation from each other) and construe those events as being related to each other, at a higher level, as tokens of the same general rule. Habitual construal therefore presupposes conceptual distancing or a remote vantage point from which the multiple situations can be evaluated as one coherent unit, and this presupposition is entailed in both the semiotic and the cognitive approaches to habit.

Conceptual distancing: a solution to the distant-past puzzle

Temporal remoteness is one natural realization of conceptual distancing. As shown in Table 1, temporally remote situations are, in fact, favored in the corpus. Most of my examples are morphologically past (64% past to approximately 34% morphologically present)[52]; in past tense usage, distant-past readings are more frequent

[52] Admittedly, the import of this statistic is somewhat lessened by the fact that, as a rule, past tense forms tend to predominate over present tense forms in imaginative or narrative

than other readings by 53% to 47%. In a cross-linguistic study of grammatical expression of tense, aspect, and modality, Bybee has shown that there is a "clear asymmetry between the expression of habitual meaning in the present and its expressions in the past" in that "no grammaticization path leads to a strictly present habitual" (Bybee et al 1994: 151): that is, no language exists that has a grammaticalized present habitual without a grammaticalized past habitual.[53] In general, then, it can be said that usage of habitual forms is favored in the past, and this tendency seems related to the fact that habitual verbs encode conceptual distancing.

All the morphologically past examples in the corpus — whether they be explicitly distant past, not explicitly distant past, or recent past — necessarily imply evaluation of a situation from a distanced perspective. In other words, in every context there has been, pragmatically speaking, a clear rupture with the past. The remoteness that facilitates the use of a habitual form is a remoteness that is due primarily to the speaker's perspective on the situation: the repeating circumstances are evaluated as instances of a gestalt because the period of time over which those circumstances occurred has reached an unambiguous end.

By briefly returning to the examples discussed in this chapter, we can see how conceptual distancing is manifested. Example (1) reports nostalgic longing for the days when the situation was regularly valid, but those days have long been over and the speaker can evaluate them from a distanced perspective. In both (2) and (4), the habitual verbs are used to describe each speaker's student days, which have definitively ended and can be summarized from both a temporal and psychological distance. In (3), reference is made to a historically distant period and the presumed behavior of an indefinite set of actors in it. Although examples (5) through (8) do not report a unambiguously distant past in the temporal sense, they do report conceptually distant situations. In (5), aspects of the traditional festival have been dramatically altered, and the narrator can look on past incarnations of the festival with some nostalgia.[54] In (6), the young woman is able to summarize her participation in competitive volleyball with a habitual verb not because it happened long ago, but because her days as a volleyball played have definitively ended. In example (7), the speaker refers to his days as a student of Czech from the viewpoint of no longer being a student; the exact amount of time separating his student and non-student periods is not particularly relevant for understanding the use of the habitual form in the passage.

Even the recent-past examples depend upon conceptual distancing. In (8), the father's heart attack has forever changed his relations with his daughter, a definite rupture with the past has occurred, and that past chunk of time is therefore at some conceptual

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prose (Kučera 1982: 170). This is presumably equally (if not more) valid for memoiristic prose, which is a principal source of many examples of the verbs analyzed for this study.

[53] English currently has the morphologically past *used to* paraphrase without a grammaticalized present habitual. Bybee notes that a present form in English did exist at one point, but then disappeared (Bybee et al 1994: 155).

[54] One native informant reports that the habitual form (*býval*y) is better than the corresponding imperfective simplex form (*byly*) at least in part because the former emphasizes the contrast between the festival as it once was and is now, which is an evaluation consistent with a focus on a conceptually distant situation.

remove from the speaker.[55] In (9), the shift to a new prison has brought about a radical change in Havel's conditions and his attitude toward imprisonment, which seems to subjectively distance his earlier conditions (and his earlier self) from him; life in the old prison has been forcibly distanced from him, even though the temporal difference between old and new locations is minimal.[56] In example (10), Masaryk is getting older, and the days when he used to ride for five hours will not return. And, finally, in (11), the speaker's predecessor has died, and a bird's-eye view of who he was and what he used to do can be clearly established.

While *temporal* distancing is a possible reading only for past tense forms of the verb, *conceptual* distancing cuts across tenses and is a requirement for Czech habitual verbs in present as well as past morphology, although with morphologically present examples the existence of a remote perspective may be more difficult to see. Consider the following morphologically present contexts:

(18) Západní návštěvníci **bývají** šokováni, že Černobyl a AIDS tu nejsou zdrojem hrůzy, ale námětem vtipů. (Havel 1989: 118)
(18) "Visitors from the West **are** shocked that Chernobyl and AIDS are not sources of terror her, but the subject matter of jokes."

(19) Moravské písně jsou tonálně nepředstavitelně různé. Jejich myšlení **bývá** záhadné. (Kundera 1967: 133)
(19) "Moravian songs exhibit an unbelievably wide range of tonality. The rationale behind them **can be** puzzling."

Both contexts illustrate the need for the speaker to take a metaphorical step backward from the plane of concrete events in order to make a general statement that is hypothetically valid for an indefinite set of those events. In (18), the habitual verb *bývají* (< *být* "to be") reports a general rule: Western visitors tend to be shocked. The focus of the statement is not on the reaction of a specific set of Western visitors, but on the overall impression gleaned from the reactions of (presumably) a good sample of visitors over the years. If the imperfective simplex form *jsou* ("are") is substituted for *bývají*, native speakers report a shift in focus from an abstract, indefinite set of visitors to a concrete group of visitors who are most likely visible and can be counted. "Western visitors" is read more as "The [Those] Western visitors," that is, "the ones standing over there" or "the ones we know." Changing the verb form habitual to imperfective simplex puts the speaker in dramatically closer proximity to the actual context and concretizes the scene; the conceptual distance involved in the habitual generalization is eliminated. Similarly, in (19), Moravian songs are clearly being considered as a single, indefinite mass. The evaluation presupposes a wide acquaintance (whether actual or merely implied to be so)

[55] A native informant notes that the habitual verb implies that the former situation is "over and done with" and that a "new model" is now in effect.
[56] Given a choice between the habitual *bývaly* and the imperfective simplex *byly* in this context, one informant opted for the habitual form because the whole context strongly implied the contrast between Havel's present situation and his past one, and the habitual verb brought this contrast out in a much more expressive manner.

with Moravian music. In the evaluation, the speaker distances himself from a definite set of songs and induces a general typological characteristic: given any Moravian song, the rationale behind it may be puzzling. The perspective from which the assertion is made is, metaphorically speaking, a remote one.

The remoteness of perspective necessary for the evaluation of a situation with a habitual verb in present as well as past morphology is particularly clear in the following example:

(20) Možná jsem bláhový, ale pořád se nevzdávám naděje, že mi jednoho dne přijde od Tebe obsáhlý dopis, kde budou přehladně zodpovězeny všechny mé dotazy z různých dopisů a kde budeš reagovat na různé mé návrhy a úvahy. Několik základních dotazů teď pro jistotu zopakuji: dostala jsi všechny mé dopisy? Jak dlouho jsi byla v Jizerských horách? [...] S kým **se vídáš**? Kam **chodíváš**? (Havel 1990a: 68-9)
(20) "Call me a fool, but I still refuse to abandon hope that one day I'll receive a long letter from you in which all the questions in my letters to you will be clearly answered and in which you will respond to my suggestions and thoughts. For the sake of clarity, I will repeat some basic questions here: Have you gotten all my letters? How long were you in the Jizerské Hory? [...] Who **are** you **seeing**? Were **are** you **in the habit of going**?" (Havel 1989a: 81)

Here Havel is writing Olga from prison, a necessarily remote perspective. Olga is not in the habit of writing him detailed letters about her daily life. Almost totally uninformed on this account, Havel asks Olga to describe whom she has been seeing (*vídat se* < *vidět se* "to see") and where she has been going (*chodívat* < *chodit* "to go") over an indefinite period of time preceding the letter. Havel's physical remoteness from Olga — as well as his lack of communication with her — contributes to his usage of the habitual forms in asking for information about her comings and goings. The use of the habitual verbs in this context is facilitated by Havel's involuntarily distanced perspective on Olga's current social life.

Conceptual distancing is manifested in other ways in the usage of Czech habitual verbs. Here, however, I will briefly consider only two other realizations: modal distancing and discourse distancing. In a few contexts in my corpus, a habitual form, in opposition to its corresponding imperfective simplex in the same context, can be explicitly used to express modal distancing: the imperfective simplex in the context tends to report a fact while the habitual form shifts the reading from factual to hypothetical. Consider this example:

(21) [Č]asto **se říkává**^{hab}**/říká**^{impf}, že poznat o jazyk víc znamená žít o jeden život víc. (Čapek 1990: 65)
(21) "[I]t **is** often **said** that to know more than one language means to live more than one life."

Example (21) is taken from Čapek's account of his conversations with T. G. Masaryk about the latter's life. Native speakers judge the imperfective simplex *říká se* to mean that the aphorism that follows is more true (*pravdivé*). This form would tend to be used if the speaker himself had direct experience with the psychological effects of knowing

another language. In the same context, the habitual form *říkává se* renders the maxim less certain, less exact, or more hypothetical in nature. The speaker thereby distances himself from belief in or responsibility for the validity of the assertion. Čapek cites Masaryk as using the imperfective simplex form, which is fully consistent with the native speakers' judgments since Masaryk himself did indeed have direct experience with the implications of the aphorism. In this regard it is worthwhile to recall Filip's insight into the modal potential of Czech habituals and her speculation that an explanation for the relationship between indeterminate iterativity and a distant-past meaning "is to be sought in the intersection of modal and temporal semantics" (Filip 1993: 138-9).

Distancing at the discourse level takes a variety of forms, many of which will be examined in detail in the next chapter. For the purposes of the present chapter, consider the following two examples, both of which illustrate aspects of conceptual distancing in discourse:

(22) Se vstupem do nového roku **bývá** zvykem, že lidé uvažují o tom, co prožili v předchozím roce; i já o tom teď uvažuji a uvažuji tudíž i o tom, o čem jsem během toho roku uvažoval. (Havel 1989a: 133).
(22) "With the coming of the new year, it **is** customary for people to reflect on their experiences of the previous year; I, too, am reflecting on my last-year's experiences and I'm consequently also reflecting on what it was I reflected on during that year."

(23) A teď k tomu mému odsouzení: byl jsem na to vnitřně připraven, takže mne to nijak nepřekvapilo ani nezaskočilo. Přesto se mé rozpoložení po procesu dost změnilo: vymizely poslední zbytky nervozity (což je pochopitelné, protože nervózní člověk **bývá** z nejistoty, nikoli z jistoty). (Havel 1989a: 30)
(23) "And now about my sentencing: I was inwardly prepared for it, so it didn't surprise me or catch me off guard at all. In spite of this, my frame of mind after the trial has changed considerably: the last traces of nervousness have died out (which is understandable since nervousness **is** never from certainty, but uncertainty."

Example (22) represents a typical case of a habitual verb that introduces a new topic of discourse; the topic is, metaphorically speaking, approached from afar with a generalization about people's habits as the new year approaches, and then Havel zooms in on his own behavior on the occasion of one particular new year. Example (23) is a typical illustration of parenthetical distancing, in which the clause with the habitual verb is both physically distanced from surrounding discourse by parentheses and conceptually distanced from it by offering a generally valid explanation of Havel's concrete reaction after his sentencing; the parenthetical explantion covers the specific case but is by no means limited in scope to it.

Conclusion

In attempting to solve the Kučera's surrounding the semantics of Czech habitual verbs, we run into the problem that it is not valid to compare morphologically present contexts with morphologically past contexts directly. Instead, we need to appeal to a

mediating conceptual structure, preferably a real cognitive structure that exists independently of the analysis at hand, in which the behavior of the verb form across both tenses can be said to make sense. I have argued that the cognitively real mediating structure that allows for a successful semantic comparison across tenses, and provides thereby a solution to the puzzle, is the notion of habituality.

Habits are generalizations, and generalizations presuppose evaluation from a distance. One form that this conceptual distancing takes is a temporal one. However, the distant-past meaning often associated with Czech habitual verbs in the past tense is merely an implicature. The habitual verb in the past tense is not necessarily used to characterize a temporally distant past, but rather a period of time that is seen by the speaker from a remote perspective; that period of time can be temporally distant (the path of, so to speak, least conceptual resistance), ambiguous with regard to temporal distance, or, under certain pragmatic conditions, recent-past. In other words, the verb form in the past does not inherently express a distant past, but a distant-past situation lends itself to being described by use of this particular form; the explicit distant-past reading comes not from the verb itself, but from the larger pragmatic context in which it is embedded. This approach to habituals has two added advantages: it obviates the need for an objective definition of a "distant" past, a definition that is impossible to provide given the Czech data, and it is flexible enough to account for prototypical as well as less typical cases of habitual usage.

That conceptual distancing is an essential component of the semantics of the verb form was confirmed by its manifestation in other meanings associated with the verb form (modal distancing) and at other levels of usage (discourse distancing). Dickey (2000) also advances an argument in support of conceptual distancing with habitual forms, although not explicitly in the terms used here. Using the distinction Langacker has made between the structural and actual planes of knowledge (Langacker 1997; see chapter 3 for a discussion), Dickey has argued that "morphologically habitual verbs [in Czech] profile not only the arbitrary instances of habitual events in the structural plane, but also the structural plane itself, as opposed to the actual plane, as the location of the habitual events" (Dickey 200: 88).[57] The final two chapters explore further consequences of the habitual form's explicit reference to the structural plane or, more generally speaking, its prompting to partition the information it imparts in a cognitive space that is separate from, but not unrelated to, the speaker's reality space.

[57] In Dickey's reasoning, perfective and imperfective forms in Czech do not specifically profile the structural plane.

Chapter 5

The Discourse Function of Habitual Verbs

Introduction

Analyses of habitual verbs in Czech have generally failed to take into account the verb form's function in discourse. There are two exceptions to this. Stunová 1993 noted in passing that Czech habituals are often used in discourse-initial positions, serving as introductions to what follows:

> In some cases the Czech imperfective can operate at the macro-level, for instance with habitual verbs. The macro-characteristics of the imperfective in Czech depend largely on the context, i.e. the position of the verb in the text. The position of the macro-imperfective is in the majority of cases paragraph- or passage-initial, i.e. when an introduction of a series of iterative events is given. Such introductory sentences contain a high percentage of habitual verbs.[58] (Stunová 1993: 40)

Danaher 1996 pointed out that Czech habituals also tend to appear in discourse-final position.

In the literature on habitual/iterative verbs in other languages, the discourse level also seems to be all but ignored. The major exception here is Suh 1992b, which examined the differing discourse roles of the English verbal paraphrase *used to* and the auxiliary *would* in its habitual-iterative meaning. Basing his analysis on a corpus of English spoken discourse, Suh demonstrated that *used to* and *would*, which both describe past habitual situations, differ in their contribution to discourse organization. The former "often occurs in a topic statement at an episode boundary" while the latter "is used to elaborate, often successively, on specific points deriving from the topical frame provided by *used to* in narratives" (Suh 1992b: 860). Suh additionally notes that *used to* can also be used in parenthetical or backgrounded comments on the story and to summarize discourse, which, he argues, follows from the fact that *used to* "encodes past habituality in the verb itself without any ambiguity" (Suh 1992b: 864).[59]

The goal of this chapter is a comprehensive treatment of the discourse function of Czech habituals as they are used in my corpus. What discourse functions does the verb form have? How can we make sense of the range of discourse roles exhibited by these forms and at the same time understand the verb form's behavior in discourse as coherent with its status as an iterative or habitual/generic form? Traditional approaches to the

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[58] Stunová considers habituals to be a subset of the imperfective aspect. In her analysis, Czech aspectual selection in interated contexts operates on the level of the micro-event. Habitual verbs, which operate at the macro-level and denote gestalts, are therefore exceptional. Stunová makes the same point later: "[H]abitual verbs usually introduce a series of other iterative events which are often expressed by perfectives" (1993: 43).

[59] For more details on *used to* and *would*, see also Suh 1992a.

meaning of habituals that rely on discreet semantic features cannot even begin to shed light on these question.

Although the analysis presented here will be shown to cohere with the Peircean/Langackerian approach to the semantics of habituality adopted previously, certain problems raised by the verb form's discourse function cannot be adequately understood at the semantic level. As Fauconnier has noted:

> When a sentence is examined in isolation, and its interpretations are studied, it is necessary to construct implicitly a discourse in which to interpret it. By default, a *minimum* discourse is usually chosen, with the implication that this will yield the "real," "core," context-independent meaning of the sentence. This implication is unwarranted; there is no reason why the *particular* configuration associated with a linguistic expression in a minimum discourse should contain the defining characteristics for the meaning *potential* of that expression in other discourses. (Fauconnier 1997: 55)

This chapter therefore introduces a theory of discourse management, namely Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces (Fauconnier 1985 and 1997) as extended to tense-aspect categories in Cutrer 1994 (see also Dinsmore 1991), in order to account for the meaning potential of Czech habituals in discourse.[60] Analysis of the Czech data will add to Suh's work on the use of iteratives in discourse since the Czech habitual form cuts across tenses (unlike English *used to* and *would*), and the relationship between the various discourse roles played by the verb form is more easily understood.

Illustrations of the verb's discourse roles

Examination of the contexts in the corpus shows that verbs of this type fulfill a range of discourse functions. They are used (1) to introduce or shift discourse topics (Stunová's discourse-initial position); (2) to summarize ideas contained in a passage immediately preceding them (my earlier observation that the verbs also occur in discourse-final position); (3) in backgrounded discourse that is often explicitly parenthetical and occurs frequently with the conjunction *jako* (*jakýž*) ("like, as"); and (4) in comparative or contrastive discourse, often introduced by the conjunction *než* ("than").

It is not an easy matter to decide what role a verb does in fact play in a given chunk of discourse. The noted discourse analyst Deborah Schiffrin has mentioned the general difficulty of identifying discourse roles: "Another part of an idea structure [of a text] is its organization of topics and subtopics — what is being talked about. Unfortunately, I have no solution to propose as to how to find topics and subtopics, although it often seems intuitively very clear, especially when topics shift" (Schiffrin 1987: 26). Nor do I have a definite solution to propose regarding how to determine the individual discourse functions of Czech habituals, and it could be said that the four

[60] To my knowledge, this is only the second application, after Dickey's work on aspect (Dickey 2000), of the mental space framework to Slavic data, which is somewhat surprising given that it is a potentially powerful explanatory framework for a variety of linguistic phenomena.

categories delineated above are more or less ad hoc and that judgements based on the contexts in the corpus are merely intuitive on my part. However, I will argue, in using mental-space theory, that fuzziness of categorization is not a weakness of the analysis, but that it is inherent in the underspecified nature of the verbal representation itself.

Discourse-initial position and topic shifting

Typical examples of Czech habituals in discourse-initial position are given below:

(1) Stačí pozorovat, jak se lidé k sobě chovají v obchodech, úřadech, v dopravních prostředcích: **bývají** nerudní, sobečtí, nezdvořilí a neochotní; pro prodávající je zákazník často jen obtěžovačem, prodavačky ho obsluhují a přitom se baví mezi sebou o svých věcech, na dotazy odpovídají s nechutí (pokud na ně vůbec znají odpověď). Řidiči aut si nadávají, lidé ve frontech do sebe strkají, předbíhají se a okřikují. Úředníkům je lhostejné, kolik na ně čeká lidí a jak dlouho. (Havel 1989b: 135)
(1) "It is enough to observe how people behave toward each other in stores, offices, and on public transportation: they **are** boorish, selfish, impolite, and unhelpful. For salespeople the client is often just an inconvenience. Salesgirls serve him while at the same time amusing each other with their own matters; they answer questions with reluctance (if they can answer them at all). Drivers curse at each other. People waiting in lines jostle each other, cut in front of each other, and reproach each other. Bureaucrats are indifferent as to how many people are waiting to see them and how long they've been waiting."

(2) V jednom rozhovoru Iva Bittová kdysi řekla, že v Brně na její koncerty chodí pán, který si přeje, aby mu zahrála na pohřbu. "**Myslívám** teď na něho. Posledně na koncertě nebyl. Příště hraju v Brně koncem června, uvidíme. Věřím, že kdyby k němu smrt přišla, nějak by se mi ozval." (*Respekt*)
(2) "During an interview Iva Bittová once said that there was a man who would come to her concerts in Brno and who wanted her to play at his funeral. 'I've **been thinking** about him lately. He wasn't at my last concert. I'm playing Brno again at the end of June, so we'll see. I believe that if he died, he would somehow make it known to me.'"

(3) Někdy se mi **vracívá** sen, nevím odkud se mi vzal, snad z nějakého obrazu: ne moři loď a nad ní se naklání anděl s hodinami; čas po čase skane z těch hodin krůpěj do moře a anděl praví: Zas jedna minuta uplynula. Ten sen si vždycky uvědomuju jako výstrahu: Dělej, pracuj, dokud tvé minuty plynou. (Čapek 1990a: 201)
(3) "There is a dream which sometimes **comes back** to me — I don't know how I come to have it, perhaps it is a recollection of some picture — I see a ship on the sea and an angel bending over it with an hourglass; and every now and then a drop runs down from the hour-glass into the sea, and the angel says: "Another minute passed away." I always think of that as a warning: work, do something, while your minutes are passing." (Čapek 1934: 285).

(4) Je pravda, že jsem **míval**^{iter}**/měl**^{impf} **rád** železnice; ale přestal jsem je mít rád, když je zasvinila válka, přestal jsem je mít rád, když jsem na nich organisoval sabotáž, a nejvíc

jsem je přestal mít rád, když jsem přišel do ministerstva. Ze srdce se mi nechutila ta papírová a z větší části marná práce, které se říkalo reorganisace našich drah. (Čapek 2000: 289)
(4) "Yes, I **used to like/liked** the railways; but I could not like them any longer when they were messed up by war, when I made plans to sabotage them, and chiefly when I came to the Ministry. Sickened and disgusted by that paper and, for the most part, futile work called the reorganization of the railways."

In (1) a general assertion in discourse-initial position is made with the habitual verb *bývají* (< *být* "to be"): people are, or tend to be, selfish and impolite. The general assertion is then fleshed out with specific examples of how people behave selfishly and rudely in a variety of contexts. Example (2) is similar: Bittová introduces the topic with the iterative form *myslívám* (< *myslet* "to think") and then goes on to describe some of the specific thoughts that have been in her mind. In example (3), the reflexive habitual verb *vracívá se* (< *vracet se* "to return") introduces the topic of a recurrent dream that Masaryk had, and then the dream itself is described in detail in the sentences that follow.

It is apparent in my corpus that habituals can introduce long or short discourse topics. They sometimes occur in headlines of news articles and in general questions. One article from the newspaper *Lidové noviny* was entitled *Výjimečně nadané děti* ***mívají*** [< *mít* "to have"] *problémy* "Exceptionally gifted children **tend to have** problems;" the article then listed the possible problems to watch out for and ways in which the child's family can cope with them. Similarly, in an interview, Havel was asked the question "What kind of dreams have you been having?" or, in Czech, *Jaké míváte sny?* with the iterative verb *míváte* (< *mít* "to have"); the habitual verb sets the general frame for the discussion that Havel, in his answer, is expected to flesh out with specific details. In this respect, Czech habituals are similar to English *used to* in that they can frame a topic for discussion; the Czech verb form, however, can also be used in present morphology.

In other words, the habitual verb — in frequent opposition to its corresponding imperfective simplex in the same context — sets the stage for further commentary: use of habituals seems to establish the expectation that the topic will be commented upon in some way while imperfective simplex forms tend to be interpreted more as absolute statements of fact that require no further discussion. Czech habituals are generally not statements unto themselves, but windows for further reflection. We see this clearly in example (4). Native speakers report that use of the habitual *míval* (< *mít* "to have") here lends itself better to the opposition that follows whereas the imperfective simplex *měl* (the past tense form of *mít*) would be better without further context, that is, as a statement unto itself. In the original text, Čapek uses the habitual form.

Introductory discourse usually marks a shift of discourse topic. Most examples of discourse-initial habituals in my corpus occur paragraph-initially where the shift of topic is made graphically apparent. However, even within a given paragraph, the use of habituals to shift topics, if only slightly, is also common:

(5) Domov, který jsem miloval, k němuž jsem se utíkal [...] Domov, jejž jsem si zalidnil pohádkami, písněmi a dobráckými skřítky. Hle, na těchhle třech židlích jsme **sedávali** u našich obědů. Ach, ty vlidné obědy, u nichž byl chlacholen a balamucen hloupý a

důvěřivý živitel rodiny. Bral jsem do ruky jednu židli po druhé a ulamoval jsem z nich nohy... (Kundera 1967: 303)
(5) "The home I loved and in which I would seek refuge [...] The home I'd peopled with folktales, songs, and good spirits. On these very chairs we'**d sat** and eaten our dinners! Oh, those peaceful family dinners that saw the gullible breadwinner hoodwinked and bamboozled day after day. I picked up one chair after another and broke their legs off..." (Kundera 1982: 257)

(6) Tak co bych vám měl říci? Jako student jsem **hrával** kulečník a hrál jsem jej velmi špatně. Jednou jsem seděl v malé kavárničce a nějaký pán mne požádal, abych si s ním zahrál kulečník. Já jsem mu řekl, že to neumím, ale on povídal, že je také začátečník a že kdybych to uměl, neodvážil by se se mnou hrát. (Jirotka 1999: 205)
(6) "So what should I tell you about? As a student I **used to play** billiards and I played them very poorly. Once I was sitting in a small cafe and a man asked me to play. I told him that I didn't know how to play, but he said that he was also a beginner and that if I knew how to play, he wouldn't have asked to play with me."

In example (5) the habitual form *sedávali* (< *sedět* "to sit") marks a clear topic shift: the narrator is talking in general about his home and then focuses in on the chairs that they used to sit on for meals. He then describes those meals. In (6), the speaker is being interviewed by a young reporter. He explicitly searches for a topic and then shifts into one with the habitual form *hrával* (< *hrát* "to play").

Discourse-final position or summary discourse

In all of the above examples, the flow of discourse is from general to specific: the habitual verb asserts a general rule from a conceptually remote vantage point and thereby introduces a theme that is then exemplified or otherwise expanded. In Stunová's terms, the macro-level evaluation inherent in the habitual verb functions as a natural introduction to further discourse. A given theme can, however, also be developed in the opposite direction: discourse can flow from specific to general. In such cases habitual forms can be used in discourse-final position to sum up what has come before; that is, their character as macro-level evaluations proves to be communicatively effective also in summary positions.[61] Some examples of this second discourse role are given below:

(7) Prokopa si představovala, že se obrátí a řekne jí pravdu. Zešílela strachem, u její ruky ležely dlouhé nůžky, zvedla je a bodla. A podařilo se jí to. Josef nic netušil a svým postojem jí nabízel výhodnou polohu. Prokopa tak v naprosté nepoučenosti spáchala dokonalý zločin. Nesmyslná, nehorázná odvaha **mívá** často štěstí, o tom nás konečně mnohokrát poučila historie. (Bělohradská 1992: 135)
(7) "Prokopa imagined that he would turn around and tell her the truth. By her hand lay the long scissors. She became mad with fear, picked them up, and stabbed him. And she struck successfully. Josef didn't expect anything and his stance offered her an

[61] In many cases, discourse-final instances of Czech habituals could serve equally well in discourse-initial position.

advantageous target. Completely unschooled in murder, Prokopa committed the perfect crime. Unpremeditated, arrant acts of courage often **have** great success; history has taught us that many times over."

(8) Moravské písně jsou tonálně nepředstavitelně různé. Jejich myšlení **bývá** záhadné. (Kundera 1967: 133)
(8) "Moravian songs exhibit an unbelievably wide range of tonality. The rationale behind them **is** puzzling."[62] (Kundera 1982: 114)

(9) Je to všechno v tom, aby byl člověk takový, jaký je, nestyděl se chtít to, co chce, a toužit po tom, po čem touží. Lidé **bývají** otroky předpisů. (Kundera 1967: 184)
(9) "It means being what you are, wanting what you want and going after it without a sense of shame. People **are** slaves to rules."

(10) Takové chvíly zloby nejsou u mne nijak časté nicméně objevují se, a to pravděpodobně častěji, než tomu bylo na svobodě [...] Není to nálada špatná jen jako zážitek, ale i pro své objektivní důsledky; mé postavení mezi spoluvězni se totiž opírá o jednu dobrou věc — že jsem brán jako člověk, který je sice všemu otevřen, [...] který je ale takový především dík tomu, že je v podstatě nad věcí a celé to hemžení se zájmem a účastí pozoruje, aniž ho sám nějak moc zúčastňuje nebo si v něm ohřívá nějakou svou polívčičku. Opírá-li se ovšem postavení, dík kterému jsem respektován a nic moc si nikdo ke mně nedovolí, o můj klidně analytický vztah k věcem, je zřejmé, že každá navztekaná a mého postavení nedůstojné reakce se může obrátit proti mně a zproblematizovat celou mou pozici. Přesto takové nálady občas **mívám** a je mi v nich docela jedno, že se shazuji. (Havel 1990a: 167)
(10) "I don't often have such fits of anger, but they occur more frequently than on the outside [...] It's a bad mood not just for me personally, but also because of its objective consequences. My position among my fellow prisoners depends on one positive thing — they see me as an open person [...] who is that way mainly because he is essentially above things and observes the mad whirl with interest and compassion without having a particular little ax of his own to grind. But if the position that brings me respct and protects me depends on a calm, analytical attitude to things, then obviously every angry, undignified reaction on my part can jeopardize that position. Still, I **have** such moods from time to time and when I do, I couldn't care less about loss of dignity." (Havel 1989a: 175-6)

In (7), the passage begins with a detailed description of how Prokopa commits unpremeditated murder. The theme of this passage is then summed up in a proverb-like sentence containing the habitual form *mívá* (< *mít* "to have"). In (8) and (9), the topics in the initial sentences are summarized from a more general perspective in the sentences with habitual verbs that follow. In (10), Havel begins with specific details relating to angry moods he sometimes has in prison. He discusses the detrimental effects of the

[62] Heim's translation reads "is sometimes puzzling." The addition of the adverb, which is not present in the original Czech, is no doubt meant to more accurately render the habitual-iterative meaning of *bývá*.

moods on him and on relations with his fellow inmates, then he summarizes the passage with a habitual verb that reports that, despite these bad effects, he has the moods anyway.

In all four examples, the habitual verb not only summarizes the previous discourse topic, but also seems to lend a tone of finality to the passage, which is difficult to capture by one verb in English translation. In light of this, it might be said that habituals in discourse-final position may sometimes serve as discourse codas.

Backgrounded or parenthetical discourse

Habitual verbs are frequently used in backgrounded comments on a focal discourse topic. Sometimes these comments are marked as parenthetical in the text itself, and sometimes they are introduced by the conjunction *jako* ("like, as"). Note these examples:

(11) Později jsme se už znali lépe, občas jsme se **vídali**, ale já se pred ním nemohl zbavit určitého ostychu, který mi chronicky ztěžoval styk s lidmi, kterých si příliš vážím. (Havel 1990b: 153)
(11) "Later we knew each other better, we **saw** each other from time to time, but in his presence I could not get rid of a certain sense of shyness, which has chronically complicated the contact I have with people whom I greatly value."

(12) Vyšel jsem na ulici. Byla prázdná, jako **bývají** ulice po slavnosti, jen mírný vítr zvedal prach a hnal ho před sebou po ploché zemi. (Kundera 1967: 300)
(12) "I went out into the street. It was empty as streets **can be** after a parade or festival; a gentle breeze picked up the dust and whisked it along the flat ground."

(13) Můj otec je čestný a pracovitý člověk, který byl u svých zaměstnanců oblíben, o čemž svědčí mimo jiné i to, že po roce 1948, kdy byla znárodněna Lucerna[,] pracoval v ní několik let jako plánovač — a to by jistě jinak nebylo možné, zvláště když Lucerna tehdy spadala přímo pod správu KV KSČ /KSČ ostatně **mívala** i za mého otce v Lucerně své sjezdy/.
(13) "My father was an honest and hard-working man, who was beloved by his employees, which is attested by, among other things, the fact that after 1948, when the Lucerna was nationalized[,] he worked there for several years as a planner — and that would certainly not have been otherwise possible, especially since at that time the Lucerna fell directly under the administration of the Czechoslovak Communist Party (incidentally the CCP **used to have**, even during my father's time, its party congresses in the Lucerna).

(14) Odpoledne a zvlášť podvečer, to je stojatá, mrtvá doba. Otevřel jsem okno v pět nebo v půl šesté? Včera, předevčírem nebo dneska? Šel jsem na chodbu, šel jsem skutečně na chodbu, asi ano, **chodívám** každý den před večeří na chodbu. Všechny ty týdny, co ležím. Vlastně tu ležím šestý den. (Bělohradská 1992: 50)
(14) "In the afternoon and especially early evening, it's a stagnant, dead time. Di I open the window at five or half-past? Yesterday, the day before yesterday, or today? I went into the hallway, I did really go into the hallway, yes, probably, every day before dinner I

go into the hallway. All those weeks that I've been lying here. I've really been lying here for only six days."

(15) Josef odešel vzápětí na oddělení, pravděpodobně Prokopu někde na chodbě potkal [...] Řekl asi Prokopě, aby za ním po vizitě přišla na inspekční pokoj. Při vizitě jí to toiž říci nemohl, byl by to slyšel celý pokoj, i Božena. Spíš na to mezitím zapomněl, vzpomněl si, až když stál na chodbě [...] Šel na inspekční pokoj, zarazil se, uvažoval, jestli se nemá pro Prokopu vrátit. Pravděpodobně se mu nechtělo, **míval** záchvaty lenosti, snad si myslel, že Prokopa přijda sama. (Bělohradská 1992: 134)
(15) "Josef left the ward immediately afterwards and in all likelihood met Prokopa somewhere in the hallway [...] He probably told Prokopa to come see him in the examination room after his rounds. He couldn't tell her during his rounds, the whole room would have heard, Božena included. He must have forgetten about it in the meantime and remembered only when he was standing in the hallway [...] He went into the examination room, paused, and considered whether he should go back to get Prokopa. It's likely that he didn't want to, he **had** fits of laziness, he probably thought that Prokopa would come on her own."

Example (11) gives background for Havel's relationship with the philosopher Jan Patočka: they used to see each other sometimes. In (12), the phrase *jako bývají ulice po slavnosti* fleshes out, in a backgrounded description, how the streets in the scene do in fact look. In (13), Havel is arguing in defense of the reputation of his father and points out, parenthetically, that even when his father owned the Lucerna, the communists held their party congresses there.

In examples (14) and (15), we see an interesting meaning associated with the habitual form in backgrounded contexts. In (14) the verb *chodívám* (< *chodit* "to go") is used as a justification or explanation for a current state of affairs even though the status of the verb as explanation is not explicitly marked (that is, we do not have an explicit "because" in the passage): he probably went into the hallway *because* he goes there every day before dinner. The habitual verb is used to implicitly motivate foregrounded information: event X in the foreground happened probably because of backgrounded situation Y. The same is true in (15), in which the phrase *míval* [< *mít* "to have"] *záchvaty lenosti* implicitly explains why Josef did not, in all probability, go back for Prokopa. This meaning is not obligatory in backgrounded usage of habitual forms, but it is one possible pragmatic interpretation of the relationship between the backgrounded information conveyed via the habitual form and the focal discourse topic.

Comparative or contrastive discourse

The last discourse role I will call, for lack of a better term, comparative or contrastive discourse. Examples here are often preceded by the conjunction *než* ("than"), and one typical realization of contrastive discourse is contrast of past with present ("what used to be is no more"). Typical examples include the following:

(16) Minulý týden ležel doma s chřipkou každý padesátý český občan. Lékaři upozornili veřejnost, že se jedná o počínající epidemie. Podle statistiky ministerstva zdravotnictví

však letošní situace není horší než loni. Chřipka překvapila pouze tím, že přišla tak pozdě: někdy **bývá** už o vánocích. (*Respekt*)
(16) "Last week every fiftieth citizen stayed at home with the flu. Doctors advised the public that it looks like the start of an epidemic. But, according to statistics from the Ministry of Health, this year's situation is no worse than last year's. This year's flu has proven surprising only because it came so late: sometimes it **is** already here by Christmas."

(17) "Chtěla jsem mu uklidit stůl," zahučela rozvážným altem. Podívala se na mě znova zkoumavě, pak mi naznačila rukou, abych za sebou zavřela dveře. "Je to divný," pokračovala pak rychlým a věcným šepotem, "jeden šuplík má zamčenej, a nikdy ho **nemívá** zamčenej. A nepasuje mi do něj žádnej klíč." (Bělohradská 1992: 88)
(17) "'I wanted to straighten up his desk,' she [the cleaning woman] murmured in a deliberate alto. She looked at me once again searchingly, then indicated to me with her hand to close the door. 'It's strange,' she continued in a quick and matter-of-fact whisper, 'one of his desk drawers is locked and he **never has** it locked. And none of my keys fit the lock.'"

(18) Týž večer jsem byl zadržen o odvezen na okrsek VB v Krakovské ulici, kde mi dva příslušníci StB připomněli to, co mi v Praze sdělili jiní už při mé minulé návštěvě: že když hned neodjedu zpátky na Hrádeček, budu zavřen. **Nebývá**[iter] sice zvykem policie radit lidem, aby před svým zavřením unikali odjezdem na svou chalupu, přesto tato varování z různých důvodů nepodceňuji. Těmto pánům nicméně řekl, že pokud jsem na svobodě, budu se také svobodně rozhodovat o svých pohybech. (Havel 1990b: 319)
(18) "That same evening I was detained and taken to the district police station on Krakovská Street, where 2 agents of the State Police reminded me of what others had already told me in Prague during my last visit: that if I do not return to Hrádeček immediately, I will be arrested. Now it **is** not the habit of the police to advise people to avoid being arrested by leaving for their country houses, but such warnings for various reasons I still do not undervalue. I nonetheless said to these men that while I still have my freedom, I will decide my own movements freely."

(19) No a pokud jde o mne, mám prostě pocit, že jsem ten svůj druhý dech dosud nenašel. Proto mám s psaním teď jisté těžkosti, větší než jsem **míval**[iter]**/měl**[impf]. (Havel 1990b: 234)
(19) "As for me, I just have a feeling that I haven't yet found my second wind. So I have certain difficulties with my writing, more than I **used to have [had]**."

(20) Ranní hlášení se odehrávalo jako obvykle v bývalé nemocniční kapli. Už řadu let to byla jakási malá jednací síň. Zapomněla jsem už vlastně, že to **bývala** kaple. Až teď, asi proto, že mě slunce přitahovalo k zaprášenému oválnému oknu, jsem si na to vzpomněla. (Bělohradská 1992: 62)
(20) "Morning announcements took place as usual in the former hospital chapel. For a number of years it was a kind of small conference hall. I really forgot that it had been a chapel. Only now did I recall it — probably because the sun was attracting my attention to the dust-covered oval window."

In (16), the habitual *bývá* (< *být* "to be") evokes a number of years when the flu arrives early, which contrasts with the year being described when the flu arrived late, and in (17), the habitual phrase *nikdy ho nemívá zamčenej* ("he never has it locked") contradicts the reality of the desk drawer being locked at that particular instant: new, unexpected information is introduced by the habitual form. In (18) the phrase *Nebývá zvykem* sets up a hypothetical discourse scenario that is in direct contrast to what really happened to Havel: the police did advise him to skip town to avoid arrest. In (19) the word *než* introduces a contrastive past tense reality that no longer holds in the present, that is, Havel's difficulties with writing are greater now than they used to be. Finally, in (20), the small hall used to be a chapel: the chapel space contrasts with the present (socialist) reality in which the chapel has been turned into a conference room.

In example (19), we are given a choice between the habitual form and its corresponding imperfective simplex form, and native speaker evaluations of this contrast are worthy of further comment. When pressed to explain their preference for the habitual *míval*, speakers report that the imperfective *měl* would tend to refer to a concrete situation and would need some kind of additional support (*doplnění*) to make it work in the given context, like *větší než jsem měl dříve* "more than I had before." The verb *míval*, however, can stand on its own: the habitual form evokes a whole scenario or period of time without additional lexical grounding (we do not need *dříve*). In my corpus, I have a number of examples that are similar to (19), and in fact the same could be said of the use of simple past versus *used to* in English (that is, "more than I had *before*" versus "more than I used to have").[63] Why this is the case, however, is one puzzle surrounding the use of habituals in discourse that calls out for an explanation.

Overall distribution of the discourse functions and overlapping functions

In my corpus as a whole, about 38% of all contexts exemplify the backgrounding function, 34% the introductory or topic-shift function, 16% the comparative/contrastive function, and the remaining 12% are examples of the summarizing function. At this point, however, a second disclaimer regarding the categorization of the examples is in order. Quite obviously, many of the four discourse functions illustrated in isolation above seem to overlap in a given context: for example, (12) could be considered a case of backgrounding but also illustrates the comparative function, (16) is explicitly contrastive but also illustrates the coda discourse function, and (18) is contrastive but the habitual verb here also marks a topic shift.

Functions that typically overlap in the corpus are illustrated by the examples below:

[63] Czech habituals are often translated into English, if the *used to* paraphrase cannot be used, with adverbials not present in the original ("sometimes", "once", "then"); the function of these adverbials is to make explicit the grounding conveyed solely by the verb in Czech.

(21) A ještě bych řekl: nevychovávají jen rodičové a učitelé děti, navzájem se rodičové a učitelé vychovávají dětmi — víc než se **myslívá**. (Čapek 1990a: 36)
(21) "And I would say further: parents and teachers do not merely educate the children; parents and teachers are also educating themselves through their children — more than one **would think**." (Čapek 1934: 50)

(22) **Nebývá** mým zvykem polemizovat s těmi čtenáři, kteří nesouhlasí s tím, co píši. Mají samozřejmě na to právo, nejednou mají i pravdu. Jestliže dnes činím výjimku, pak je to ze dvou důvodů [...] (Lidové noviny)
(22) "It **is not** my habit to polemicize with those readers who disagree with what I write. They have, of course, a right to do so, and more than once they have been right in doing so. If today I make an exception, then it is for two reasons [...]"

In example (21), the habitual phrase *víc než se myslívá* (< *myslet se* "to be thought") functions both as backgrounded information (an additional side comment) and in its contrastive meaning (the information goes against what people generally believe). In (22), which is similar to (18), the habitual phrase *Nebývá* (< *být* "to be") *mým zvykem polemizovat* is clearly both discourse-initial and contrastive with what follows (the journalist goes on to make an exception and polemicizes with one reader).

The data shows that a habitual verb in a given context often simultaneously fulfills more than one discourse function, although primary functions may be identified for analytical convenience. This leads to the conclusion that the general function of the verb form in discourse must not be strongly specified.

A mental-space analysis

Before introducing some particulars of mental space theory, it is worthwhile to summarize what needs to be accounted for given the data in the corpus. First of all, why do habituals seem to be used systematically in these four particular discourse roles? Secondly, why do the functions not appear to be rigidly distinct from one another, that is, how can we account for the fuzziness of the data and cases of functional overlap? Thirdly, why do habituals in discourse-initial position, unlike their corresponding imperfective forms, seem to set the stage for further commentary? Fourthly, why can habituals, like those in (14) and (15), serve as backgrounded explanations of present circumstances without explicit lexical reinforcement of their explanatory function? And finally, why do imperfective simplex verbs in comparative discourse ("that was then, this is now") need additional lexical grounding to evoke a whole period of time whereas corresponding habitual forms, like English *used to*, are able to do this by themselves?

Some of this behavior can undoubtedly be understood given the semantics of the verb form, which I have examined in previous chapters. Thus, habituals report generalizations based on real or believed experience; they do not report actual instances but indefinite iterativity over a (long) period of time; they cannot report absolutely regular iteration, and so they allow for possible contradictory scenarios ("hedging"); they report construal from a remote vantage point (ie, some form of conceptual distancing).

Given this general semantic description, we can begin to understand much about their use in discourse.

However, to understand their discourse function we cannot stay within the realm of semantics proper; we need an explanation at the level of discourse, and for that we need a theory of discourse management that can somehow account for the range of functions and associated meanings that I have just described. I will now argue that Fauconnier's theory of mental spaces provides exactly that.

Fauconnier's mental-space theory is a framework designed to model thought as it is represented in and mediated by language. Mental spaces "are a significant part of what is happening backstage, behind the scenes, in the cognitive background of everyday speaking and commonsense reasoning" (Fauconnier 1994: xviii); they are "cognitive constructs set up by speakers to organize the knowledge introduced in a discourse" (Dickey 2000: 25). In this framework, cognitive processing occurs that is not explicitly present in the linguistic structure of the sentence; language is merely a prominent, external manifestation of "hidden, backstage cognition" (Fauconnier 1997: 2). Language does not create meaning, but guides the construction and elaboration of interrelated mental spaces.[64] Language tells us what new spaces to construct and when to construct them, how the spaces we create are to be structured, and how these new spaces are linked to existing ones. On this view, the meaning of an utterance is "the difference between space configurations before and after it occurs. The 'meaning' of a sentence would be its potential for modifying space configurations" (Fauconnier 1986: 27, note 6).

Language is also an inherently underspecified means of representation for space construction: there is no one-to-one, rigid mapping between a linguistic form, the space it creates or modifies, and a cognitive interpretation of the meaning of the resulting space configuration. Moreover, although the theory is designed to describe universal processes of cognitive processing[65] and discourse management, language-specific coding mechanisms are not denied (Fauconnier 1997: 83; see also Fauconnier 1994: xli). In regard to tense/aspect categories, Cutrer (1994: 93-4) notes that each category "issues a certain set of instructions to the language decoder about the space configuration to be built" and that these instructions may be encoded differently in different languages: "A particular language space marker may encode a universal link and other more language-specific discourse semantic notions or cognitive conceptual material" (Cutrer 1994: 95, note 36).

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[64] In her 1987 study of discourse markers, Schiffrin — without being aware of Fauconnier's work — characterizes their function in a way surprisingly consistent with a mental-space approach: "[S]tudies of cohesion indicate that the meaning conveyed by a text is meaning which is interpreted by speakers and hearers based on their inferences about the propositional connections underlying what is said. Cohesive devices do not themselves create meaning; they are clues used by speakers and hearers to find the meanings which underlie surface utterances" (Schiffrin 1987: 9).

[65] Mental space theory has been used to account for the discourse meaning of referential and temporal expressions, propositional attitudes, hypotheticals, counterfactuals, quantification schemata, tense, aspect, and performatives. For relevant details, see Fauconnier 1985 and 1997 and Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996.

Space constructions begin with a default space, called the Base space, which is assumed to be the speaker's reality space or the reality space in a fictional narrative. The construction of new spaces, daughter spaces of the Base parent and linked to it in certain typical ways, can be triggered by adverbials ("Actually...", "Before..."), prepositional phrases ("In 1929...", "In that story...", "In that movie...", "In reality..."), certain verbal predicates ("Max believes...", "Sabine hopes...") and some grammatical constructions and forms ("If it snows..."). Linguistic forms like these are called space-builders; they are "overt mechanisms which speakers can use to induce the hearer to set up a new mental space" (Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996: 10).

A few examples will demonstrate how linguistic input can trigger the construction of new spaces. In order to adequately understand the sentence "The house you designed was never built," we need a minimum of two spaces: the design space in which the house exists on paper and the reality space in which it does not exist as a house (Fauconnier 1986: 33). For a temporal space-building phrase, we could consider the following: "In 1929, the woman with the white hair was blonde" (Fauconnier 1985: 29ff). The present-day reality space contains a woman who has white hair, but the past-tense space whose construction is prompted by the phrase "In 1929" contains a woman who has blond hair; the sentence additionally specifies a pragmatic link between the women in each separate mental space. Finally, consider how the use of tense marks access to individual mental spaces in the following: "In 1950, Claudette married someone who was/is a friend of mine" (Fauconnier 1994: 39). This example is similar to the one just discussed in that two spaces are set up and a pragmatic link established between them: the present space and the 1950 space, both of which Claudette, at different stages of her life, inhabits. The tense of the verb form in the relative clause guides us in the further elaboration of the space configuration: the past tense verb "was" is most naturally interpreted as implying that the person Claudette married was a friend of the speaker in 1950 while the most natural understanding of "is" in this context is that Claudette's husband is a friend of the speaker in the current reality space. That is, the tense tells us in which space to place, pending further instructions, our mental representation of the speaker's friend (Claudette's husband).

Although the technical aspects of mental-space theory are complex, the notion that certain linguistic forms are inherent space-builders is, in essence, all we need from the theory to understand the range of discourse functions fulfilled by Czech habitual verbs. My argument is that the Czech habitual is a grammatical form which operates in discourse as an explicit space-builder. This argument is consistent with Cutrer's observations on habitual/generic phrases: habitual propositions do not necessarily hold at all times since "meaning is partitioned within a frame [a distinct mental space] which holds only over a particular period of time" and, with generics, this partitioning in a separate space "gives us a way to handle the fact that a generic assigns a property or properties to all members of a class, yet some members of the class may not have the property in question" (Cutrer 1994: 152-3; see also Cutrer 1994: 143ff and Fauconnier 1985: 166ff).[66]

[66] In a brief discussion in one of his articles, Fauconnier specifically identifies English *used to* as a space-builder (Fauconnier 1986: 34-5).

As a space-builder, the habitual form prompts us to create a new space that is distinct from but linked — in a way that is not strongly specified — to the Base space; the new space may then be elaborated, although this is not obligatory, and information in the discourse that follows may elaborate the new space or redirect focus back to the Base space. That habituals trigger construction of a new space that is distinct from the Base may be seen in the following example, an extension of example (20):

(23) Ranní hlášení se odehrávalo jako obvykle v bývalé nemocniční kapli. Už řadu let to byla jakási malá jednací síň. Zapomněla jsem už vlastně, že to **bývala** kaple. Až teď, asi proto, že mě slunce přitahovalo k zaprášenému oválnému oknu, jsem si na to vzpomněla.
Okno **bývalo** barevné, nepodařený votivní obraz. Jeptišky sem chodily každé ráno na svou pobožnost [...] Nešla jsem nikdy na jejich pobožnost, ačkoliv mě znova a znova zvaly. (Bělohradská 62)
(23) "Morning announcements took place as usual in the former hospital chapel. For a number of years it was a kind of small conference hall. I really forgot that it **had been** a chapel. Only now did I recall it — probably because the sun was attracting my attention to the dust-covered oval window.
The window **used to be** colored, an unsuccessful votive image. The nuns would come here every morning to attend their service [...] I never went to their service, although they invited me over and over."

In this example, the narrator alternates between two mental spaces: the narrative reality space, which itself is already in the past and in which the former hospital chapel is a conference room, and the space evoked by the habitual *bývala* (< *být* "to be"), which is a temporally pluperfect space in the context of the past narration and in which the hall was still a functioning chapel. The second use of a habitual form in the phrase *Okno bývalo barevné* is an explicit elaboration of the pluperfect chapel space: the habitual form unambiguously structures the chapel space while the imperfective simplex *bylo* in the same context would refer most naturally to the narrative reality space. Note that the narrator goes immediately on to describe the nuns and her interaction with them, which is a further elaboration of the chapel space. In this regard, (23) has a mental space interpretation similar to the example with Claudette's husband that was discussed immediately above.

A new mental space triggered by a habitual verb derives its structure from the general semantics of habitual forms in Czech (a language-specific encoding) as well as by information contained in the iterative context and pragmatic inferencing. Understanding habitual verbs as explicit space-builders can adequately explain all our observations of the data:

(a) *Variety of discourse functions.* The range of discourse functions exhibited by Czech habitual verbs in context is explained by the underspecified nature of the mental-space construct: habituals prompt the construction of a new space, but they do not specify exactly how that new space will be linked to all past and future spaces in the general space configuration. The semantics of the habitual form allows for local links to be set up between the new space created by the habitual verb and other spaces that would support the range of discourse functions we have observed.

(b) *Fuzziness of categorizing the data and overlapping*. The seeming fuzziness of the data with regard to discourse function is explained away: the fuzziness is not a methodological problem, but is inherent in the underspecified nature of the mental-space representation. Analysis via mental-space theory can adequately account for both prototypical instances of the four discourse roles, in which one function is strongly profiled, and the less prototypical cases of overlapping functions. All combinations are potential given the space-building nature of the verb.

(c) *Setting the stage for further commentary*. The fact that habituals in discourse-initial position seem to set the stage for further commentary in a way that imperfective simplex forms do not also follows from the space-building nature of the habitual form. Having established a new space, a speaker might naturally want to flesh out its structure; the newly constructed space itself seems to call out for this. However, elaborating a new space is not obligatory because an immediate shift back to the Base space cannot be ruled out: a new topic may be introduced, but not pursued in depth.

(d) *Backgrounded explanations*. Those instances where a backgrounded habitual phrase implicitly provides an explanation for a foregrounded situation may also be motivated within this framework. The explanatory function is not inherent in the semantics of the verb, but is one possible pragmatic inference linking the habitual space with its parent space. The meaning is therefore an implicature (see below).

(e) *Additional lexical grounding unnecessary*. Finally, the fact that habituals in contrastive discourse introduced by *než* do not need additional lexical grounding to evoke a whole period of time is easily explained given that habituals create a space distinct from the Base space: the new mental space itself provides sufficient ground. We see this clearly in the contrasting examples below:

(24) Občas tam **byly**$^{\textbf{impf}}$ besedy.
(24) "Sometimes there **were** discussions there."

(25) Tam **bývaly**$^{\textbf{iter}}$ besedy.
(25) "There **used to be** discussions there."

The imperfective simplex form *byly* (a past tense of *být* "to be") in (24) requires the space-builder *občas* ("sometimes") whereas the habitual *bývaly* (< *být* "to be"), itself a grammatical space-builder, can stand alone. Grounding without lexical support is an inherent feature of Czech habituals regardless of tense: recall that the great majority of contexts in the corpus, including morphologically-present contexts, do not contain frequency specifications like *občas* in (24). Adverbs of frequency are one way of triggering generic or habitual readings (that is, they are prompts for construction of a new space), but the habitual forms are already explicit space-builders and do not need adverbials to fulfill this function. Frequency adverbials co-occurring with habituals may reinforce the space-building trigger in addition to increasing or reducing the overall strength of the habit.

The notion of implicature warrants further discussion in the context of the mental-space framework. Comrie (1976: 29ff) has noted that English *used to* creates the implicature that the situation reported by the verbal paraphrase no longer holds in the present. In Comrie's view, this is an implicature and not an implication because the former is a weaker notion than the latter. That is, the information reported by *used to* may still be valid in the present: the implicature that it is no longer true can be explicitly denied. Comrie's argument is true insofar as it goes, but he fails to lay bare the conceptual mechanism that makes it so. This mechanism is easily perceived in the mental-space framework. The implicature that the situation described by *used to* and/or by a morphologically past Czech habitual no longer holds in the present is an inference that follows directly from information-partitioning: the habitual form structures its own space and the scope of the verb is limited to this space. It is possible to infer from this partitioning that the situation that is valid in the habitual space is therefore not valid in the present reality space, but this is merely an inference. On implicatures, Fauconnier has written: "Cognitive constructions require frames and connectors which are not inherently linguistic, although language may code or highlight some of their characteristics. The frames and connectors bring with them rich [...] inference systems, and implicatures are typically part of such systems" (Fauconnier 1990: 400-1).

I would add that the mental-space approach also accounts for several other interesting aspects of the behavior of habituals in context. For instance, in some contexts, like example (26) below, a habitual phrase has the effect of slowing down the pace of the narrative, and this effect is difficult to neatly capture in English translation:

(26) Myslím na naše manželství, jak se to v něm tiše a samozřejmě našlo. Má žena od první chvíle vzala na sebe tu úzkost o mé zdraví, jako by řekla: to není tvá mužská věc, to je ženská starost [...] A ta její umírněná, zdrženlivá láska, to bylo také to: kladla mně určité meze, abych si je nemusil ukládat sám ze strachu o sebe: Nebýt tak divoký, řekla skoro mateřsky, a pěkně spát; žádné kruhy pod očima a takové věci. **Zlobíval jsem se někdy**, ale v hloubi duše jsem jí byl za to vděčný; uznával jsem, že je to tak pro mne lépe. (Čapek 2000: 305)

(26) "I am thinking of our marriage and how it emerged from it silently and self-evident. From the very first moment my wife took it upon herself that concern for my health, as if she had said: That's a woman's job; you needn't worry about it, leave it to me [...] And her temperate, abstinent love that was also part of it: she made certain rules for me so that I was not driven to lay them down out of fear for myself. Don't get so excited, she used to say, almost like a mother, and sleep nicely; no rings around your eyes and such-like things. **Sometimes I was angry**, but in the depths of my soul I was grateful to her, for I had to confess that it was better for me like that." (Čapek 1990b: 410)

In this excerpt, the narrator is talking of his marriage and the habit or ritual (*to* or "it") that became established early on between him and his wife. The tempo of the discourse seems steady up to the sentence beginning with the habitual *zlobíval jsem se někdy* (< *zlobit se* "to get angry"): here the pace of the narration is suddenly interrupted and seems to undergo a slight change of direction. The habitual phrase marks a shift in the narrator's thinking, a distancing of himself from his detailed description of the marriage ritual, and

the introduction of new perspective from which to think about it. Although this discourse effect is difficult to quantify, it does appear in many different contexts in the corpus. Given the mental-space analysis proposed here, the effect makes sense: the habitual form triggers the opening of a new mental space, and the observed slowing and distancing arises from a mental shift of focus from the Base space to the new habitual space.

The mental-space framework is also useful in providing an adequate account of the following three examples:

(27) Jan **kouří^{impf}/kouřívá^{iter}** cigarety.
(27) "Jan smokes cigarettes."

(28) Honza **chodí^{impf}/chodívá^{iter}** do školy.
(28) "Honza goes to school."

(29) Náš brankář **chytá^{impf}/chytává^{iter}** lépe.
(29) "Our goalie tends goal better."

All three of these examples have been discussed in the scholarly literature on Czech habituals, but the discussions have failed to explain, rather than just describe, the distinctions between the imperfective simplex and habitual forms.[67] The reason for this failure is clear: adequate explanations cannot be provided without reference to the discourse level and a theory of discourse processing.

In (27), the imperfective simplex *kouří* (< *kouřit* "to smoke") is the neutral choice and reports quite simply that Jan is a cigarette-smoker; the sentence with *kouří* does not need an extended context to sound acceptable to native speakers. However, speakers report that the sentence with the habitual form *kouřívá* is somewhat odd without some additional context: a suggested reading might be that Jan smokes cigarettes, but only sometimes. Several speakers offered the same variation on this reading: Jan usually smokes cigarettes (*Obvykle kouřívá cigarety*), but now he is smoking a pipe (or a cigar). In other words, the sentence with *kouřívá* is most naturally understood as triggering the construction of a space contrastive with the reality space (i.e., the actual "pipe/cigar space" versus the usual "cigarette space").

One speaker also noted another interesting fact: the morphologically present *kouřívá* seems to imply irregular repetition whereas the past-tense form *kouřival* in the same context would naturally be understood as reporting regular repetition.[68] In the first case, *kouřívá* prompts construction of a space that is contrastive with the reality space (and so might potentially — even quite naturally — report Jan's irregular smoking of cigarettes) while in the second case the past-tense verb triggers construction of a "that was then, but this is now" interpretation. In both cases the habitual functions as the trigger for a contrastive space, but inferences about regularity of iteration vary depending on how that contrast is pragmatically understood.

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[67] For example (27), see Němec 1958: 197. For example (28), see Kopečný 1962: 20, and for example (29), see Kopečný 1962: 33 and Poldauf 1964: 48-9.
[68] I am grateful to Irena Vaňková for this observation.

In (28) and (29), the imperfective simplex forms serve to structure a Base space, that is, the real world as it is assumed to be: in (28) Honza goes to school and in (29) our goalie is either keeping goal better in a particular game (which we are currently watching) or tends to keep goal better usually. The habitual forms, however, prompt the creation of a new space, distinct from the Base, and the resulting sentences can have various interpretations. *Honza chodívá do školy* can be read as an ironic statement comparing his not absolutely regular attendance at school with the pragmatically expected regular attendance in the real world or, with a small addition, it could refer to his path to school: *Honza obvykle chodívá do školy kolem Národního divadla, ale dnes...* ("Honza usually goes to school around the National Theater, but today..."). Similarly the sentence *Náš brankář chytává lépe* could be said during a particular game only if our goalie is not playing very well at all, even though in general he tends to play better. In both cases, the habitual space is contrastive, and the proposition is valid in the new space, even though it does not hold in the reality Base space.

Another way to account for the differing interpretations in (27) and the others is by recognizing that, as discussed in chapter 3 in regard to habitual forms under negation, Czech habituals express the probability, based on existing experience, that a given proposition will be valid over an indefinite set. The vailidity is not asserted to be absolute for all future items in the set (Filip's "hedging"). This is true of habit in general:

> [E]ven when a habit is stable, it usually permits exceptions and deviations, provided these do not become themselves further habits. So the probability of habitual actions may vary while the habit they express remains. (Savan 1988: 12)

In Tyvaert's model of linguistic habit, "the collection S is always 'open' to new items and [...] the habit that it signifies 'reasonably' permits contradiciton" (Tyvaert 1987: 155). Tyvaert has commented upon the open-ended nature of a habit in more explicit terms: "A list of counter-examples is tolerated as long as it remains negligible" (Tyvaert 1987: 152). Dahl has made a similar argument with regard to generic noun phrases: "My claim about generic noun phrases is that they always involve a quantification over possible objects rather than over actual ones" (Dahl 1975: 108). In example (29), then, the habitual form implies the possibility that there are occasions when the proposition does not hold (when he does not tend goal well); this implication does not, however, undermine the broad assertion of the habit itself (that he tends goal well in general).

Summary

In this chapter, I have argued that Czech habituals function necessarily as grammatical space-builders: the habitual form triggers construction of a new mental space that is distinct from the base reality space and in which the information conveyed by the habitual phrase is effectively partitioned from the Base space. The exact relationship between the new space created by the habitual phrase and the parent Base space is not strongly specified by the habitual form, and thus habituals can play a variety of discourse roles that are all nonetheless potential given the space-building nature of the verb.

Their status as space-builders reinforces why approaches to the semantics of habituals that rely on discrete features and do not make us of a corpus of contextualized examples cannot adequately explain the behavior of the form. In this discourse-based analysis, even aspects of the core semantics of the verb form become clearer. The mental-space framework reinforces the earlier analysis of the behavior of habituals under negation and motivates the fact that most verbs do not co-occur with an explicit specification of frequency. Moreover, the fact that past-tense habituals can be used to refer to a range of temporally past situations (from distant to recent) is understandable given the partitioning of information reported by the habitual form in a new mental space: the "old model" in the habitual space, whether it be distant or recent, is mentally juxtaposed to the "new model" in the Base space.

The mental-space analysis also explains why morphologically present habitual forms tend to report irregular iteration while morphologically past habitual forms tend to imply regular iteration. In the latter case, the habitual form triggers construction of a past-tense space that may be interpreted as contrastive, temporally speaking, with the Base reality space, but in the former case the new space created by the use of the habitual verb cannot be juxtaposed temporally with the current reality space. In the past tense, habitual spaces are naturally contrastive, and regularity of iteration is the typical case; in present morphology, the habitual space is often contrastive on the basis of iteration: the iteration of the action is irregular or reported to be somehow different from the actual case in the Base space. Thus, it could be said that Czech habitual verbs behave, on the whole, more like prototypical habits in the past tense.

I have obviously not resolved here the complicated issue of the substitutability of imperfective simplex forms for habituals, or rather I have only begun to resolve it. The issue cannot be resolved without first looking at the role played by habituals — as well as imperfective simplex forms — in discourse management. What seems clear is that subsitution is not as automatic as is generally assumed in the scholarly literature. Širokova (1963: 80), for example, writes:

> Iterative verbs [*mnogokratnye glagoly*] and their corresponding imperfective forms can be used in almost identical contexts with regard to lexical items and grammar, in the exact same syntactic constructions, with the same conceptual and grammatical load [*s odinakovoi smyslovoi i grammaticheskoi nagruzkoi*].

While it is true that imperfective simplex forms can replace habitual forms in many contexts, the former are not inherent space-builders and often require additional lexical support to make substitution possible (for example, adverbs that trigger a habitual/generic reading), and it is difficult to agree that there is an identity, or even near identity, of "conceptual and grammatical" value. Clearly, more analysis is needed both of this specific question and more generally of the discourse role of aspect in Slavic, and mental-space theory may prove to be an especially productive framework for carrying out that kind of research.

Chapter 6

A Typology of Iteration

Introduction

This chapter presents a typology of iterative situations (simple versus habitual iteration) that is implicit in both Peirce's discussion of habit and cognitive approaches to habitual propositions. It is argued that Czech habituals report evaluation of an iterative situation at the level of habitual iteration (Peircean Thirdness, Langacker's "structural" plane) while Czech imperfective simplex forms in iterative contexts prototypically report evaluation at the level of simple iteration (Peircean Secondness, Langacker's "actual" plane). This typology provides a useful framework in which to consider additional questions surrounding the meaning and use of habitual verbs in contemporary literary Czech. These questions have been deferred to the last chapter because adequate answers to them can only be arrived at given the semantic framework outlined in chapter 3, the notion of conceptual distancing explored in chapter 4, the mental-space framework in chapter 5, and the typology of iteration to be discussed here. Some of these questions have been treated, without being fully accounted for, in earlier work on Czech habituals while others are raised here for the first time.

These additional questions are: (1) the definite/indefinite contrast arising from the use of either an imperfective simplex or its corresponding habitual in the same context; (2) the tendency of imperfective simplex forms to report fact while habituals in the same context imply supposition or hypothesis (a reprise of Filip's modality thesis); (3) the tendency of habitual verbs to imply emotional nuances not present with imperfective simplex forms in the same context; (4) the status of nonquantified, past-tense habituals (Kučera's quantification puzzle); (5) the relations between habituals, modals, and conditionals; (6) the stylistic limitations on use of habitual verbs; and (7) the iconic relationship between the form and meaning of imperfective simplex verbs and their corresponding habitual forms.

Simple versus habitual iteration

Iterative situations can be evaluated at two different, hierarchically organized levels: the level of simple iteration and the level of habitual iteration. Habitual iteration presupposes simple iteration. The minimal existence of a set of entities or repeating situations is a necessary prerequisite for habitual evaluation: if the set of entities or situations does not exist, an underlying rule unifying them into a single conceptual gestalt cannot be posited. What is foregrounded in simple iteration, the repeating circumstances themselves, is taken as background to a higher-level evaluation in habitual construal. It is due to the hierarchy that obtains between simple and habitual iteration that imperfective simplex forms can be substituted for habitual forms without completely distorting the meaning of the utterance in question: habitual construal is potential, but not obligatory, in the imperfective simplex form.

To understand more clearly how two different construals are possible in the interpretation of a given iterated situation, consider the following sentences (borrowed from Rhétoré 1990):

(1) "Pierre is hitting Paul."

(2) "Pierre and Paul are hitting each other."

(3) "Pierre and Paul seem to be hitting each other."

At the phenomenological level, the basic elements are the same in all three statements: "Pierre," "Paul," and "hitting" (the relation between them). Given an event in which these three elements all participate, an interpreter of the event may describe it with any one of the three statements. With specific regard to this example, Rhétoré argues: "Every sign is in effect doubly determined: (i) it is determined at the phenomenological level by its real, active object(s) (Pierre, Paul, and their relation), and (ii) it is determined at the semiotic level by its object of representation (to hit, to hit each other, seem)" (Rhétoré 1990: 127).

Langacker has put forth the same argument on the asymmetrical relationship between the phenomenological and semiotic (interpretive) levels, although in his own terms:

> The meaning of an expression is not determined in any unique or mechanical way from the nature of the objective situation it describes. The same situation can be described by a variety of semantically distinct expressions that embody different ways of construing or structuring it. Our ability to impose alternate structurings on a conceived phenomenon is fundamental to lexical and grammatical variability. (Langacker 1987: 107)

Langacker's "objective situation" and "alternate structurings" are Rhétoré's phenomenological level and semiotic level.

Langacker illustrates his position by noting the possible interpretations given the elements *clock* and *table* and a relation of contiguity between them (Langacker 1987: 110):

(4) "The clock is on the table."

(5) "The clock is resting on the table."

(6) "The table is supporting the clock."

Each of these sentences "embod[ies] substantially different images (and hence [is] semantically distinct) even though they could all be used to describe the same objective situation" (Langacker 1987: 110). In other words, a given situation at the

phenomenological level is subject to a variety of interpretations depending on the interpreter's construal.[69]

From a Peircean perspective, the two levels implied in the structure of a habit-gestalt are reflections of Secondness and Thirdness and the relationship between them. In simple iteration, a series of events is evaluated at the level of Secondness; in other words, simple iteration is defined by the actual occurrence of individual events. A building-block interpretation is applied to the repeated occurrences such that the potential relations that may exist between them are not reported; in simple iteration, focus is on the mere existence of the entities or occurrences. Iterated events evaluated at the level of Secondness are consequently individual occurrences considered in isolation from each other. As Peirce himself (CP 7.538) said of a repeated event evaluated with regard to Secondness: "If it is repeated, the repetition is another consequence, no matter how like the first it may be. It is anti-general." Illustrations of simple iteration, which have been mentioned in previous chapters, include the following: a series of musical notes (which are not interpreted as comprising a melody), isolated acts of smoking (which are not attributed to a habit of smoking), and individual drinks of alcohol (which are not construed as tokens of dependency).

If simple iteration reports actual facts, then habitual iteration focuses attention on the relations between those facts by construing them as tokens of a broader type or as instantiations of a general rule. Habitual iteration illustrates a general law that governs future facts: additional notes following a melody (a musical habit) will tend to be interpreted as parts of the melody, just as cigarettes smoked by a habitual smoker or drinks drunk by an alcoholic will be seen as supporting a general tendency. Thus habitual iteration, as a Third or general, presupposes simple iteration, as a Second or actuality, but is not limited to it. In other words, simple and habitual iteration exist along a continuum from a simple succession of mechanical, isolated and dead acts of Secondness to rational, related, and meaningful construals of Thirdness (Savan 1988: 62). Given these definitions, it follows that simple and habitual interpretations necessarily have different cognitive and communicative functions.

As noted in chapter 3, an example of construal of a succession of similar entities at the level of Thirdness is provided in language by the structure known as the collective noun (see Brinton 1991: 59 and Langacker 1997: 199). Understanding a succession of professors at a university as a *faculty* is to move from the level of simple iteration, the individual professors themselves (a plural count noun), to habitual interpretation, the professors as seen through the lens of the collective that they comprise but the scope of which goes beyond the mere sum of the individuals involved (a collective noun).

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[69] This is obviously true of non-linguistic interpretive acts as well. For instance, a cluster of seven bright stars in the northern sky is called the Big Dipper in America: the stars are interpreted as outlining the form of a ladle. The French call it the Casserole. In England, the constellation is called the Plough and in medieval Europe the same grouping of stars was known as Charles' Wagon. The ancient Greeks and Native Americans saw these same stars as comprising the tail of the Great Bear. The same constellation thus receives a multiplicity of interpretations, depending on the cultural perspective of the interpreter. See Sagan 1980: 46-7 for illustrations of these interpretations.

Similarly, an *orchestra* is composed of a series of musicians who function, not in mechanical isolation from each other, but as one complex gestalt.

The semiotic distinction evident in how we understand collective nouns is pervasive in human conceptualization, which is natural given that it is a reflection of the hierarchical relationship between the phenomenological categories of Secondness and Thirdness. Below, I offer some examples of the conceptualization of repeating entities in various domains, the repetition of which can be interpreted as simple or habitual iteration. These examples could easily be multiplied.

Construal as Simple Iteration	Construal as Habitual Iteration
•a series of musical notes	•a melody
•individual acts of smoking	•a habit of smoking, an addiction
•acts of drinking	•a dependency on alcohol
•stars in a part of the sky	•a constellation of stars
•sexual encounters with someone	•a relationship with someone
•a series of articles	•chapters in a book
•taking classes	•taking classes in a degree program
•a number of political initiatives	•a political vision
•a series of events	•a narrative or story

All these examples serve to illustrate simple and habitual iteration and the hierarchical relationship between them. Evaluation of a succession of entities results from construal or interpretation in a given context. Habitual evaluation gives meaning to the iteration by situating the individual events within a framework: a political vision imbues individual policy initiatives with a broader (and rational) significance, a romantic relationship provides a larger context in which to understand repeated acts of love-making, a series of articles compiled into a single book are often partially rewritten to mesh with the overall thrust of the book's argument, a narrative gives structure and meaning to a series of what might otherwise be isolated events, and classes taken toward a degree have a wider import than classes taken at random and with only a short-term goal in mind. The habitual construal offers a *mediating representation* (a Third) through which we interpret the existing tokens; the tokens themselves (the laws, the sex, the individual articles, the events, the classes) are understood as background to the habitual assertion (the vision, the relationship, the book, the story, the course of study). In this regard, habitual differs from simple construal because it is an evaluation of iterated entities on a higher level.

The opposition between simple and habitual iteration is pervasive in human conceptualization, and it is not surprising that it is also manifested in the structure of language. The phenomenological category of Thirdness (in its relation to Secondness) is reflected not just in the patterning of verbal forms in some languages but also in the organization of other linguistic subsystems. A particularly relevant example of this is the distribution of the negative particles *ου* and *μη* in Attic Greek.[70] The example is relevant

[70] My information on Attic Greek is taken from Smyth 1956 [1920]; references are made to section number.

to the typology of iteration because the particles pattern, if not perfectly, then at least to a remarkably consistent degree, based on the same distinction between Secondness and Thirdness that I have been using to discuss simple and habitual iteration. The negative particle *ου* is used in direct questions when the expected answer is "yes," that is, when the information is assumed to be factual (Smyth 1956: 2651); to contradict or deny factual statements (2688): *τα ουκ οντα* "that which does not actually exist, independent of any opinions about it;" in relative clauses with definite antecedents (2705); and with participles and an article when definite persons or things are meant (2734). In other words, the particle *ου* generally tends to combine with evaluations at the level of Secondness (fact, definiteness, actuality). On the other hand, the negative particle *μη* occurs in contexts associated with Thirdness (abstraction, indefiniteness, supposition, subjunctivity). It is specifically used in answer to direct questions when the expected answer is "no," that is, when the speaker is less than certain about the validity of his information (2651); to contradict or deny statements of will or thought (2688): *τα μη οντα* "that which is regarded as not existing in the writer's opinion;" in relative clauses with indefinite antecedents (2705); with conditional statements (2689, 2705); and generically with nouns and substantivized adjectives (2735): οι μη πλουσιοι "whoever are not rich (the non-rich)."

What the Greek examples show is that the semiotic categories of Secondness and Thirdness are realized in many forms, both conceptually and linguistically. The distribution of the two negative particles is parallel to the opposition between simple and habitual iteration. Evaluation with regard to Secondness is judgment about a definite set of facts or actual instances; evaluation at the level of Thirdness is conditional generalization or hypothetical supposition about a broad type.

In the Czech verbal system, habitual verbs report evaluation at the level of habitual iteration. Czech imperfective simplex forms are typically used to report simple iteration, although they can be pragmatically construed as denoting habitual iteration, especially given additional lexical support.

Habitual evaluation and inductive inference

How does an interpreter move from simple iteration (a series of isolated situations) to habitual iteration (the law connecting the situations)? In other words, what is the cognitive process underlying habitual evaluation?

Habitual evaluation presupposes inference by induction. Induction is the logical process by which we infer that something is true of a certain type which is evidently true of a number of tokens of that type. Peirce defined induction in the following way: "Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases of which something is true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class" (2.624). In an inductive inference the flow of thought is from token to type, from specific to general, from definite to indefinite. Henning Andersen, basing his reasoning on Peirce's work in logic, has stated: "[I]nductive inference proceeds from observed cases and results to establish a law" (1973: 774-5). Induction permits generalization on the basis of a number of concrete instances.

Inductive inference often presupposes, to a greater or lesser degree, another type of logical inference. This second inferential type was called *abduction* by Peirce. Abduction involves the setting up of a hypothesis with which "the thinker is led from the examination of unexplained facts to a theory which explains them" (Freeman 1983: 64). Abduction suggests that something *may be* and is therefore fallible. Peirce himself defined abduction in the following way: "The surprising fact, *C*, is observed; but if *A* were true, *C* would be a matter of course. hence, there is reason to suspect that *A* is true" (5.189).[71] Reilly notes: "The conclusion of the process of abductive inference is a proposition which places an individual in a class, or a less extensive class in a more extensive class" (1970: 48).[72]

Habitual evaluation follows from simple iteration as a result of an inductive inference that has, to a greater or lesser extent, an abduction as its original premise. The general rule that is foregrounded in habitual evaluation is, in Peirce's terms, the *A* that accounts for the surprising fact *C*. The general rule accounts for the individual instances or tokens of the rule that are necessary to it within a more general framework. The specific formulation of the rule in habitual evaluation comes about through the process of induction: *A* is a good hypothesis to account for *C* because of what the speaker knows or believes to be true. Induction is the process of moving from the background material of tokens to an assertion with much broader scope. It is therefore fundamental to habitual propositions in language.

It can be mentioned that the inductive model of habitual evaluation outlined here subsumes the notion of quantification over subject and predicate terms proposed by Kučera. Quantification in Kučera's sense is accounted for within the framework of inductive inference. The advantage that the inductive model has over a quantificational analysis is twofold. In the first place, the implications of the inductive model are much wider and it therefore provides a motivation for the semantics of habitual verbs in more contexts than does a quantificational approach. And secondly, inductive inference is a basic element of human cognition: the induction model is not only more powerful than an analysis based on quantification, but it is also simpler from a cognitive perspective.

The expression of simple and habitual iteration in language can be productively viewed as a token of a larger cognitive type that is grounded in the hierarchical relationship between simple and habitual construal of any iterated situation and the process of inductive inference. In the sections that follow, the differences between simple and habitual construal will be used to discuss some explicit contrasts between Czech imperfective simplex and habitual verbs in the same contexts and to thereby account for a number of issues surrounding the semantics of the habitual form that still merit treatment.

Definiteness and indefiniteness

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[71] See also Anttila 1978: 49, Savan 1980: 253, and Harris and Hooper 1983: 134.

[72] For more on the role of induction and abduction in Peirce's logic, see especially Reilly 1970. For the specific relation of these inferential processes to language, see, for example, Andersen 1973 (and Savan 1980 for a response); Shapiro 1983; and Anttilla 1977a, 1978, and 1989.

Habitual verbs are used in Czech to report indefinite situations; corresponding imperfective simplex forms in the same context tend to be read as reports of definiteness. Consider the following example, taken from one of Havel's essays:

(7) Západní návštěvníci **jsou**[impf]**/bývají**[hab] šokováni, že Černobyl a AIDS tu nejsou zdrojem hrůzy, ale námětem vtipů. (Havel 1989b: 118)
(7) "Visitors from the West **are** shocked that Chernobyl and AIDS are not sources of terror here, but the subject matter of jokes."

In the sentence with the habitual verb, the speaker reports a general rule about Western visitors: the indefinite set of Western visitors is the scope of the assertion, and the reactions of individual visitors from the West are considered as background elements of a broader statement. In contrast, the same sentence with the imperfective simple form *jsou* is neutrally read as reporting simple and definite iteration: the meaning of the whole set of visitors is a function of the definite number of visitors on hand. There is no higher-level evaluation that extends the scope of the assertion from a specific set of visitors to the indefinite set of all possible Western visitors. The imperfective simplex forms tends to be read as reporting a specific fact, and the resulting phrase could be translated into English with a definite article: "The Western visitors [the ones over there, the ones we talked to last night] are shocked."

Another example, taken from a Czech news magazine, further illustrates the contrast between definite and indefinite readings:

(8) Minulý týden ležel doma s chřipkou každý padesátý český občan. Lékaři upozornili veřejnost, že se jedná o počínající epidemie. Podle statistiky ministerstva zdravotnictví však letošní situace není horší než loni. Chřipka překvapila pouze tím, že přišla tak pozdě: někdy **bývá**[hab] už o Vánocích. (*Respekt*)
(8) "Last week every fiftieth Czech citizen stayed at home with the flu. Doctors advised the public that it looks like the start of an epidemic. But, according to statistics from the Ministry of Health, this year's situation is no worse than last year's. This year's flu has proven surprising only because it came so late: sometimes it **is** already here by Christmas."

In this passage, the habitual form *bývá* (< *být* "to be"), in combination with the quantifier *někdy* ("sometimes"), reports the possibility of the flu occurring by Christmas. The evaluation has broad scope and indefinite implciations. The same passage with the corresponding imperfective simplex *je* ("is") would tend to denote a simple, definite fact: the flu is sometimes active by Christmas.

The contrast between definite and indefinite interpretations of a given context is consistent with the difference between evaluation at the levels of simple and habitual iteration: in the case of the former, the whole is the sum of the parts and the situation is effectively concretized while, in the latter case, the sum of the parts points beyond the individual units to a greater whole and the resulting situation is understood to have potential, and not merely actual, validity. This definite/indefinite contrast also coheres with the explicit space-building nature of the habitual form: while habituals trigger the

creation of a new space linked to but conceptually distant from the Base discourse space, imperfective simplex forms in the same context tend to be taken as elaborations of the Base reality space itself.

Fact and reality versus supposition and hypothesis

Closely associated with the contrast between definiteness and indefiniteness is the contrast between reporting a fact and making a supposition or hypothesis. Example (8) illustrates the shading of a definite into a factual reading (the flu is active by Christmas) and an indefinite into a hypothetical one (the flu tends to be active by Christmas). When chunks of discourse are examined, it becomes clear that habitual verbs in Czech denote suppositions and imperfective simplex forms in the same contexts tend to be read as reporting facts, which is again consistent with the implications of the mental-space framework. The exact value of the supposition reported by the habitual verb varies and is dependent upon the larger context in which it is used. It can report what Filip terms "hedging," but is not limited to this value. Consider the three examples below:

(9) Často se **říká**^{impf}**/říkává**^{hab}, že poznat o jazyk víc znamená žít o jeden život víc. (Čapek 1990a: 65)
(9) "It **is** often said that to know another language means to live another life."

(10) Otevřela jsem kabelku, jestli tam nemám prášky, ale věděla, že žádné prášky s sebou nemám, ale pak jsem si vzpomněla, že Jindra **má**^{impf}**/mívá**^{hab} u sebe všelijaké léky. (Kundera 1967: 282)
(10) "I opened my bag to see if there was anything I could take for it [if I had any pills], though I knew I had no pills, but then I remembered that Jindra **always had [has]** a whole pharmacy with him." (Kundera 1982: 238)

(11) Já jsem vypozoroval, že americké děti **mají**^{impf}**/mívají**^{hab} k učitelům a učitelkám daleko kamarádštější poměr než u nás — a že Američané po celý život rádi vzpomínají na své učitelé a na školy. (Čapek 1990a: 19)
(11) "I noticed that American children **are** on terms of greater camaraderie with their teachers than the children here — and that all their lives Americans keep pleasant memories of their teachers and schools." (Čapek 1934: 25)

(12) Čas od času **mám**^{impf}**/mívám**^{hab} příležitost hovořit s různými západními intelektuály, kteří zavítají do naší země a odhodlají se navštívit nějakého disidenta. (Havel 1989b: 51)
(12) "From time to time I **have** the opportunity to talk with various Western intellectuals who come to our country and resolve to visit a dissident."

In example (9), which is taken from Čapek's account of his conversations with T. G. Masaryk about the latter's life, native speakers of Czech suggested that the imperfective simplex form *říká se* ("is said") would mean that the aphorism that follows is more true. This form would tend to be used if the speaker himself had direct experience with the psychological effects of knowing another language. Moreoever, the imperfective simplex

indirectly implies that what is said is not only true, but is also accepted by a great number and variety of speakers. That is, it is seemingly more factual or objective than the same sentence with the habitual verb *říkává se*, which renders the maxim less certain, less exact, or more hypothetical in nature. The habitual verb has modal force: it hedges the speaker's commitment to the information that follows. Čapek cites Masaryk as using the imperfective simplex form, which is fully consistent with the native speakers' judgments since Masaryk himself did indeed have direct experience with the implications of the maxim.

In example (10), speakers reported that the imperfective simplex *má* ("he has") would be used if the woman were certain that Jindra had the pills she was looking for. In the context provided, the habitual form *mívá* was preferred because the uncertainty of Jindra's habits is brought out by the verb *vzpomněla jsem si* ("I remembered," presumably instead of "I knew") and the indefinite object *všelijaké léky* ("all kinds of medicine"). The habitual form was, in fact, used in Kundera's original text. Note that the English translator has added the adverb "always," which is not explicitly present in the original Czech, to better capture the generalizing value of the habitual *mívá*.

In example (11), the imperfective simplex form would be used if the person is absolutely certain that American children are more friendly with their teachers than Czech children. The habitual form indicates not so much a fact as a supposition about the experience of most Americans. The habitual reading is coherent with quantification over the plural subject: not all American children, but some or most are more friendly with their teachers. With the imperfective simplex, there is a tendency to factualize or concretize the reading while the habitual verb rerports a generalization.[73]

In example (12), native informants reported that both verb forms are acceptable in this context but that they have different communicative implications. The imperfective simplex *mám* ("I have") would tend to indicate that, as a result of the conversations, something specific and important was learned. One speaker gave the following paraphrase: "I have [*mám*, imperfective simplex] the opportunity to talk with them and from the conversation I learn this and that." On the other hand, the habitual form *mívám* would indicate that the conversations are just conversations (*běžné konverzace*); they occur often, but no great train of thought results from them. In other words, the imperfective simplex verb tends to concretize the situation: something specific and valuable must be learned from the conversations. The habitual verb implies a more general reading: conversations occurred, but the specific details were not necessarily important. Havel used the imperfective simplex, and it is interesting to note that a later sentence in the text confirms the intuitions of the native speakers: "These conversations arre usually instructive and one learns and realizes a great deal from them" (Havel 1989b: 51).

In the opposition between fact and supposition, the different levels of evaluation of an iterated event are again reflected. Simple iteration, expressed by imperfective simplex forms, reports actual occurrences of a number of known events that should therefore have real consequences: the maxim is repeated because it is true, the pills are there because the speaker knows (or believes she knows) that Jindra has them, American children all have fond memories of their teachers, the conversations occur and Havel is

[73] The habitual verb was used in the original text.

writing about them because of their tangible value. Simple iteration concretizes the discourse. Habitual iteration steps away from the concrete to introduce an abstraction: the maxim is heard but the speaker does not necessarily endorse it, Jindra may have some pills because he is in the habit of carrying around a whole pharmacy with him, American school children on the whole have better relations with their teachers, and Havel occassionally has some conversations with Western intellectuals. Habitual verbs partition the information they impart in a space distinct from the reality space but linked to it in a certain unspecified way while imperfective simplex verbs tend to be interpreted as elaborating the Base reality space.

Emotional connotations

It is commonly pointed out that Czech habitual verbs tend to express emotional nuances that are not generally associated with corresponding imperfective simplex forms in the same context.[74] Consider, for instance, the following example:

(13) Navrhl, abychom odešli; abychom se dali polní cestou oklikou k městu, tak jak jsme kdysi **chodili**$^{\textbf{impf}}$**/chodívali**$^{\textbf{hab}}$, kdysi dávno. (Kundera 1967: 309)
(13) "He suggested we leave, take a path to town through the fields, the way we **used to go** long ago." (Kundera 1982: 264)

In this example informants much preferred the habitual form. The tone of the passage is nostalgic ("long ago"), emotional, lyrical. The speaker is presenting an emotional judgment of the good old days, and the habitual form helps to communicate this emotional speaker-orientation. In the same passage, the imperfective simplex *chodili* was said to be factual and void of emotional content. It was not preferred because the context calls for personal judgment and a high degree of emotional involvement on the part of the speaker.

The status of the emotional connotations associated with habitual verbs has not been adequately analyzed in previous scholarly treatments. As is evident from the corpus, all instances of habitual usage do not automatically carry with them an emotional charge. Czech habituals can also be used in scholarly rhetoric, in which the quasi-scientific nature of the observation is stressed, as in (13):

(14) Výjimečné nadané děti **mívají** problémy. (Headline of a news article)
(14) "Exceptionally gifted children **[often] have** problems."

In (14), there is no emotional coloring regarding the problems that gifted children may encounter. The habitual form *mívají* (< *mít* "to have") is used to make explicit that these

[74] Expressiveness can be reinforced by a reduplication of the habitual suffix and by rendering the form in colloquial, rather than literary, Czech: *bývat* (< *být* "to be") > *bývávat* [reduplication of suffix] > *bejvávat* [spoken Czech *ý* > *ej* vowel shift].

problems are merely potential.[75] The sentence has the tone of a scientific inference (inductive hypothesis) rather than of an emotionally-charged statement.

The contexts in the corpus also indicate that past-tense usage seems to favor emotional coloring, often reinforcing a nostalgic reading of the passage as in (13), but that emotional connotations cannot be ruled out in mophologically present examples:

(15) Představuji si rád svatého Petra, jak sedí na štokrleti u okénka, kterým je vidět dolů na zem. Moje maminka za ním **chodí**^{impf}**/chodívá**^{hab} často k tomu okénku. (Kundera 1967: 146)
(15) "I like to think of Saint Peter perched on a stool looking down on earth through a tiny window. My mother often **visits** him there." (Kundera 1982: 124)

In (15), according to native informants, the imperfective simplex *chodí* would report a bald, objective fact; it emphasizes the actual physical act of going there. In contrast, the habitual form *chodívá* has strong emotional content: it does not merely report a raw fact, but a fact that means something to the speaker. Moreover, the habitual form evokes all the trappings of a visit instead of just the bare act of going on one.[76]

In light of the contexts in the corpus, it is clear that the emotional connotations often associated with Czech habitual forms are, like the distant-past meaning, implicatures made possible by the interaction between the verb forms' semantics and the larger pragmatic context. In the case of past-tense habituals, for example, while a nostalgic reading is often possible, it is not obligatory. The emotional charge is not inherent in the verb's semantics, but rather conditionally present in certain contexts. In some contexts the nostalgic element is clearly absent although other emotional content might follow from the general situation:

(16) Lidstvo ještě nezapomnělo na světovou válku, která zmařila deset miliónů životů. Napadení Sovětského svazu? Copak by to světová dělnická třída dopustila? A Rusko je dnes jiné, než **bývalo**. Magnitka a Kuzněck vyrábějí železo, ve Stalingradě a Charkově zahájily provoz továrny na traktory. (Rybakov 1987: 35)
(16) "Mankind still hasn't forgotten the World War which wiped out ten million lives. An attack on the Soviet Union? Would the working class of the world allow that? And Russia today is different than it **used to be**. Magnitka and Kuznetsk produce iron, Stalingrad and Kharkov have begun production of tractors."

In (16), the habitual form *bývalo* (< *být* "to be") sets up a contrastive space: Russia at the time of the narration is different than it was at a point in the past (presumably before the World War or before industrialization). The habitual form does not invoke nostalgia for a non-industrial, non-Soviet past, but rather the opposite: the narrator is proud of his contemporary Russia and the emotional charge of the passage falls out from the dramatic contrast between the speaker's present reality space and the past space created by *bývalo*.

[75] In keeping with the analysis in chapter 5, the corresponding imperfective simplex in this context (*mají*) would imply that all gifted children (in the reality space) have problems.
[76] In the original context, Kundera uses the habitual verb.

The habitual form itself is not responsible for the emotional tone of the passage, but its use as a contrastive space-builder facilitates the emotionally charged reading.

Another example of how setting up a contrastive space can contribute to an emotionally charged reading is the following:

(17) "Přijde toho vždycky hodně najednou," rekla a vyfoukla neobratně kouř nosem. "Táta má infarkt."

"Infarkt?"

"Prý malý, daří se mu celkem slušně. Ale na mě je toho moc. **Bývala** jsem zvyklá, že rozhodoval všechno za mě, nikdy jsem se nemusela o nic starat, a teď..." (Bělohradská: 86)

(17) "Everything always happens at once," she said and awkwardly blew smoke out of her nose. "My father has had a heart attack."

"A heart attack?"

"Apparently a small one, he's doing okay. But it's too much for me. I **had been used** to him deciding everything for me. I never had to worry about anything. But now..."

In this example, evaluation of the contrasting spaces is reversed: the speaker clearly experiences nostalgia for the past space triggered by the habitual verb. The habitual verb sets up an explicit contrast between, as one native speaker said, the "new and old models" of the relationship between father and daughter. If the corresponding imperfective simplex form *byla* were substituted in, the passage would lose much of its nostalgic tone and be read as a more or less neutral statement of fact. With the habitual form, the "old model" is given a status equal to the "new model" and, conceptually speaking, two spatial domains are implied to be in competition with each other. With the imperfective simplex form, the old model is reduced in status and subordinated to present-day events. The emotional charge of the passage is strongly facilitated by use of the habitual form because its source is the strong contrast established between the competing spaces.

In mental-space terms, then, a habitual verb evokes the whole period of time — with additional entities and relationships implied to exist in the habitual space — while the imperfective simplex merely adds another fact to the existing narrative. An emotional charge can follow from a habitual space that strongly contrasts with its Base space or from the fact that a habitual space implies the existence of a small world unto itself. The former is the case for examples (13), (16), and (17), and the latter is the case for example (15), in which the habitual form vividly evokes all the trappings of his mother's visit to St. Peter and not merely the act of going to see him: the implied elaboration seems to be the source of the passage's emotional overtones. In any case, the emotional charge is only one possible reading of the habitual form. Examples (11) and (14) demonstrate that heightened objectivity is another possible reading. The subjective/objective usages are not, however, mutually exclusive in the framework proposed here: both are potential given the conceptual structure underlying habitual verbs.

The association of habitual verbs with strong emotional content can also be motivated as a consequence of the speaker-orientation of habitual propositions. Speaker-orientation follows logically from the status of habitual propositions as inductive inferences. Simple iteration reports the bald existence of certain entities or situations,

that is, tokens of a potential type. Statements of simple iteration are by and large unexamined statements; they are closely associated with fact or direct observation. Habitual iteration results from actively interpreting the existing entities or situations as samples of a more general type. Statements of habitual iteration are examined satements; they are inductive inferences from known or believed cases, and, as such, they are to a significant degree speaker-oriented assertions. In other words, habitual evaluation is a creative interpretation of the generic facts at the phenomenological level, and it is an interpretation that requires active involvement of the speaker's reasoning. As speaker-oriented statements, habitual propositions can be expected to have, but do not obligatorily have, emotional overtones that are absent in assertions of simple iteration.

Consider one more example:

(18) Vzpomínám si, jak jsem se v mládí **bavil**$^{\textbf{impf}}$**/bavíval**$^{\textbf{hab}}$ tím, že hlavní referát na různých spisovatelských sjezdech a konferencích měl vždy znovu název "Úkoly literatury v tom a tom období nebo po tom a tom sjezdu strany nebo v té a té pětiletce" a jak si navzdory všem úkolům, které jí byly trvale dávány, dělala literatura vždy znovu jen to, co chtěla. (Havel 1989b: 146)
(18) "I remember how in my youth I **was/used to be amused** when the keynote paper at various writers' congresses and conferences was always called "The Tasks of Literature in This or That Period or After This or That Party Congress or in This or That Five-Year Plan." I also remember how literature, in defiance of all the tasks that were continually being given her, would always do only what she wanted to do."

In (18), informants judged that both forms are possible, but that the habitual form *bavíval se* (< *bavit se* "to be amused") emphasizes the personal involvement of the speaker. The imperfective simplex *bavil se* was read as more of a straightforward reporting of Havel's reaction on the occasions he describes. In this context, the difference between the habitual and imperfective simplex forms seems to be minimal (the initial phrase "I remember" is itself an adequate space-builder), but this minimal distinction is primarily focused on the speaker's personal involvement in the utterance.[77]

J. Harris and K. Hooper have written: "As an inference, induction has the psychological effect of fixing belief in a certain hypothesis" (1983: 134). In opposition to imperfective simplex forms, habituals denote a hypothesis in which the speaker believes. It is a belief arrived at by reasoning, and, consequently, there is often an affective component to the speaker's belief that is either brought out or enhanced by use of the habitual form.

Kučera's non-quantified contexts in the past tense

As mentioned in chapter 2, Kučera has shown that there exist habitual forms in Czech that denote neither iteration in any sense of the word nor quanitifcation in his sense of the term. He offers the following examples (1981: 179):

[77] Here Havel uses the imperfective simplex.

(19) **Stával** tam dům. [*stávat* < *stát* "to stand"]
(19) "A house **used to stand** there."

(20) **Mívala** ho ráda. [*mívat ráda* < *mít ráda* "to like"]
(20) "She **used to like** him."

(21) **Znával** jsem ho dobře. [*znávat* < *znát* "to know"]
(21) "I **used to know** him well."

In none of these sentences is there a term that can be said to iterate, nor is there any possibility of quantification. In (19), for example, a house does not stand in a location at various intervals, but is a more or less permanent feature of the landscape. Each of these examples denotes "a state asserted to exist over an extended duration in the [...] past" (Kučera 1981: 180). These are the same cases that Kučera uses as the basis for his argument that the Czech past continuum can be divided into a distant past and a recent past.

At first blush, the existence of habitual forms that behave in this manner seems to contradict the analysis of habitual evaluation as a gestalt structure, which consists of, but cannot be reduced to, a series of repeating subsituations. These examples seem to have no internal structure, that is, no building blocks from which to generalize a habit. They behave more like mass nouns than collective nouns.

Indeed, Brinton has suggested that these contexts represent past states (Brinton 1987: 212). For Brinton, one and the same morphological form in Czech can therefore express both states and habits, between which Brinton maintains a rigorous distinction. Brinton argues that stativity is an aktionsart category and habituality an aspect one (Brinton 1987: 195ff).[78] This stance is in contrast to Vendler's (and Kučera's) conjecture that a habit is a kind of state. Brinton's suggestion that one morphological form in Czech can express both habits and states can be viewed as one way in which to take care of the problem raised by Kučera's non-quantified examples.

Perhaps a more satisfying way of understanding these contexts can be be found in an application of Smith's theory of aspectual selection (Smith 1983 and 1991) to them. Smith argues: "The aspectual meaning of a sentence results from interaction between two independent aspectual components, situation type and viewpoint" (Smith 1991: xvi). Situation types refer to the basic Vendlerian categories of accomplishment, achievement, activity, and state; aspectual viewpoints, in Smith's presentation, cover perfective, imperfective, and neutral. Both situation types and aspectual viewpoints are cognitively based: humans make such distinctions more or less automatically and evidence for them can be found not only in aspectual systems, but also in other cognitive evaluations.

Since the aspectual meaning of a given sentence results from the interaction between situations and viewpoints, Smith further maintains that the same aspectual viewpoint can have different realizations in combination with different types of situations. For instance, a stative situation type can be presented as an event (with a progressive viewpoint in English): "I am understanding more and more every day."

[78] For a detailed discussion of how Brinton differentiates aktionsart and aspect, see Brinton 1985a: 158-9 and 1985b: 449.

Smith argues that this mode of presentation reflects non-standard or marked aspectual choice on the speaker's part: the fit between situation type and aspectual viewpoint is not conventional. Smith suggests:

> [A] speaker may choose to make a non-standard association, for emphasis or for other rhetorical reasons. Such an association is conveyed by the use of the linguistic forms related to the unusual situation type. (Smith 1983: 495)

In the example above, a progressive form is used to render a stative situation type: a state is presented as an activity. Thus, the combination of an aspectual viewpoint with a situation type not normally associated with that viewpoint is permissible in language.

An analysis of Czech habitual verbs suggests that Smith's list of aspectual viewpoints could be expanded to include a habitual viewpoint. The habitual viewpoint is normally associated with accomplishment, achievement, or activity situation types. However, in the cases cited by Kučera, the habitual viewpoint combines with a stative situation type, which represents a marked aspectual selection on the part of the speaker.

The hypothesis that state terms that do not exhibit quantification represent a non-standard selection on the part of the speaker is supported by their marginal representation in the corpus, a fact that is not evident in Kučera's treatment. Since Kučera does not base his discussion on a corpus, he unintentionally exaggerates the importance of non-quantified habitual forms and distorts their value in a general semantic description of the verb form. These cases are clearly non-prototypical ones, and an analysis must somehow reflect this.

In discussing grammatical meaning, Bybee has argued that the meaning of a given gram is not absolutely invariant: grams exhibit multiple meanings organized into semantic networks that interact with contexts so that "not all features that characterize the meaning of a gram have to be present in all of its uses" (Bybee 1998: 261). In the case of non-quantified Czech habitual verbs, only those features of the habitual gestalt that are compatible with non-quantified situations are present.

We can understand this better by looking at native speaker evaluations of example (21) in the mental-space framework. Speakers indicated that both the imperfective simplex *znal jsem* ("I knew") and the corresponding habitual *znával jsem* ("I used to know") are acceptable in this limited context, but that the verb forms evoke rather different pragmatic situations. In the sentence with the imperfective simplex verb, one informant suggested that perhaps he has died, and the speaker is stating the simple fact that he knew him when he was alive. In the sentence with the habitual verb, the same informant proposed that he was still alive, but had changed significantly and was therefore no longer like he once used to be.[79] In mental-space terms, the imperfective simplex is typically interpreted as an indirect elaboration of the reality space and implies therefore that the entity no longer exists in that space: he is, for instance, dead. The habitual verb, however, triggers construction of a new space, linked to but distinct from the reality space, and the habitual space here is interpreted as strongly contrastive with the speaker's reality space: he is still alive, but he is not like the person the speaker once knew. Here we have not so much a distant-past meaning, but a space configuration in

[79] These are not the only interpretations of this bare context, but they illustrate well the conceptual structure underlying possible interpretations.

which the contrast function is intensified and through which — with the help of the habitual verb — the speaker's personal experience of the person in question is profiled. The non-quantified stative verb *znával* grounds its meaning in the underspecified mental-space construction, just like any other habitual verb, but does not partake of all the features of habitual evaluation. In this regard, non-quantified contexts are not as problematic as they may seem to be — they are just not prototypical.

Relations between habituals , modals, and conditionals

Czech habituals do not report mere possibility, but rather a generalization that is based on real or believed experience. Note the following examples, the first of which concerns people in a post-totalitarian society who remain politically active despite the regime and the last of which refers to a paragraph in the Czechoslovak communist legal code:

(22) Že tito lidé jsou a pracují, je samo o sobě nesmírně důležité a dobré: udržují i v nejhorší době kontinuitu politické reflexe a jestli nějaký reálný politický pohyb, vzešlý z té či oné "před-politické" konfrontace, začne brzy [...], **může to být — a mnohdy to bývá** — právě dík těmto osamělým "generálům bez vojska," kteří udrželi navzdory všem těžkým obětem kontinuitu politického myšlení. (Havel 1990b: 83)
(22) "That these people exist and work is in and of itself immeasurably important and good: they maintain, even in the worst of times, the continuity of political thinking and if some real political movement, which might come out of this or that "pre-political" confrontation, would soon begin [...], it **may be — and it often happens to be** — thanks to those very "generals without an army", who maintained, in the face of all their difficult sacrifices, a continuity of political thought."

(23) Snadno **může být a také často bývá** využíván k politické represi.
(23) "It easily **can be and also often is** used for political repression."

As both these examples illustrate, habitual verbs do not express pure possibility. The *může* ("can, is able") phrase in these examples is fully potential, but the habitual phrase that follows assumes some real grounding in experience, and Havel makes his point in both (22) and (23) through the very contrast between abstract possibilty and an inductive generalization. While the *může* phrase does not exclude actual occurrence of the event, it does not explicitly imply, as the habitual form does, that actual occurrences have taken place.

In a cross-linguistic study, Bybee et al. (1994: 160) have noted that lexical sources for habitual-iterative grams often profile experience: "living," "knowing," and "being accustomed to" are cited examples. This is further evidence that the distinction between pure modals and habitual-iterative forms lies in the irrelevancy of experiential grounding in the former and the implication of it in the latter. In mental-space terms, both modals and habitual-iteratives prompt construction of a space that is distinct from the reality Base space, but the local link between the two spaces in the configuration is different: the habitual-iterative space is linked to the Base space through actual events or

entities already existing in the Base while the modal space is not. In Langacker's terms, the habitual-iterative forms are inferences from events or entities in the "actual" plane to the more abstract "structural" plane. The habitual-iterative verb form acts therefore as a connector between the potential (modal) space and its parent (Base) space because it assumes the reality of actual instances in the parent space that exemplify the habitual proposition.

Scholars have also noted a cross-linguistic overlap between verb forms used to express habitual-iterative and conditional meanings. For example, Aronson (1978: 14ff) points out that the same Bulgarian verbal form can denote either an aspectually iterative situation or a conditional. He also notes that much the same can be said of English, Serbo-Croatian, and Hebrew, and he hypothesizes that the habitual-iterative/conditional connection is a universal: "The connection between these two functions is so close and so widespread as to lead one to believe that we are operating with a universal" (Aronson 1978: 15). In his article on the Slavic frequentative habitual (F-HAB), Monnesland draws a similar conclusion:

> The F-HAB construction [...] is not in itself modal. It is non-actual but not non-factual. There is, however, no sharp division between the F-HAB construction and related modal sentences, expressing prediction, supposition and potentiality. This is why modal verbal forms are used to express F-HAB: future, conditional, imperative. (Monnesland 1984: 73)

I would point out that the iterative contexts that both Aronson and Monnesland use for their arguments are examples of habitual, and not simple, iteration. Lazard has also discussed a general habitual-iterative/irrealis (future) association in Indo-European, about which he writes: "[D]ans le champ de pensée d'une certaine partie au moins de l'humanité ces notions occupent des positions voisines" (Lazard 1975: 358). Citing Lazard, Fleischman (1995: 538ff) understands the same overlap as motivated by the indefiniteness inherent in habitual-iterative forms, the meaning of which can therefore extend over possible worlds.

It is clear that the "would-be" nature of habit in Peirce's semiotic provides a framework for understanding the natural connection between habituality and hypothetical conditionality, although by itself the Peircean framework is not sufficient. It is with the addition of mental-space theory to the analysis that an understanding of the relations between conditional marking in verbs and habitual-iterative situations can be explained. The English sentence Aronson uses to exemplify the overlap is: "He **would play** golf every day when/if he lived in Chicago" (Aronson 1978: 15). In both the habitual-iterative interpretation with "when" and the conditional interpretation with "if", the same verb form ("would play") can be used. In terms of mental-space theory, the explanation for why this can be the case is simple. Conditionals are similar to habitual-iterative propositions in that they trigger the creation of a new space which is distinct from the Base space.[80] The conditional space diverges from the habitual-iterative space, however, in its structure and its link with its parent space: conditionals prompt hypothetical spaces (the construction is triggered by "if") and the link to the parent space is not based on experiential grounding as it is with the habitual-iterative space. The same verb form can

[80] For analyses of conditional constructions in the mental-space framework, see Sweetser 1996 and Dancygier and Sweetser 1996.

be used because the verb (in English, "would") calls out for placement in a space which is not the Base reality space: that is, in either a conditional or habitual-iterative space.

Czech habitual verbs demonstrate some aspects of Peirce's "would-be" treatment of habit in their semantics, but the verb form, unlike English "would," cannot be used to mark the conditional mood. Nonetheless, the Czech situation does represent a good test-case for Aronson's hypothesis since it demonstrates what the habitual-iteratives have in common with conditionals and also clearly what they do not. Habituals, conditionals, modals, and futures all prompt the creation of new mental spaces, and this general mental-space function is what they all share and why they can sometimes overlap in form and in meaning. Obviously more cross-linguistic research, which is beyond the scope of this study, would need to be carried out to untangle all the details of this potential overlap, but it seems likely that an adequate solution to the question can ultimately be provided within the mental-space framework.

Stylistic limitations on the usage of habitual verbs

The opposition between simple iteration as typically expressed by imperfective simplex verbs and habitual iteration as expressed by habitual verbs in Czech may also be at the root of the stylistic differences between the usage of these two forms. A clear majority of native informants reported that habitual verbs tend to be avoided in contemporary spoken Czech; in everyday language, the imperfective simplex is preferred to the habitual even in expressions of habituality. In her study of Czech and Russian aspect, Eva Eckert (1984: 78) writes: "All the *-íva-/-áva-* [i.e., habitual] verbs are infrequent in contemporary spoken Czech." Habitual verbs therefore tend to be perceived as literary and sometimes archaic forms. As an illustration of this, consider the passage below:

(24) Mé názory o socialismu vyplývají z mého pojmu demokracie; revoluce může někdy rušit špatné věci, ale **netvoří**^{impf}**/netvořívá**^{hab} dobrých a trvalých. (Čapek 1990: 126)
(24) "My opinion of socialism is derived from my understanding of democracy. Revolution can sometimes destroy bad things, but it **doesn't create** good and lasting things."

With this example, speakers indicated a preference for the habitual form *netvořívá* (< *tvořit* "to create") because of the out-dated genitive morphology of the adjectives in the scope of negation. The archaic adjectival form seems to correlate with an archaic (or stylistically marked) verb form.

This interpretation of habitual verbs as stylistically marked, literary forms is coherent given previous discussion of the verb's association with hypothetical, rather than factual or everyday, domains. The imperfective simplex correlates strongly with definiteness and fact while the habitual verb reports indefiniteness, supposition, abstraction. Because of this, habituals tend to be used in literary Czech (*spisovná čeština*) and avoided in spoken Czech (*mluvená čeština*). Since the written language tends to be the primary locus of abstract or hypothetical discourse while the spoken

language is the source of commentary on real, everyday existence, the stylistic marking of habitual verbs makes a great deal of sense.

The use of the imperfective simplex in iterative contexts to express simple iteration to imply definiteness, fact, or specificity is not surprising given the primary function of the imperfective form in non-iterative contexts. In contrast to the habitual form, the imperfective simplex can denote actual events: *David právě teď* ***píse***^{impf} *něco o českých slovesech* ("David is writing something right now about Czech verbs"). The habitual verb cannot combine with adverbials indicating an exact moment in time: **David právě teď* ***psává***^{hab} *něco o českých slovesech* is not a well-formed sentence. The imperfective simplex form, then, is already associated with definiteness, fact, and the immediacy of everyday perception. It seems only natural that, in iterative contexts, this form would generally be used to express these very same conceptual features in a way appropriate to an iterated situation.

To understand this more clearly, we might look again at an example from the previous chapter:

(25) Náš brankář **chytá**^{impf}**/chytává**^{iter} lépe.
(25) "Our goalie tends goal better."

In the version with the imperfective simplex *chytá*, the meaning the sentence is ambiguous: it could refer to the actual behavior of the goalie during a game, or it could be a general statement of the goalie's abilities. If two people are watching a soccer game and one of them says *Náš brankář chytá lépe*, two meanings are possible: our goalie is goal-tending better right now or our goalie keeps goal better in general. In the same context, the habitual form asserts only generality: the statement is independent of the goalie's performance in isolated games.

The imperfective simplex form is therefore associated with actuality and immediate perception in a way that the habitual form is not. In iterative contexts, in which an actual present is excluded, the imperfective simplex retains its association with immediacy in its tendency to express definiteness, fact, and specificity and to be used in reference to everyday situations.

In this regard, a final example is instructive:

(26) Další filozofické vlivy na mne? Značně: Comte, Hume, Mill; přitom se nesmí zapomenout, že na nás **mívají**^{hab} vliv lidé a autoři, se kterými nesouhlasíme. (Čapek 1990: 76)
(26) "Other philosophers who have influenced me? In particular: Comte, Hume, and Mill. And it must not be forgotten that persons and writers with whom we disagree also **have** an influence upon us."

The habitual verb in this example is appropriate at least in part because the information contained in the statement is not a matter of everyday knowledge or easily concluded form one's normal experiences. In fact, just the opposite is true. Masaryk himself (with the help of Čapek) points out that we tend to forget that we are influenced also by people with whom we do not agree. The habitual form marks the information as unexpected, as more theoretical and at some remove from immediate understanding. Such a marking is

consistent with the stylistic limitations on the usage of habitual verbs and with their general character as expressions of habit.

Iconicity of suffixation

The semantic opposition between simple iteration and habitual iteration is at least partially reflected in the morphology of imperfective simplex and their corresponding habitual forms. In a ground-breaking article in 1965, Roman Jakobson demonstrated that, despite Saussure's emphasis on the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, the relationship between linguistic form and linguistic content is largely one of semiotic coherence. His goal was to explore the relationship between the signans and the signatum in a linguistic sign and specifically "to approach the linguistic pattern in its iconic aspect" (1965: 26).[81]

Following Peirce, Jakobson distinguished between two kinds of icons: images, in which "the signans represents the 'simple qualities' of the signatum" (1965: 27) and diagrams, in which "the likeness between signans and signatum consists 'only in respect to the relations of their parts'" (1965: 27). The relationship between signans and signatum or, more generally, between form and meaning in a linguistic sign is often (at least partially) determined iconically. The more significant of the two kinds of icons for language is the diagram: relations within the formal system of language tend to be diagrams of relations within the content system.

For example, Jakobson argued that, in inflectional languages, there is a relationship of diagrammatic iconicity between inflectional suffixes and morphemes and the phonemes used to represent them: "[A]ffixes, particularly inflectional suffixes, in languages where they exist, habitually differ from the other morphemes and their combinations [...] Of the 24 obstruents of the Russiana consonantal pattern, only four phonemes, saliently opposed to each other, function in the inflectional suffixes" (1965: 29). He additionally noted the general tendency of plural nouns to have longer suffixes than corresponding singular nouns (1965: 30). In this case, the conceptual opposition between singular and plural is iconically reflected in the morphological forms: "The signans of the plural tends to echo the meaning of a numeral increment by an increased length of the form" (1965: 30). These relations could be schematized in the following way:

Form	Content
Base (*dog*)	Singular
Base - suffix (*dog-s*)	Plural

The same kind of correspondence is evident in the morphology of the comparative and superlative degrees of adjectives (Jakobson 1965: 29). The superlative degree tends to be longer than the comparative degree that, in turn, tends to be longer than the base form of

[81] Jakobson explored the indexical elements of the linguistic sign in his 1957 article. See Jappy 1988 for a discussion of Jakobson, Peirce, and iconicity.

the adjective. The increase in length corresponds to an increase in conceptual complexity of the adjectival form. Jakobson concludes that diagrammatization, "patent and compulsory in the entire syntactic and morphological pattern of language, [...] invalidates Saussure's dogma of arbitrariness" (1965: 35). Linguistic signs tend to cohere iconically; form and meaning tend to be diagrammatically related.[82]

The same approach to iconicity has also been adopted by researchers in cognitive linguistics, as evidenced in the work of Langacker, Haiman, Givón, and Lakoff.[83] Langacker, for instance, has described the linguistic sign in the following terms: "The form itself is conventional, inasmuch as another form could perfectly well have been chosen for this concept, but it is not arbitrary in the sense of being unmotivated, given the existence of other signs" (1987: 12). For Langacker, grammar is "simply the structuring and symbolization of semantic content" (1987: 12). Haiman (1985) has provided evidence for semiotic coherence in morphology and syntax. He writes: "[L]inguistic forms are frequently the way they are because, like diagrams, they resemble the conceptual structures they are used to convey" (1985: 1).

Lakoff has observed that iconicity seems to be a general principle of natural language. The form of iconicity present in Jakobson's singular-plural and comparative-superlative diagrams can be captured in the general tendency in language that "more of form is more of content" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 127). To illustrate this principle Lakoff and Johnson give the English example *He ran and ran and ran*, which denotes "more running than just He ran" (1980: 127). This example can be schematized in a manner similar to the one above:

Form	Content
"He ran"	Activity
"He ran and ran"	Emphatic activity

In this particular case, the addition of formal elements to the basic phrase corresponds to an increase in the cognitive complexity of the utterance. A somewhat different perspective on the situation is presented: the basic activity of running is rendered emphatic, or it is implied that he ran for a greater distance.

These studies all demonstrate that the relationship between form and meaning is not arbitrary. It is defined by diagrammatic coherence between levels of language: relations within the formal system tend to be icons of relations within the content system. Diagrammatic iconicity is thus a central principle of language organization, and, not surprisingly, it can also be observed in the relations between the imperfective simplex and habitual forms in Czech.

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[82] For extensions of Jakobson's work in diagrammatization, see Shapiro 1980, 1983, 1990, and 1991; Anttila 1977a and 1989; and Andersen 1979, 1986, and 1991. Wolfgang Dressler follows a similar line (with references to Jakobson, Shapiro, Anttila, and Peirce) in the context of his natural morphology; see Dressler 1990a and 1990b.

[83] Curiously, though, cognitive linguists make little or no reference in their work to the Jakobsonian tradition. For a representative sample of Givón's research in this area, see Givón 1985.

As has been argued, the typical interpretation of a Czech imperfective simplex form in an iterative context is one of simple iteration. The habitual form, on the other hand, necessarily yields a meaning of habitual iteration. Simple iteration is a necessary prerequisite for habitual evaluation of a set of repeating circumstances. If the circumstances themselves do not minimally exist, an underlying rule that unifies them into a single conceptual gestalt cannot be hypothesized. The relations obtaining between imperfective simplex and habitual forms on the level of content are iconically diagrammed in their morphology. Habituals are derived from imperfective simplex forms by augmentation with the infix *-va-*. This relationship can be schematized as below:

Form	Content
Base (*říkat*)	Imperfective simplex
Base - *-va-* (*říkávat*)	Habitual

The infinitive of the imperfective simplex acts as a morphological base for the formation of the corresponding habitual form in the same way that simple iteration semantically underlies habitual iteration. Habituality on the level of content as well as on the level of form is simple iteration with the addition of something extra.

This analysis is confirmed by an examination of the productivity of the various ways of deriving habitual verbs from corresponding imperfective simplex forms. Given a tendency toward the establishment of diagrams between the level of form and the level of content to increase the semiotic transparency of the forms, it is expected that deriving the habitual form from the imperfective siimplex form by means of the *-va-* infix would be a productive formation. This is, in fact, the case. Derivation with the *-va-* formant is the most productive formation of habituals.

Some habitual verbs do not exhibit the *-va-* formant in their primary derivations, but there is a strong tendency for secondary derivations to occur on the basis of the productive model (Kopečný 1948: 153). This results in the existence of two habitual forms for certain verbs, as summarized below:[84]

Imperfective Simplex	Unproductive Habitual Form	Productive Habitual Form
číst "to read"	*čítat*	*čítávat*
jíst "to eat"	*jídat*	*jídávat*
slyšet "to hear"	*slýchat*	*slýchávat*
vidět "to see"	*vídat*	*vídávat*
sedět "to sit"	*sedat*	*sedávat*

[84] The last two unproductive habitual derivations from *sedět* "to sit" and *ležet* "to lie" are homonymous with simple imperfective forms correlative to other verbs. Kopečný notes that they are not only habituals from the verbs of positioins *sedět* and *ležet*, but "they can also be simple imperfectives of *sednout*, *lehnout*" (1948: 106). For further discussion of verbs in this chart, see Širokova 1963: 75.

ležet "to lie" *léhat* *léhávat*

In the context of the analysis presented above, the existence of productive formations for verbs of this type is significant. They illustrate the tendency toward semiotic transparency in the relations between the form and content systems. The semantic relations between imperfective simplex and habitual forms in Czech tend to be iconically diagrammed in the morphology of the verb forms.

It might further be pointed out that habitual verbs are more conceptually limited than corresponding imperfective simplex verbs and that this fact is also captured in the morphology of the two forms. Habitual verbs in Czech must express habitual iteration; they cannot denote simple iteration in any context. Imperfective simplex verbs in iterative contexts tend to express simple iteration, but can also express habituality. The habitual form is therefore conceptually more limited than the imperfective simplex form. This conceptual limitation is iconically represented in the addition of a morpheme to the imperfective simplex base in the derivation of the habitual form. The extra morpheme fixes the habitual form, making it more concrete. The same process is seen in Lakoff and Johnson's example *He ran* versus *He ran and ran.* The first sentence can be used to represent a neutral activity or an emphatic activity. The second sentence, however, is more fixed in meaning: it can only denote an emphatic activity. On the level of form, this restriction in meaning is diagrammed by the increase of formal length.

Summary

In this chapter, I have attempted to describe a general model of iteration that is implied by the conceptual realities of both actualities and future potentialities and the hierarchical relations between them. I have argued that this model is active in human conceptualization, broadly speaking, and therefore also in language. The Czech habitual verb is a linguistic sign that expresses what I have termed habitual iteration. This is not to say that every usage of a habitual verb in Czech expresses the full complex of habituality, but that the verb is used in those contexts in which habitual construal (the habitual viewpoint) is communicatively effective.

The analytical approach adopted in this chapter takes as its starting point the hermeneutic nature of linguistic structure. Shapiro has explained that understanding language as a hermeneutic object means going "beyond the cataloguing of linguistic units and the rules of their combinations" and attempting "a recovery or a reconstruction of the coherence which enables facts to subsist as such" (Shaprio 1983: 10-11). The thrust of this chapter has been to show the meanings associated with habitual verbs, even in non-prototypical contexts, are coherent in light of the conceptual structure of a habit, and that the framework for understanding habit developed throughout this study can also be extended to account for facts of form and style and the relations between habitual-iterative forms, modals, and conditionals. I do not claim that my analyses of these individual questions necessarily represent the definitive word on them; in fact, most of them would likely benefit from further analysis as well as a cross-linguistic perspective.

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