
David S. Danaher
Slavic Languages and Literatures, Wisconsin-Madison

Abstract Russian has two words corresponding to English truth and four words corresponding to English lie. While studies have detailed the semantic and pragmatic differences between these two terms, how these domains are metaphorized in everyday language—and exploited in literature—has yet to be examined. In the first half of the article, I present an analysis of everyday metaphorical expressions for Truth and Falsehood in contemporary Russian. Linguistic evidence suggests that these domains are understood via a small set of interrelated conceptual structures. Metaphorical expressions in Russian cluster around one basic metaphor (KNOWING IS SEEING) and three image-schematic structures (STRAIGHT, PATH, and CONTAINER). This network of everyday metaphors serves as a point of reference for an examination of Tolstoy’s aesthetic representations of the same domains. In the second part, I examine Tolstoy’s extensions and elaborations of metaphors for Truth and Falsehood in his postconversion works, and I argue that they comprise a central metaphorical motif, the full complexity of which has yet to be appreciated, in his novella “The Death of Ivan Il’ich.”

He struggled in a black sack into which he was being thrust by some invisible force... and with each moment he felt that he was getting closer and closer to

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what terrified him, despite all his struggles. He felt that his agony was due to his being thrust into that black hole and still more to his not being able to get right into it. He was hindered from getting into it by his conviction that his life had been a good one. That very justification of his life held him fast and prevented his moving forward, and it caused him the most torment of all.

L. N. Tolstoy, “The Death of Ivan Il'Ich,” 1886

1. Tolstoy's Metaphorical Prose: From the Everyday to the Literary

Russian has two words corresponding to English truth (pravda and istina) and four words corresponding to English lie (nepravda, lozh', yan'e, and obman). The semantic and pragmatic differences between these two terms within Russian, as well as in comparison with so-called translation equivalents in other languages, have been studied (Arutiuonova 1991; Mondry and Taylor 1992; Shopen 1992; Krongauz 1993; and Arutiunova and Rjabtsева 1995), but how these domains are metaphorized in everyday language and in literature has yet to be examined.

This study proposes a systematic analysis of everyday metaphorical expressions for Truth and Falsehood in contemporary Russian which is potentially valid, in general terms, for other languages. The analysis is based on the use of such expressions in Russian speech, journalistic prose, memoirs, and a series of popular detective novels; sources were supplemented by data collected from dictionaries (Lubensky 1995; Iarantsev 1981) and in interviews with native speakers.

Linguistic evidence from Russian (as well as English and other languages) suggests that the abstract domains of Truth and Falsehood are coherently and meaningfully organized via a remarkably small set of conceptual structures that have a potentially infinite number of elaborations and extensions. As illustrated below, metaphorical expressions in Russian for these domains cluster around one basic conceptual metaphor (KNOWING IS SEEING) and three image-schematic structures (STRAIGHT, PATH, and CONTAINER), all of which motivate a number of general metaphors which are central to how Russian speakers structure their understanding of the two domains. My first goal in this study will be to sketch the system of metaphors for Truth and Falsehood in Russian and to describe the network of related meanings which is latent in the collectivity of everyday metaphorical expressions.

The network of everyday metaphorical conceptualizations for the domains Truth and Falsehood will serve as a point of reference for an examination of Leo Tolstoy's aesthetic representations of these domains. In his postconversion polemical works, Tolstoy extends and elaborates everyday metaphors for Truth and Falsehood, used systematically and consistently, largely for Truth and Falsehood metaphors. Critics of the story are not understood that these metaphors are not to be taken at face value (or literal meaning).

While Tolstoy's use of these metaphors has been previously discussed (e.g., in Laruelle 1992; and Silbajoris 1998), there has been no systematic analysis of the metaphorical use of these terms in Russian. Shopen (1999) has attempted to provide an account of the meaning of these terms in Russian and has shown that Tolstoy systematically uses Truth and Falsehood metaphors in his works.

To demonstrate the systematic use of these metaphors in “Ivan Il'Ich,” I will use the model of the Truth and Falsehood metaphors proposed by Olney (1992: 103) in his book “Essence of Fictional Art: A Theory of Literary Elements and Experience.” Olney's model suggests that the conceptual apparatus of the story is based on a three-way opposition between Truth, Falsehood, and Lies. Tolstoy uses these metaphors throughout his works, and the analysis of these metaphors in “Ivan Il'Ich” will serve as a case study for the application of Olney's model to Tolstoy's works.

Corrada Fiumara has argued that Tolstoy's approach is unique in Russian literature, and she cites Tolstoy's use of metaphor as a key feature of his aesthetic style. John’s (1995) definition of metaphor is as an “aesthetic category in Tolstoy, where ‘a metaphor is...’” experience on a more general level than in the current analysis because of the way in which he uses language and the conclusion.

Olney (1992: 103) defines “falsehood” as a “universally shared” experience in Tolstoy's works, and he argues that Tolstoy's use of metaphor is an integral part of his aesthetic style. Olney's model of the Truth and Falsehood metaphors in Russian literature is based on a three-way opposition between Truth, Falsehood, and Lies. Tolstoy uses these metaphors throughout his works, and the analysis of these metaphors in “Ivan Il'Ich” will serve as a case study for the application of Olney's model to Tolstoy's works.

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metaphors for Truth and Falsehood; and similar aestheticized representations, used systematically and coherently, comprise a central metaphorical motif in “The Death of Ivan Il’ich,” a story widely recognized as one of the most powerful literary meditations on death and arguably Tolstoy’s most artistically dense work. Despite its haunting conceptual power, the truth/falsehood metaphorical motif in this work has yet to be fully appreciated. Critics of the story have identified isolated parts of the motif but have not understood that these parts comprise a family of related metaphors and that Tolstoy systematically exploits this relationship in the story’s imagery.

While Tolstoy’s use of metaphor in “Ivan Il’ich” and elsewhere has been previously discussed (in, for example, Curtis 2002; Jahn 1999: 19; Olney 1972; and Silbajoris 1990: chap. 3), metaphor in these works is variously defined, and all the scholars in question seem to favor a rather broad definition of the term.1 Curtis, for example, grounds his discussion in the Jakobsonian model of metaphoric and metonymic poles (Jakobson 1956), while Olney (1972: 103) defines the term only obliquely, calling metaphor the “essence of fictional art” and attributing to it the power of evoking an emotion and experience.2 While these approaches to metaphor in Tolstoy have proved valuable, each in its own way, they are inadequate—precisely because of their broad idea of metaphor—for discerning the figurative linkages that will be discussed here.

To demonstrate the value of the truth/falsehood metaphorical motif in “Ivan Il’ich,” I will make use of the conceptual theory of metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 1998; Lakoff 1993; Johnson 1987, 1993; Lakoff and Turner 1989; Gibbs 1994), which operates with a definition of the term that will allow us to recognize the specific nature of this motif: I am aware that the conceptual approach to metaphor has been criticized both on the ground that many of its claims are not as innovative as they are presented to be and also because literary critics who make use of this cognitive approach have allegedly failed to give literature its full due (see, for example, Gross 1997 and Adler and Gross 2002). The point of this article is not to dispute these criticisms. I will merely note that the conceptual approach, what-

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1. Corradi Fiumara has argued that a broader view of metaphor is often the best analytical approach, and he cites Cooper (1986: 165) in suggesting that "usually one gains rather than loses by employing 'metaphor' in a generous way" (Corradi Fiumara 1995: 9).

2. John's definition is equally broad. He (1999: 19) argues that a metaphorical symbol is evident in Tolstoy, where "a report of experience on one plane of existence is taken to reflect, explain, etc. experience on a different plane." Silbajoris's discussion contains the most sophisticated treatment of Tolstoy's use of metaphor, but his perspective is also not directly relevant to the current analysis because he is less interested in how Tolstoy uses particular metaphors than in how he uses language in a way that calls to mind how metaphor works (see, however, the conclusion).
ever its theoretical novelty and however it has been applied to date, has considerable methodological merit in that it provides both the tools and a well-defined method for systematic analysis of metaphorical expressions in a text. I also hope to demonstrate here that the framework can be applied to a prose text in a way which does not reduce—but rather enhances—appreciation of the text’s “literariness.”

2. The Network of Metaphorical Expressions for Truth/Falsehood in Everyday Russian

Conceptual metaphor theorists maintain that metaphor is not primarily *propositional* but *conceptual* in nature and is therefore central both to how we think (and speak) and to who we are:

Metaphor pervades our normal conceptual system. Because so many of the concepts that are important to us are either abstract or not clearly delineated in our experience . . . , we need to get a grasp on them by means of other concepts that we understand in clearer terms. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 125)

Via the power of metaphor, abstractions (concepts, like truth and falsehood, or mental processes, such as reasoning) prove to be grounded in our (physical) experience of the world. Moreover, in this framework, metaphorical propositions in literature are viewed as secondary extensions of basic metaphorical concepts which are present in everyday language and cognition (Lakoff 1993: 203).

Conceptual metaphors function when an abstract domain, which lacks in and of itself clearly delineated semantic structure, receives that structure from a more concrete (often physically embodied) domain. The abstract domain receiving structure is called the *target domain*; the concrete domain providing structure is called the *source domain*. A conceptual metaphor therefore represents the mapping from source to target domain. Concrete phrases in a language which instantiate this mapping are termed *metaphorical expressions* of the underlying conceptual metaphor. The classic example of a conceptual metaphor, originally analyzed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980: 44–45; see also Lakoff 1993: 206ff.), is LOVE IS A JOURNEY: “Our relationship has hit a *dead-end*,” “We’re at a *crossroads*,” “Their marriage is on the *rocks*,” “It seems like we’re just *spinning our wheels*. These common metaphorical expressions point to an underlying conceptualization of

3. In examining Tolstoy’s use of metaphor in “Ivan Il’ich” from this angle, I am also implicitly taking up Mark Turner’s (1999: 149) proposal, within this conceptual theory, to investigate a longer literary work as “inspired and informed globally by a controlling conceptual connection.”
a love relationship in terms of a journey: the lovers correspond to travelers, their relationship corresponds to the vehicle (the exact kind can be variously specified), and difficulties in the relationship correspond to obstacles to travel. Everyday metaphors for Love can be creatively elaborated (for example, “We’re riding on a freeway of love in a pink Cadillac,” a line from a popular song sung by Aretha Franklin) without loss of meaning because the same conceptual metaphor LOVE IS A JOURNEY mediates our understanding of both the everyday and the creative expressions. In this regard, Lakoff (1993: 203) states: “The result is that metaphor . . . is absolutely central to ordinary natural language semantics, and that the study of [creative] metaphor is an extension of the study of everyday metaphor.”

Lakoff (ibid.: 215) has also noted that, in a metaphorical mapping from source to target domain, it is the schematic structure of the source domain that is preserved “in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain.” Schematic structure is often represented in image-schematic form. An image-schema is “a recurring, dynamic pattern of our perceptual interactions and motor programs that gives coherence and structure to our experience,” and it has been argued at length that such schemas are “integral to meaning and rationality” (Johnson 1987: xiv). Tied to our bodily experience, they are among “the foundations of the conceptualizing capacity [and] form, in effect, a set of primitive [foundational] meanings” (Mandler 1992: 591). Image-schemas which are commonly used in the formation of conceptual metaphors include: PATH (JOURNEY), CONTAINER, SURFACE, BALANCE, FORCE, CENTER-PERIPHERY, PART-WHOLE, VERTICALITY, and PROCESS (Johnson 1987: 126; see also Cienki 1998a). Raymond Gibbs, for example, has conducted psycholinguistic experiments on our experiential understanding of standing in an attempt to motivate, at a conceptual level, the polysemy of the word stand in expressions like “I can’t stand him,” “The candidates for Senate don’t stand for anything,” “I won’t stand out if I wear this pink shirt?” and so forth (Gibbs et al. 1994). His research demonstrated that our sensorimotor, schematic understanding of standing (informed particularly by the schemas BALANCE, VERTICALITY, and LINKAGE) does seem to influence how the word stand is used in its different meanings, even if image-schemas do not tell the whole story.4

It is important to note that image-schemas provide only a vague structural outline of a definition, that is, they specify very little. For example, our understanding of the CONTAINER schema is grounded in what we know,

4. See also Gibbs and O’Brien 1990, in which the metaphors MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES are discussed with reference to how we cognitively process common idioms like “to spill the beans” and “to let the cat out of the bag.”
generally, about containers of all types: all have an inside and an outside as well as a barrier (sometimes opaque, sometimes transparent) between the inside and the outside. Schemas like CONTAINER can then be fleshed out by speakers in the process of creating specific metaphorical expressions which are consistent with the source domain's schematic structure. If, for example, the body (head) is understood as a container for meaning (see below), then the sharing of ideas "contained" in it can be conceptualized in a multitude of ways, all of which specify in some coherent way the schematics of the Container image-schema ("He poured out everything he knew," "Can I pick your brain sometime?" "Don't let the cat out of the bag").

The crux of my analysis here will be a presentation of the four basic modes of conceptualizing Truth and Falsehood—the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING and the image-schemas STRAIGHT, PATH, and CONTAINER—modes which I have derived from an analysis of a large number of everyday metaphorical expressions for these domains in Russian. These four modes are used systematically in both Russian and English (for example, "He told an obvious lie," "Don't bend the truth," "You've got a long way to go to get to the truth of the matter," and "I had to pull the truth out of him"). In Russian, as I will show, the various terms for truth and falsehood are all grounded in one or more of the four conceptual modes.

In presenting this analysis of everyday metaphors, I argue that it serves as a necessary starting point for the literary analysis which follows. In "Ivan Il'ich," Tolstoy systematically grounds his metaphorical imagery in one of the four conceptual modes underlying Russians' understanding of Truth and Falsehood and, in doing so, powerfully reinforces the story's overarching concern with the themes of truth and deception.

2.1. The Conceptual Metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING

There is a small number of metaphorical expressions sanctioned by the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING: Knowledge (and, by extension, knowledge of the truth or true essence of some entity), the abstract target domain, is structured by the concrete source domain of Vision. This conceptual metaphor is itself a product of the general metaphor MIND IS BODY (Sweetser 1990: chap. 2) and is so commonplace in everyday language that metaphorical expressions motivated by it may not be immediately perceived as metaphorical. Lakoff and Johnson (1987: 238ff.), for example, have noted that "we take an important part of our logic

5. There seem to be slight differences in the metaphorical conceptualizations of the individual Russian terms, but these differences (see Danaher forthcoming) are not directly relevant to the literary analysis which follows.
of knowledge from our logic of vision,” and they list a series of conceptual metaphors (THINKING IS PERCEIVING, COMMUNICATING IS SHOWING, ATTEMPTING TO GAIN KNOWLEDGE IS SEARCHING, BEING IGNORANT IS BEING UNABLE TO SEE, etc.) that follow from the basic experiential link between knowing and seeing.

In this conceptualization, truth is understood as a location or object that can be seen and therefore known: thus, the Russian word ochevidno (evident, obvious), which is more semantically transparent than its English translations and literally means: that which is seen (vidno) by the eyes (ochi). Visibility of a location (or an object in a location) can be due to light shining upon it, which may be natural or created by the observer to facilitate perception, or due to a perspective on the location/object which renders it visible and which may necessitate movement on the part of the observer or the object itself. Thus, in order to arrive at a knowledge of the true essence of something, we can “throw” or “pour” light on it in Russian with the phrase brosit' / prodosvit' set na chto-to, or the object itself might “swim up to the light” (vospit' na set') and reveal itself. Since visible, illuminated objects are, in everyday experience, knowable, knowledge or truth is metonymically associated with light: set istiny (light of truth), prosvetit' cheloweka (to enlighten [literally, to shine light through] a person). In the Russian proverb Pravda glaza kolet [Truth stabs the eyes; i.e., the truth hurts], truth is understood to be blindingly bright, piercing as a ray of light. Moreover, as blazing light becomes conceptually linked to truth, so darkness is associated with ignorance or falsehood: bluzhdat' v potemkhakh (to wander in darkness [ignorance]) and tennye/chehnye dela (dark/black [illegal, dishonest] deeds).

While intense brightness can function as a sign of truth, superficial light (glitter) may be associated with active deception or an attempt to distract the observer with a dazzling but ultimately false light show: for example, the Russian phrase ovost' gliansov na chto-to, just like its English equivalent “to put a veneer on something” (cf. “to gloss over something”), can describe a strategy used to trick observers into believing that the underlying product is of high quality. Dazzle is not the only way to package falsehoods in order to pass them off as truth. In his Prizheva o pravde i lozh' [Parable of truth and falsehood], the Russian bard Vladimir Vysotsky sings of lozh' (falsehood) stealing pravda's (truth's) clothes and trying to “dress itself up” as the truth (na lozh' odelian'e men' [falsehood is wearing my clothes]).

its nature is, as in English, *prozrachnaia* (transparent) because we are able to clearly see the features which make it a lie.

Nonvisible objects or locations may be naturally obscure or actively obscured to prevent knowledge of them. In the proverb *Chuzyhaia duska potemki* [Another's soul is unknowable], the soul is naturally inaccessible because it is in *potemki* (darkness), while in the phrase *Eto zatemnit smysl frazii* [this will obscure {darken} the meaning of the phrase], the obscuring of the meaning may be intentional or accidental. Other ways to keep something nonvisible are to impair the observer's vision or to distract the observer's attention, and both can be metaphorically associated with deception: note, for the former, the expression *vidrat' ochki komu-to* [to rub something into someone's glasses], which is associated with active deception through presentation of something in a distorted light, and, for the latter, the phrase *dlia ovtovka glaz* [for directing away the eyes], which describes a strategy for distracting attention from something in order to mislead.

A possible implication following from the KNOWING IS SEEING framework is that bareness or plainness of the object under observation is indicative of its truth; any embellishment may be interpreted as a distortion of the object's true nature. In English we speak of the "plain" or even "unadorned" truth and of "bare facts," and in Russian we have nearly identical expressions: *nagaia istina* (naked truth), *golye fakti* (bare facts), and entities which appear to *vesi svoi nagoti* (in all their nakedness). These everyday extensions of the basic KNOWING IS SEEING model for the domain Truth illustrate that the model has its own metaphorical logic; the potential for metaphorical extension is dramatically increased when the Vision framework occurs in combination with the other modes of conceptualization that we are about to examine. As I will soon demonstrate, Tolstoy often relies on visual metaphors of this kind—as well as on their latent potential metaphorical extension—in his later writings.

### 2.2. The STRAIGHT Schema

Alan Cienki (1998a and 1998b) discusses "STRAIGHT" as an image-schema and, based on evidence from Russian, English, and other languages, its extension in metaphorical usage to the domains of time, events, discourse, thought (see also Emanatian 1996), control, social norms, morality, law, and truth. In this section, I will focus on two conceptual metaphors for Truth and Falsehood motivated by the STRAIGHT schema: **TRUTH IS STRAIGHT** and **LIES ARE BENT**.

In Russian, as in English, an honest person is said to *govorit' priamno* (speak straight, directly), the straightness of the metaphorical line of discourse from speaker to addressee implying the true (not crooked, not evasive) nature of the speech is more genuine than *priamoi dorogi* [to walk] (Iarantsev 1981) as "to lie or deception." The very Proto-Indo-European roots of meanings it developed the point in front via a straight line, the meaning of this Il'ich." Via the location/shape model, the straight line can be alternately conceptualized as a person or not only a thing, which the root of which (kri-*) in English and other languages can be the root of which (kri-*) in English and other languages. The very origin of *ugrat* in Indo-European from *leg* (Gienki 1998b: 303).

Like the conceptual STRAIGHT image-schemata, metaphorical conceptualizations *govorit' bez okolichnosti* (to say things, which literally mean things)

7. Lakoff (1987: 210ff.) has shown how he refers to this general phenomenon of be metaphors for the domain of location in space ("We're coming approaching when .").

8. In English, truth can be straightforward sometimes to avoid making past mistakes: "His truth seemed to be curved a little uncomfortable, unsure whether of severe personal shortcomings implies not outright maliciously distorted the facts."
nature of the speech in much the same way that “plain” or “bare” truths are more genuine than “adorned” ones. Similarly, the Russian phrase idli priamoi dorogoi [to walk a straight road] is defined in one idiom dictionary (Iarantsev 1981) as “to live honestly [chestno] and act openly, without trickery or deception.” The very root of the word pravda (правда) derives from a Proto-Indo-European root meaning “inclined forward,” and one of the meanings it developed through Common Slavic “involved connection to the point in front via a straight path” (Cienki 1998a: 130), and, as we shall see, the meaning of this root is aesthetically exploited by Tolstoy in “Ivan Il’ich.” Via the location/object duality inherent in the event-structure metaphor model, the straightness of metaphorical movement to a location can be alternately conceptualized as a property of the truth-object itself, and so a person can not only speak “straight” (придомо) but also be straight (придомон: straightforward, direct) or, in a more Russian manner, прямодушный (straight-souled).

If truth is metaphorically straight, then lies are bent. Russian slang for “You’re lying!” is Ни, ты загнул, literally, “you bent, folded over, turned” (Cienki 1998a: 130). The exact opposite of Russian pravda is, in fact, krioda, the root of which (крив-) means “bent, crooked.” Crookedness in Russian, as in English and other languages, is associated with falsehood: kriotolki (bent talk; i.e., false rumors), kriotol’ dusch (to bend with the soul; to be hypocritical). The very origin of the word for lie in English and other languages, including Russian (lжит’ [to lie]), may derive from a change within Proto-Indo-European from *leug- (to bend, turn, wind) to *leugh- (to tell a lie) (Cienki 1998b: 303).

Like the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, the STRAIGHT image-schema does not occur in isolation from other forms of metaphorical conceptualization. Consider, for example, the Russian idiom говорить без околохлодства (to speak directly, without recourse to hints or distortions), which literally means “to speak without going around (около) and...”

7. Lakoff (1993: 218ff.) has shown that many metaphors come in location/object pairs, and he refers to this general phenomenon as metaphoric “duality.” An example of this would be metaphors for the domain of Time, which can be conceptualized in English either as a location in space (“We’re coming up on Christmas”) or as a moving object (“The time is fast approaching when . . .”).

8. In English, truth can be straight, bent (and therefore less true: “Doctors do slant the truth sometimes to avoid making patients feel slighted”), or even, in an extended sense, curved: “His truth seemed to be curved and this casual attitude toward facts and figures made some uncomfortable, unsure whether to take it as evidence of a superior imagination or proof of severe personal shortcomings” (Secrest 1992: 383). Here, the curved nature of his truth implies not outright malicious lying, but an elegant and therefore not entirely unappealing distortion of the facts.
around.” This idiom represents a coherent blending of the STRAIGHT schema (to speak truthfully means to speak directly), the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING (the interlocutors orient themselves—through visual metaphor—to the object of communication, around which the speech circles), and the PATH schema, to which we now turn.

2.3. The PATH Schema
Mark Johnson (1987: 116) has noted that the PATH schema “is one of the most common structures that emerges from our constant bodily functioning”; this schema is “(a) pervasive in experience, (b) well-understood because it is pervasive, (c) well-structured, [and] (d) simply structured.” Common conceptual metaphors sanctioned by this schema include: AN ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 8ff.); LIFE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 1ff. and 60ff.); COMMERCE IS A JOURNEY (Johnson 1993: 305); and STORIES ARE JOURNEYS (ibid.: 165). We have already established that truth is metaphorically understood as a location (the truth is “out there”) and that knowing the truth means being able to see where it is and ideally to head directly toward it. The pervasiveness of our experiential understanding of the PATH schema allows us to flesh out this metaphorical quest for the truth and to conceptualize falsehood and deception as phenomena which somehow hinder that quest. Given the strong experiential grounding of PATH metaphors, it is not surprising that they comprise, as I will show, one of the principal conceptual modes informing Tolstoy’s later writing, including “The Death of Ivan Il’ich.”

Russian metaphorical expressions that support the metaphor TRUTH IS A LOCATION (GOAL) include: iskat’ pravdu/istinu (to search for the truth), dobros’ia do pravdy (to get to the truth), okryt’ dostup k istine (to open up access to the truth), na polputi k istine (halfway to the truth), približenie k istine (nearing the truth). If truth is located somewhere, then we can be close to it or far from it: otkazat’ sia daleko ot istinnogo rezulta (to turn out to be far from a true result). One person can be closer to the truth than another: Aristotel’ byl blizhe k istine, chem Bergson [Aristotle was closer than Bergson to the truth].

9. Michele Emanatian (1996) discusses aspects of this conceptualization, which she calls the Propositional Distance Metaphor. It should also be noted that truth here is understood primarily as a location in space and only secondarily as a goal. The interpretation of Truth-As-Goal (the quest for truth) is motivated by an understanding of truth as “out there” combined with a general metaphorical conceptualization of any purposeful activity as a journey (for example, “I’ve reached the end of a long project” and “We’ve come a long way already, but still have a long way to go”). I will indicate the relationship between Location and Goal conceptualizations of truth by placing the latter word in parentheses after the former: TRUTH IS A LOCATION (GOAL).
THE schema “is one of the constant bodily functions, (b) well-understood, (d) simply structured.”

Involving the object/location dual (see note 7), we can understand truth as a touchable object in the truth-location: *Prikorszeghis’ k istine, oni ne v silakh ot nee otkaazatsia* [Having touched {made contact} the truth, they are powerless to deny it].

Since we journey to the truth along a “true path” (*istinye put*), falsehood is conceptualized as a deviation from the path. We can deviate from the path for any number of reasons or indeed for no reason, simply “to move away from the truth” (*otkhodit’ ot istiny*). We may take a “false step” (*detlat’ lozhiy shag*). We can meander around the goal without ever reaching it, as in the phrase *vozhug da oko khodit’*, which literally means “to go around and around” and is a near equivalent of the English idiom “to beat around the bush.” We may also be forced off the true path by another’s active deception: *otdalit’ kogo-to ot pravy* (to distance someone from the truth), *westi kogo-to v zabluzhdenie* (to lead someone astray). The last two examples illustrate a distinction between truth telling and deception apparent in the lexicon of both languages, which is that deception necessarily presupposes a force-dynamic directed against another entity: we can force a lie on someone else without the person’s agreement (that is, by definition, what deception is). Thus, in Russian we “commit” deception (*sovershit’ obman*) in much the same way that we commit a crime (*sovershit’ prestuplenie*), and a deceptive trick or ruse is *alovka* (a trap) by which the deceiver captures and controls the deceived.¹⁰ Note the force-dynamic present in this example from Anna Karenina (Tolstoy 1928, 18: 309) in which Anna speaks of her husband—who wishes to pretend they have a contented marriage despite Anna’s affair with Vronsky—as both entrapper and potential agent of violence through his insistence on living a lie: *Ia razoruu etu ego pautinu izhi, v kotorni on menia khochet oputat’* [I will tear apart that {his} spiderweb of lies in which he wants to entangle me!]

2.4. The CONTAINER Schema

Like a path or journey, the notion of containment is “inherently meaningful to people by virtue of their bodily experience” (Lakoff 1987: 273; also Johnson 1987: 21ff.). It is a conceptual notion which we come to understand well as infants (Gibbs 1994: 413–16; Mandler 1992: 597), and, not surprisingly, it serves as the basis for how we conceptualize a large number of quite common abstract domains, including the opposition between “in” and “out,” emotions (which are “contained” within the body), and even support (Mandler 1992: 597). As we shall see, CONTAINER imagery plays a

¹⁰ Compare the English word *device*, which comes from Latin *de-* + *capere*, with the second element meaning “to take, seize, ensnare, catch in a trap” (cf. *capitive*).
central role in "The Death of Ivan Il'ich," especially in its interaction with the other modes underlying conceptualizations of Truth and Falsehood.

Like all image-schemas, the CONTAINER schema specifies little: an interior, an exterior, and a boundary between them. Metaphors produced on the basis of this schema therefore exhibit a wide range of possible specifications: focus can be placed on the type of container, its contents, its parts, or on the relationship between the interior and exterior. All these possibilities are realized in those conceptual metaphors and metaphorical expressions for Truth and Falsehood which are grounded in the CONTAINER schema.

Aspects of the metaphors relevant here are, via the CONTAINER schema, implicit in how speakers systematically conceptualize the process of communication. Thus, what has come to be known as the CONDUIT metaphor (Reddy 1979) defines discourse as the process of transferring meanings between interlocutors; meanings themselves are contained inside words, sentences, ideas, or longer pieces of discourse (speeches, poems, novels). Since oral speech is a typical locus of discourse, meaning can be understood as contained within the body (or mouth).

Equation of discourse meaning with truth yields, via the CONTAINER schema, the understanding that truth is contained within the knowledge receptacle and—by extension—the depths of the receptacle contain the most genuine forms of this or that truth. The conceptual metaphor TRUTH IS INTERNAL (DEPTH) is conventionally realized in Russian by expressions like the following: derzhat' rat na zemle (to keep your mouth locked [so the truth cannot get out]), znat' v glubine dushi (to know the [real] truth in the depths of your soul), glubokaya pravda (deep truth), vytynut' iz kogo-to pravdu (to pull the truth out of someone). Many expressions sanctioned by this metaphor focus on the Russian duša (soul) as a locus for personal meaning and truth. Russians who speak openly and honestly with each other thus speak "soul-to-soul" (pogovorit' po dušam), or they "lay out" (vyložit') and "pour out" (izlit') their souls.11

If true essence is contained within the meaning receptacle, then to know it we need to be able to reach it either physically or visually. This metaphorical conceptualization thus overlaps with vision and path metaphors for

11. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 148) consider this a subset of the metaphor IMPORTANT IS CENTRAL and LESS IMPORTANT IS PERIPHERAL. This metaphorical conceptualization of Truth has much in common with the conceptualization of Secretiveness, in which the metaphors MIND IS A CONTAINER and IDEAS ARE ENTITIES dominate subjects' descriptions of their mental images (Gibbs and O'Brien 1990).

12. For a discussion of Russian duša in opposition to English mind, see Wierzbicka 1992, and for a treatment of the term duša and glubina duši (in the depths of one's soul) in Anna Karenina, which is complementary to my discussion here, see Turner 1995.
in its interaction with truth and Falsehood. Metaphors produced a range of possible specific meanings, its parts, or. All these possibilities metaphorical expressions the CONTAINER

As the CONTAINER heltalize the process as the CONDUIT

process of transferring "theories are contained inside" (speeches, poems, verse, meaning can be

a the CONTAINER within the knowledge

conceptualize the metaphor TRUTH in Russian by expressing our mouth locked [so the [real] truth in the

TRUTH-AS-OBJECT and TRUTH-AS-LOCATION (GOAL). In Russian we can “look inside someone’s soul” (zaglavl’ v dushu) for the truth about that person, we may “see through” someone or something (videt’ maskrov’), or we may need to “turn something inside out” (vyvernut’ naiznanka) to gain access to its essence. Gaining access can often be difficult, which is implied by the use of the “piercing” words in the phrases promiknut’ v dushu (to penetrate into someone’s soul) and pruziel’nyi ugol’ (piercing glance).

Visual or physical access to the truth is made more difficult when the meaning receptacle is covered up or hidden, either naturally or through intentional deception. Thus, in Russian: skrytaia istina (hidden truth), utaat’ pravdu (to conceal the truth), zamaskirovat’/zamakirovat’ pravdu (to mask/veil the truth). The case of a covered-up true essence is distilled in the maxim “appearances can be deceptive,” variations on which appear in these Russian expressions: potemkinskaia derevnia [Potemkin village], naruzhnost’ chasto byvaet’ obmanchica [outer appearance is often deceptive], ne krasna iza uglatni a krasna pirogami [meat pies, not corners, make the hut beautiful]. The body (especially the face), as a container of meaning, can be deceptively veiled or disguised to prevent access to its depths: nadez’ masku (to put on a mask), napuskat’ na sebia vid’ (to assume a certain appearance). Lies themselves, as truths which are not meant to be discovered (that is, uncovered), can be carefully packaged for delivery (zamaskirovannaia lozh’ [a masked lie]), and the truth can “come out” when the integrity of the packaging is threatened: Loshnee aliib tressulo po zsem shvam [The false alibi ripped along all its seams].

Since lies can cover up the truth and since knowing the truth presupposes being able to see it and/or reach it without obstruction, it logically follows that TRUTH IS OPENNESS. In Russian, for example, to “discover” something is literally to “open” it up (otkr1’t): Kolumb otkryl Ameriku [Columbus discovered America]. We can also “open” the truth (otkr1’t istinu) or “open” our soul to others (otkr1’t dushu). A frank person is “openly” and, the Russian equivalent of the English idiom “He’s an open book” is “He has an unbuttoned soul” (U nego dusha nanaspashki).

If lies are taken to be a subset of the larger category of sins, then a connection can be made between the metaphor LIES ARE COVERING and the representation of the soul in Eastern Orthodoxy. There, the soul is understood as a pure core of the self that is gradually obscured by the commission of sin:

13. N. D. Arutunova (1991: 28) distinguishes istina and pravda along these very lines: “Pravda shares with istina a premise of being concealed [but] istina is hidden from man by the nature of things, and pravda by human will. Istina is naturally concealed [otkryvenna], while pravda is intentionally covered up [ukryvaema].”
In the Eastern Christian tradition, sin, original and otherwise, is understood as a dark mark on the image—metaphors of rust, dust, dirt, and paint abound—and the cleansing of the image is the act necessary for its restoration. . . . The point is that the image remains intact, covered by sin, but waiting to be uncovered. (Gustafson 1986: 176)

This representation of sin as impurity culturally grounds conceptual metaphors for Truth and Falsehood that specify the container as either clean and clear or dirty and obscured. Thus in Russian an “unclean affair” (neчистое дело) is an illegal or dishonest one, and “clean truth” (чистая праща) is better than any embellished version of it.

The productivity of the CONTAINER schema for grounding conceptual metaphors for Truth and Falsehood is obviously prodigious. A final productive extension of this schema in both English and Russian is the metaphor TRUTH IS NOURISHMENT, in which the body is understood as a container for ideas that are conceptualized as ingestible substances; acts of eating and feeding, including any and all details associated with these processes, are taken to model the “digestion” of abstract thoughts. In this conceptualization, truth may be something we want, but it may be difficult to digest (“to swallow a bitter pill”); lies can be fed to others if they are packaged to be tasty (“sweet talk”); and feeding someone insubstantially is equivalent to feeding them an “empty” truth. Russian examples include the following: испить чашу истину/правду (to drink the cup of truth), горькая праща (bitter truth), медовые речи (honeyed words), and кормить завтраками обещаниами (to feed [inadequately] with future promises).

2.5. Summary

I have emphasized that these four basic modes of conceptualizing Truth and Falsehood are not isolated from one another. Figure 1 attempts to represent the complex system of metaphors for these domains which must be in place to account for the range of metaphorical expressions in everyday Russian: the two major nodes on the diagram correspond to the dual conceptualizations of Truth as an object or location (goal). Every source domain on every node in the figure calls to mind a complex frame or model of its own, and the target domains are potentially structured in terms of any salient feature of that frame. Only some of the possible elaborations are regularly used in everyday metaphorical expressions. Many of the expressions we have considered exist somewhere between two or more nodes on the figure: visual orientation (KNOWING IS SEEING) is necessary for traveling along the path toward truth (the “straight and narrow”), and the metaphor LIES ARE OBSTACLES represents an intersection of KNOWING IS SEEING (lies block vision), TRUTH IS OBJECT (lies cover the object to prevent access),
TRUTH IS LOCATION (lies hinder our movement toward the location), and LISS ARE FORCE (obstacles exert a metaphorical counterforce).

Figure 1 Network of everyday metaphors for truth and falsehood in Russian.

3. Tolstoyan Metaphorical Representations of Truth and Falsehood

In his postconversion writing, Tolstoy systematically extends and elaborates everyday metaphors for Truth and Falsehood. I will illustrate this first by summarizing the system of metaphors for these concepts that he uses throughout several of his later polemical works, and then I will undertake a close examination of how these same metaphors are used to aesthetic effect in “The Death of Ivan Il’ich.”

3.1. Tolstoy’s Later Polemical Works

In looking at Tolstoy’s later polemical works for representations of Truth of Falsehood, I operate on Richard Gustafson’s (1986: 6–7) principle that “the primary rule in reading Tolstoy . . . is that . . . later works may reveal hidden patterns and meanings of earlier ones.” In this spirit, I have gleaned patterns of metaphors for Truth and Falsehood from the following works: selected letters (1880 onward), “V chem moia vera?” [What I believe] (1883), “Tsarsstvo Bozhie vnutri vas” [The kingdom of God is within you] (1893), “Chto takoe iskusstvo?” [What is art?] (1899), and “Put’ zhizni” [The way of life] (1910). Tolstoy’s mature metaphorical representations

The volume of selected letters is Tolstoy 1912. “What I Believe” is in volume 23 of the Collected Works (Tolstoy 1928); “The Kingdom of God Is within You,” volume 28; “What Is
of these domains provide evidence for one of the central points of a conceptual theory of metaphor: aesthetic language is grounded in everyday language, which, in turn, takes much of its structure from basic cognitive experience. Tolstoy systematically uses everyday metaphorical conceptualizations of Truth and Falsehood, grounded in the four areas of conceptual experience, as stepping-stones for his own creative representations. Making sense of, as well as appreciating, the creative character and conceptual power of Tolstoy’s representations requires implicit recognition of the underlying structures.

A few representative illustrations will suffice to prove the point. Tolstoy extends the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING and one of its metonymies (glitter stands for deception) by equating deception with hypnosis. The Orthodox church, he argues, espouses a false doctrine by “acting on the masses by means of hypnosis [gipnotizatsiei] and deception [obmanam]” (Tolstoy 1928, 28:67), and armies of people in the church and the government exist only to “deceive [obmannyvat] and hypnotize [gipnotizirovat] the people” (ibid.: 209). On a larger scale, Tolstoy (ibid.: 256–57) suggests that deceived or self-deceiving people are like people under hypnosis:

These people find themselves in the same state as hypnotized [zagipnotizirovanye] people who are ordered to imagine themselves in certain conventional situations and to act as if they were those creatures whom they are depicting.

Hypnosis is linked to both a superficial light image (hypnotists typically dangle a shiny bauble in front of their subjects to hull them into a trance) and force (note Tolstoy’s use of the word armies to describe the officially sanctioned hypnotists, that is, church and government functionaries). The Tolstoyan extension DECEPTION IS HYPNOSIS is a node which exists potentially between two everyday metaphorical conceptualizations of Truth and Falsehood.10

Likewise, Tolstoy makes a conceptual jump in linking LIES ARE DEVIATIONS and TRUTH IS INTERNAL with the image of the soul (dusha) or conscience (soustь) as the “arrow of a compass” (strelka kompassa) that is activated when we have stumbled off course (Tolstoy 1928, 45:37). The truth that preexists in its pure state in our souls thus directs us toward

10. Art?", volume 30; and “The Way of Life,” volume 45. From “The Way of Life,” I have considered only those passages written by Tolstoy himself and not his citations of others. Citations are indicated by volume and page number. All translations are mine.15. It is a node which could also be interpreted as having affinities with another Tolstoyan extension, LIES ARE NARCOTIC, which I will not detail here: both hypnosis and drugs can affect subjects in much the same way through loss of self-control and responsibility for one’s actions, a numbing to reality, etc.
the central points of a con-
gress is grounded in everyday
experience from basic cognitive
metaphorical concepts in the four areas of conceptu-
ality, creative character, and con-
sciousness. The everyday metaphor LIES ARE COVERING also supplies Tolstoy
with fertile ground for elaboration and extension. He constantly invokes the
image of the “dirty soul” and links it with the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, as in this example:

The human soul lives as though it were in a glass vessel, and a person can either
dirty [zagruzhat'] this vessel or keep it clean [deszhat' chistym]. The cleaner the
glass of the vessel is, the better the light of truth [svet istiny] can shine through it. . . . Therefore, a person's main task is an inner one: to keep his vessel clean.

All truth [istina] already lies within the souls of all people. Just don’t drown it out
[tol'ko ne zaglushait' es] with lies, and sooner or later it will reveal itself [oknoetsia]
to you. (Ibid., 45:351)

In the first example, reaching the truth requires actively piercing the barriers
to our perception of it. In the second example, an acoustic cover (static or noise) prevents us from hearing our true “inner voice” (inutrenniy golos), a frequent phrase in Tolstoy's writing.

Since the soul is metaphorically contained within the body, the body can logically represent the very deceptive buildup around the soul from which we must free ourselves in order to live a life in truth. The body becomes a prison for the soul, a metaphorical extension of CONTAINER- and PATH-based metaphors combined with the metaphor LIES ARE FORCE (cf. to “commit” a deception):

The body is equivalent to walls which enclose and restrict the spirit [dukh] and
hinder its freedom. The spirit ceaselessly tries to move these walls apart, and the entire life of a rational man consists in moving these walls apart, in freeing the spirit from the captivity of the body. (Ibid.: 452–53)
The opposition between soul (as the receptacle of istina and the internal vessel containing the deepest and therefore truest layers of the psyche) and the body (as the worldly exterior of the receptacle, the locus of potential deceptive buildup) leads Tolstoy to conclude: "As close as the body is, it's still alien [chuzh], only the soul is our own [sova]" (ibid.: 33). Our body is not only alien to us but alienates us from others: "All living creatures are separated from each other by their bodies" (ibid.: 47). This statement acquires a broader philosophical significance (Tolstoy's intention) only if we understand that the body represents, metaphorically speaking, a potential locus of deception: the body is a lie which prevents people from knowing the light in each other's souls. Living primarily for bodily gratification is equivalent, in Tolstoy's metaphorical thought process, to living a false life. A false life is a stagnant dead end: it imprisons us, thereby ending all possibility of movement toward the truth. Freedom and motion require breaking through the prison's "walls" and ridding ourselves of a metaphorical impediment to the realization of the spiritual union of all human beings.

For Tolstoy, truth is simple, plain, natural, and preexistent in our souls. It is simple and plain when it is pure and uncontaminated. We could easily perceive it, as a child naturally does, were it not for a process of enculturation that blurs our vision and disorients us. Tolstoy carries this notion of the "simplicity [prostot] and clarity [iasnost]" of truth to a logical extreme in that falsehood comes to mean for him anything that is not simple: "Falsehood [lozh'] is always complex, intricate, and verbose [mnagostovna, literally, many-worded]" (ibid.: 419). This extension shows that language, especially conventionalized language, becomes for Tolstoy a locus of falsehood. Words can be used for active deception, and even when the deception is unintentional, they smear over and distort the truths they are meant to convey. Having examined the relationship between thought and language in Tolstoy's characters, Efim Etkind (1984) argues that the Tolstoyan psyche consists of a succession of layers, from the deepest and most nonverbal to the most superficial and most strongly verbal (see also Khrapchenko 1968). While the deeper, nonverbal layers (that of instinct and unconsidered psychological reaction, that of emotional response) "enjoy a fundamental veracity" (Etkind 1984: 12), the outer layers (of verbal discourse and analytic reasoning) are the most susceptible to deception.16

It is the same concern for simple, unembellished truth which leads Tolstoy to proclaim that Christ's words should be taken at face value: "I

16. Aleksei Karenin is a perfect example of this principle in that he is a fully bureaucratized man with little to no inner life whose distinguishing characteristic is "une verbalisation outrée et grotesque" (Etkind 1984: 11). For further discussion of the deceptive potential of language in Tolstoy (especially in his later works), see Pomorska 1982, Emerson 1985, and Helle 1997.
do not want to interpret [tokosvat'] Christ's teachings; I just want one thing: to forbid others from interpreting them" (Tolstoy 1928, 23:304). Christ's words have a "direct" meaning or priamoi smysl (ibid.: 329), and interpreters of Christ have as their goal to "distort [izvratit'] and hide [skryt'] the meaning of his teaching" (ibid.: 357). In this metaphorical framework, church doctrines become "growths" on Christ's teaching (ibid.: 411), and the church thereby attempts to outfit Christ's basic meaning "in its own clothes" (ibid.: 440). These dressed up doctrines "screen off [zasloniat'] people from God" (ibid., 28:55), and the only way to return to the truth is to "cast aside [otkinut']" all these artificial interpretations (ibid., 23:336). When this is accomplished, everything becomes clear:

I understood that Christ says exactly what he says [govorit to samoee, chto govorit'].
At that moment it wasn't that something new had appeared, but that everything obscuring [zatemnitoe, literally, darkening] the truth had fallen away [otfalo].
(ibid.: 310)

For Tolstoy (1912: no. 200), this is equivalent to "cleansing [ochishchat'] the deep foundations [of religious thought] from those incrustations [namсты] which hide and conceal them." A summary of the patterns of Tolstoy's representations is given in Figure 2.

As Figure 2 shows, Tolstoy does not mechanically reproduce everyday metaphors for Truth and Falsehood even in his polemical works but creatively elaborates them, logically extends them, and on occasion compresses them (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 54) into powerful images which represent a coherent blending of several metaphorical perspectives. In one work of fiction in particular, the system of everyday metaphors for Truth and Falsehood is aesthetically exploited to such an extent that we could consider the metaphor network one of the guiding principles of the work. To an analysis of this work I now turn.

3.2. The Truth/Falsehood Metaphorical Motif in "The Death of Ivan Il'ich"
On the surface, "The Death of Ivan Il'ich" is a simple story: a conventional family man and a successful judge who is a member in good standing in high social circles develops a mysterious illness that causes him agonizing pain before eventually killing him. The story's deep subtext depicts a man who has no spiritual life, who is alienated from his family and colleagues, and who is eventually compelled by his sickness and the pain accompanying it to seek and find true meaning. This subtext is characterized by a number of motifs which detail Ivan's dramatic journey from a convention-governed death-in-life to spiritual rebirth (Jahn 1993).

"The Death of Ivan Il'ich" is arguably Tolstoy's most tightly structured...
and deeply metaphorical word symbolism. Remarking on Tolstoy's realist vein, Gary Jahn (1999: 16) works, to some extent, to prefigure the aesthetic devices of those whom he quotes as Tolstoy could be considered onward ("Ivan Il'ich" was Tolskoy Karinina), and she claims that "Ivan" whose prose experiments point innovations."

Many of the "postrealist" or story are tied to an everyday Falsehood. Indeed, all the motifs subtext plug the reader directly into these domains, and we are able of the network similar to the Tolstoy uses in the subtext of the alizations of Truth and Falsehood that seems tual motifs. Ivan's journey from out independently in each of the as a metaphorical struggle for Tr I will first consider several of the our familiar conceptual struc arguably the story's culminating black sack through which Ivan n spiritual truth.

As I have argued elsewhere (Danaher 1998: 26: 90): blindness the random trope: the personified ing light which both looks at Ivan
and deeply metaphorical work and has been read as a precursor of Russian symbolism. Remarking on Tolstoy’s failure to appreciate writing in the symbolist vein, Gary Jahn (1999: 19) notes: “It is a curious irony that Tolstoy’s works, to some extent, prefigure, in their use of symbol and metaphor, some of the aesthetic devices of those later writers.” Amy Mandelker (1993: 76) argues that Tolstoy could be considered a “post-realist” from Anna Karenina onward (“Ivan Il’ich” was Tolstoy’s first major work of fiction after Anna Karenina), and she claims that “Tolstoy should be considered a peri-modern whose prose experiments point in the direction of symbolism and modernist innovations.”

Many of the “postrealist” or “presymbolist” figurative elements in the story are tied to an everyday metaphorical understanding of Truth and Falsehood. Indeed, all the motifs which collectively comprise the story’s subtext plug the reader directly into the network of everyday metaphors for those domains, and we are able to see this clearly only through an analysis of the network similar to the one I have just sketched. Since the images Tolstoy uses in the subtext of the story play a role in everyday conceptualizations of Truth and Falsehood, the truth/deception motif serves as a tropological thread that seamlessly ties together all the individual subtextual motifs. Ivan’s journey from a death-in-life to spiritual rebirth, mapped out independently in each of the subtextual motifs, is consistently framed as a metaphorical struggle for Truth over Falsehood. In demonstrating this, I will first consider several of the story’s key subtexts from the perspective of our familiar conceptual structures, and then I will zoom in on what is arguably the story’s culminating trope, namely, the image of the narrow black sack through which Ivan must pass in the final stage of his quest for spiritual truth.

As I have argued elsewhere (Danaher 1995), one of the story’s key subtextual motifs consists in the use of light and dark imagery. This motif is best understood as an elaborated form of the conceptual metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, and a look at some of its main components will demonstrate this point. First and foremost, Ivan’s progress toward the truth is characterized by frequent reference to his and others’ vision; verbs and adverbs connected with sight, such as videt’ (to see), rasno (clearly), and ochevidno (evidently), abound in the story (Danaher 1995). Moreover, it is no coincidence that one of the potential causes of Ivan’s illness is a slepaia kishka (blind gut) (Tolstoy 1928, 26: 90): blindness to the truth is, after all, Ivan’s main problem. Nor is the personification of the pain via the pronoun ona (it) merely a random trope: the personified pain is consistently described as a shining light which both looks at Ivan and “shines through” his screens against
it, forcing him to face the truth of his physical and metaphorical pain and thereby calling graphically to mind the Russian proverb Pravda glaza kolot [Truth stabs the eyes] (Danaher 1998).17

Throughout the story, darkness is emblematic of spiritual stagnation (a death-in-life), and dark images are strongly associated with (self-)deception. For example, one of Ivan’s colleagues, Schwarz (“black” in German), is a bald representation of misleading insouciance in the face of death. Like an ostrich, he buries his head in the sand and refuses to draw a lesson from Ivan’s death, deceiving himself (as Ivan also does during much of his struggle) that death is something that happens to other people and which has nothing to do with him. While Schwarz’s elegant and playful presence at Ivan’s funeral in the opening chapter may momentarily “refresh” the funeral’s chief observer, Ivan’s friend Petr Ivanovich, the refreshment is effectively undermined by the “blackness” lurking in Schwarz’s own name.

Schwarz’s misleading playfulness is juxtaposed with the genuine light which emanates from Ivan’s peasant servant, Gerasim. Gerasim is the only character in the story who does not deceive himself but accepts death as natural and leads a life in harmony with such a profound realization. He is consistently described in terms of light imagery. Gerasim shares this distinction with Ivan’s childhood, described in one passage as “otnja tochka svetlata tam, nazadi v nachale zhizni” [one light shining back there, at the beginning of life] (Tolstoy 1928, 26:109) and toward which Ivan regresses (progresses), mentally and physically, as he nears spiritual rebirth. The significance of childhood, and its association with genuine light, should be obvious given Tolstoy’s views on education and socialization: “Society is a construct of artifices, and enculturation consists of learning to perceive these artifices as things natural to our humanity” (Silbajoris 1990: 150). As Tolstoy (1912: no. 79) himself wrote in another context, coherently mixing his metaphors: “Truth [istina] is accessible to children and concealed from philosophers [mistrustnuushchije], that is, the philosophers themselves smear it over [zamazyvat’ ee].” Society gradually buries the child in each of us under layer upon layer of deceitful social convention, but in the depths of our soul is the uncontaminated child we once were, and reaching back to this pure being requires cleansing oneself of the dirty buildup of social incrustations. Note the coherence here between the metaphor of the pure, uncontaminated child and the degree of genuineness embodied in “plain” or “unem-

17. By itself, the use of one (a third-person singular feminine pronoun) to refer to the pain (bol’, a grammatically feminine noun), is not evidence of personification. However, the pain’s behavior, described using the italicized esa, is clearly animate in the story. At one point, it even peeks out at Ivan from behind the potted plants in the house. For more on the significance of the pronoun in the interpretation of the story, see Danaher 1998.
bellish" truths: the more developed and complex an entity becomes, the more precarious is its connection with the truth.

Besides darkness and blazing light, Ivan's existence is characterized by displays of false light or superficial glimmer, which produce a will-o'-the-wisp effect and delay him in his quest for spiritual truth. These false lights are unambiguously connected with life in high society: they occur in descriptions of his marriage, his work as a judge, and his whist playing (Danaher 1995: 228ff.). The false dazzle of Ivan's life in high society is reminiscent of Tolstoy's later definition of false art as art which relies on external glitter and embellishment to produce an impression: "Genuine art has no need of decoration [ukrasheniia], like the wife of a loving husband. Counterfeit [poddel'noe] art, like a prostitute, must always be garishly made-up [izukrasheina]" (Tolstoy 1928, 30:178). Ivan eventually learns to see through these deceptive displays of conventional social glimmer and even comes to understand them as indices pointing toward a deeper truth.

Light and dark imagery in the story conforms to the scheme implicit in the metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, the imagery is therefore bound up, by association and within the context of the narrative, with everyday conceptualizations of Truth and Falsehood. Ivan eventually comes to "view" his life more "clearly" by changing his way of seeing, and, for Tolstoy, "[a] change in the way of seeing in the world is a change in the way of being in the world" (Gustafson 1986: 142-43). In this sense, the light/dark motif reflects his journey toward truth.

That Ivan does indeed "journey" to the truth is made explicit by Tolstoy's use of "road of life" imagery throughout the story. The images that make up the journey motif are all consistent with my exposition of the PATH schema and its relation to everyday metaphorical expressions for Truth and Falsehood. His actual journey through life from young adulthood to the onset of his illness is characterized primarily by stagnation (compare the bland narration in chapter 2, which describes the bulk of his life), by worldly clutter or material accumulations that act as obstacles to his spiritual journey (Saly 1986), and by a lack of direction. In one of the guiding tropes of the story, a metaphor compressing both the light/dark and journey motifs, Ivan is described as a fly circling the light of a candle (Tolstoy 1928, 26:69): his life is equated with action going nowhere (circling, skirting) as well as with suicidal intent, although this trope also prefigures Ivan's eventual merging with the light of truth. If one possible cause of his illness, as noted earlier, is metaphorical "blindness" (the pain arises from his "blind gut"), then another is purported to be his blizhdeliaskhaia pochka or "floating [literally, in Russian, wandering] kidney" (ibid.: 90), a description emblematic of Ivan's own deviations from the true path. Ivan's inability to follow a straight line to the
truth is ironically captured in the name of his chosen profession, *pravoedenie*, which is usually translated as “jurisprudence” or “law” but derives from the roots *prav-* (right, true) and *ved-* (lead), thus loosely meaning “to lead on a correct or true path.”

Ivan’s life journey all but ends with the intensification of his illness. His external journey is replaced by an internal, mental journey (*khod mystei* or, literally, way/path of thoughts) that leads him back to the pure and “enlightened” state of childhood. Ivan’s inner journey takes place mostly while he is lying on a couch and tossing and turning, first toward the wall and a mental dead end and then outward toward the open space of the room, which coincides with progress he makes toward understanding his situation. When Ivan finally nears the truth—that he lived his life wrongly and must correct his mistakes—the narrator characterizes his epiphany in terms of motion:

What happened to him was what he used to experience in a train car when you think you’re going forward, but you’re actually going backward, and suddenly you realize the real direction [*nastoiaschhee napravlenie*]. (Ibid.: 112)

The “true direction” is a spiritual one but is communicated by Tolstoy in terms of a palpable and common real-world sensation.

Perhaps most significantly, Ivan’s progression to spiritual rebirth is framed by Tolstoy in terms of the CONTAINER schema. As I have already mentioned, what starts out for him as an external (and therefore deception-prone) physical life journey becomes a journey inward toward his true essence and backward to childhood. In his external life, governed by social conventions, Ivan is characterized by limitation and superficiality. He always does everything “*u izvestnykh predelakh*” (within conventional limits) (Ibid.: 70) because he has been thoroughly socialized. In his work as a judge, he deals with cases “in such a form that the matter was reflected on paper only in its external features [*vneshnim obrazom*]” (Ibid.: 72). He is careful to observe the mere “semblance [podobie] of friendly human relations” (Ibid.: 81), the key word *podobie* calling to mind Tolstoy’s earlier condemnation of life in high society as merely a “semblance [podobie] of life” (Tolstoy 1964, 16:146).

In fact, the external in Ivan’s life is explicitly grounded in the conventions of high society: the false *vaneshnie formy* (external formalities) which control his life “were determined by public opinion” (Tolstoy 1928, 26:74–75). When Ivan is on the verge of realizing the truth of a life badly lived,

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18. Jahn (1999: 175) has also commented on Ivan Ilich’s attempts to “right” himself.
19. Jahn has detailed the figurative motif of enclosure and containment in the story (see his note in Jahn 1999: 173) but without discussion of its relationship to metaphors for Truth and Falsehood.
the narrator remarks: “He groaned and threw himself about and pulled at his clothing. It seemed to him that it was suffocating [dushila] and crushing him” (ibid.: 111). The image is graphically clear: Ivan’s clothing is emblematic of social conventions, which weigh down upon him as the true source of his illness. His clothing physically manifests the buildup on his soul which spiritually suffocates him and from which he must free himself in his quest for truth.20

It is Ivan’s physical illness that creates the conditions for his spiritual rebirth by removing him from the oppressive atmosphere of high society. This development in the story is consistent with Tolstoy’s (1928, 45:439)

general belief in the spiritually therapeutic value of sickness:

When you are healthy and try to live a good life, you can do so only with effort. In sickness, however, all the heaviness [tiiazhet’] of worldly temptations is suddenly lightened [oblegkaetsia], and it is suddenly easy [leoke, literally, light] to live well, and it even becomes frightening to think . . . that as soon as the illness is over, that heaviness, in all its strength, will once again be laid upon you [naliiazhet na tebia].

Ivan’s sickness forces him to concentrate on his immediate self by rendering the comforting, distracting rituals of everyday life intolerable. He is compelled to listen to the “voice of his soul” (Tolstoy 1928, 26:106–7) and undertake a journey inward.

The dominant figure depicting Ivan’s dramatic progression in his journey from death-by-social-convention to true life is the image of the black sack. As his pain increases and he nears physical death, Ivan imagines that:

he was being thrust into a narrow black sack [uzkii chernyi meshok], a deep sack, which he was continually being thrust into but not all the way through . . . And he both feared and wanted to fall through, both struggled and helped.

(Ibid.: 105)

His ambivalence toward the sack is repeated again as his death approaches, and we learn that what prevents him from falling easily into the sack is the false conviction that he led a good life:

He felt that his agony was due to his being thrust into that black hole and still more to his not being able to get right into it. He was hindered from getting into

20. In an 1887 letter to the French author Romain Rolland, Tolstoy equates the hood of a cloak, a conventional article of travel clothing, with comfortable superstitions about life which we are taught to believe, without question, in the process of enculturation: “In order to see clearly [znatsya] the path which we should follow, we must begin from the beginning by removing the hood of the cloak [kapushon] which may keep me warm, but which covers [zakryvat’] my eyes” (Tolstoy 1912: no. 39). Social conventions, which Tolstoy metaphorizes here as fashion, prevent us from achieving a correct spiritual and moral orientation.
it by his conviction that his life had been a good one. That very justification of
his life held him fast and prevented his moving forward, and it caused him the
most torment of all. (Ibid.: 112)

Clinging to the self-deception that his life was lived properly, Ivan is stuck
fast in the blackness of the sack, stalled on his inward journey.

At this very moment Ivan looks further inside the sack and sees a light at
its deepest point: “Suddenly some force struck him in the chest and side, he
had still more difficulty breathing, and he fell through the hole and there,
at the bottom, something was shining [zasvetil’s chto-to]” (ibid.). The next sentence in the story contains the train image by which it is made clear
that Ivan’s “true direction” is toward the light deep at the bottom of the black
sack.

What is remarkable about the image of the black sack, and no doubt the
source of its haunting power, is Tolstoy’s natural compression of the meta-
phor KNOWING IS SEEING and the PATH and CONTAINER schemas
into a single coherent trope. All the elements composing the image, from
the external darkness of the sack (Ivan’s false life that suffocates him) and
the blazing light deep in its core (inner truth) to the journey inward from
the former to latter, evoke not only everyday metaphorical conceptualizations
of Truth and Falsehood, but also the basic human affective experiences
which underlie these conceptualizations. The black sack is the culminating
image of the story because it brings together in one forceful trope the three
central frames upon which the story is constructed and which themselves
separately map out Ivan’s spiritual (subtextual) journey: light/dark imagery
(KNOWING IS SEEING), the “road of life” motif (the PATH schema),
and CONTAINER imagery.

The action that pushes Ivan through the sack and down into the light
deep at its core and which thereby brings his spiritual journey to its logical
end is also described in these same terms:

It was at the end of the third day, an hour before his death. At that very moment
his schoolboy son quietly crept up to him and approached his bed. The dying
man was still screaming desperately and throwing his arms about. His hand fell
onto his son’s head. The schoolboy seized his father’s hand, pressed it to his lips,
and began to cry.

At that very moment Ivan Il’ich fell through, saw the light [svet]; it was re-
vealed [otkrylyas’, literally, opened] to him that his life had not been what it should
have been, but that there was still time to set things right [pomestit’, with the root
prav- {right, true}]. (Ibid.)

The act that sparks Ivan’s revelation is “wordless, with a focus on sponta-
eneous action, direct and unmediated human communication, not conscious
and imitative behavior according to
concrete, simple gesture of either
of “decent” and “decorous” family and friends and ultim-
it is fundamentally opposed
ness, nonverbal, unambiguous
is simultaneously a metaphorically
powerful action, it is
his own life.

His son’s touch triggers his realization that his life journey reaches its logical final point:
and adulthood to a spiritual won-
truth. His last revelation is de-

And suddenly it grew clear [it was]
and would not leave him on the
sides, and from all sides. He
them, to release [osvobodit’] them
1928, 26:119)

As Ivan falls, he simultaneously sees
his false life in high society; phoenix-like, in a dramatic

4. Conclusion

In “The Death of Ivan Il’ich,” the
underlying everyday metaphors of the individual motifs
of the image of the black sack
of everyday metaphors for these
Each motif independently differ-
all at the same time coherent with
network of everyday metaphors
the sack, Tolstoy binds together

It has become generally un-
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In an earlier chapter, Ivan is de-
an image of bloody violence that also prepares his fiery
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CONTAINER schemas imposing the image, from which himself) and journey inward from the
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forceful trope the three sides, and which themselves
were: light/dark imagery of the PATH schema,
and down into the light of Ivan's spiritual journey to its logical
death. At that very moment Ivan reached his bed. The dying
in his arms about. His hand fell from his hand, pressed it to his lips,
in the light [svet]; it was re- had not been what it should light [popravt'], with the root
with a focus on spontaneous, not conscious
and imitative behavior according to social dictate” (Gutsche 1986: 83). It is a concrete, simple gesture of compassion that penetrates the lifelong buildup of “decent” and “decorous” incrustations which alienated Ivan from his family and friends and ultimately from consciousness of his own humanity. It is fundamentally opposed to deceit in that it is simple, natural, spontaneous, nonverbal, unambiguous, and triggered by a still innocent child. It is simultaneously a metaphorical and literal “touching” of the truth. A po-
sically powerful action, it serves as a token of how Ivan should have led his own life.

His son's touch triggers his fall into the light, which is the same thing as his realization that his life was wrong. In this fall, Ivan's metaphorical journey reaches its logical fulfillment. He has regressed from conventional adulthood to a spiritual womb, and he is reborn in a merging with inner truth. His last revelation is described explicitly in CONTAINER imagery:

And suddenly it grew clear [isasno] to Ivan that what had been oppressing him and would not leave him was all dropping away at once from two sides, from ten sides, and from all sides. He was sorry for them, but he must act as not to hurt them, to release [svobodit'] them and himself from these sufferings. (Tolstoy 1928, 26:113)

As Ivan falls, he simultaneously frees himself from the weighty buildup of his false life in high society; he sloughs off the black sack and is reborn, phoenix-like, in a dramatic merging with the light.21

4. Conclusion

In “The Death of Ivan Il'ich,” Tolstoy makes use of the conceptual structures underlying everyday metaphors for Truth and Falsehood both on the level of the individual motifs in the story's subtext and in the final culminating image of the black sack. In the individual motifs, he both elaborates everyday metaphors for these domains and extends them to new domains. Each motif independently diagrams Ivan's spiritual journey, but they are all at the same time coherent with each other, since each is grounded in the network of everyday metaphors for Truth and Falsehood. In the image of the sack, Tolstoy binds together three conceptual structures in one powerful trope, revealing their coherence in the final, climactic moments of the story.

It has become generally understood that Tolstoy, in Rimydas Silbajoris’s (1990: 165) words, uses language in a particular way to convey “be-

21. In an earlier chapter, Ivan is described in lightly ironic terms as “le phénix de la famille,” a status that also prefigures his fiery resurrection. For a discussion of the double-edged nature of foreign phrases in the story, see Salys 1986.
yond the words, yet through their mediation, the way a metaphor does.” He began to use this style of writing more systematically after *Anna Karenina*, although scholars have remarked on the “poetic concreteness of his use of language” (Jackson 1993: 58) even in earlier works.22 As Mandelker (1993: 143) has written about the later period in Tolstoy’s writing: “Tolstoy’s rejection of realism involved the denigration of the verisimilitudinous application of detail in favor of an exploitation of universally comprehensible metaphors and symbols.”

In this study I have argued that Tolstoy exploits the metaphorical potential of language in “The Death of Ivan Il’ich” in a more intricate way than previously thought. While the metaphoricity of the subtextual motifs had been noted by other scholars, the fact that all the motifs represent everyday modes for conceptualizing Truth and Falsehood—that, taken collectively, the subtexts evoke one overarching theme—has not been appreciated, and the mechanics of how this representation is made possible has not been described. In demonstrating this, it was necessary to rely on a framework for understanding metaphor that profiles its conceptual grounding and that provides a researcher with a well-defined set of tools and methodology for investigating the cognitive affinities among diverse metaphorical expressions for one and the same domain. A conceptual approach to metaphor has thus proved useful in contributing to our understanding of the “literariness” of the story.

A final note about the relationship between metaphorical imagery in Tolstoy’s later polemical writing and in “Ivan Il’ich.” It is clear that metaphorical imagery is used systematically in both the former and the latter. In his polemical writing, however, the images tend to be used in relative isolation from one another: they represent “one-shot” metaphors that are not linked systematically by Tolstoy with other metaphorical language in the given text. In “Ivan Il’ich,” the images are coherently blended and their conceptual power thereby increased. This reminds us that Tolstoy (1978: 297) once defined the literary critic’s task as one of “direct[ing] the reader through the endless labyrinth of linkages [*labirint stseplenii*] which is the essence of art.”

22. In this citation, Jackson is referring to *War and Peace*, written a decade before *Anna Karenina*. 

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