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
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Conceptual Metaphors for the Domains TRUTH and FALSEHOOD in Russian and the Image of the Black Sack in Tolstoi's *The Death of Ivan Il'ich*

David S. Danaher

One of the strengths of a cognitive approach to the study of language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987 and 1993) is that it provides a framework for analyzing not only conventional linguistic forms and relations, but also aesthetic elaborations and extensions of these conventional structures.¹ This is by no means true of all frameworks for linguistic analysis: rigidly formalist approaches to language, for example, seem to have little to offer scholars of literature. Cognitive theorists in the Lakoff/Johnson tradition take as axiomatic that poetic language is not divorced from language in general, but rather grounded in it. Mark Turner (1987: 9), for example, has written: "Good literature is powerful because it masterfully evokes and manipulates our cognitive apparatus." This is particularly true with regard to the use of metaphor, and the relationship between metaphor in literature and basic cognitive experience could be represented graphically as a continuum:



The conceptual theory of metaphor posits a link not only between poetic metaphor and metaphor in conventional language, but also between conventional language and our basic cognitive experiences, which turn out to be schematically accessible and many of which are realized in linguistic structure. To my knowledge, the potential for cognitive linguistics to provide a unified framework in which to analyze conventional linguistic structure as well as literature (Lakoff and Turner 1989; see also Turner 1987 and 1989) has yet to be explored on the basis of Slavic texts.

I intend this paper as a case study for Slavists in the application of a cognitive analysis of one aspect of conventional language structure, namely, metaphors for the domains TRUTH and FALSEHOOD in contemporary Russian, to the structure of a literary text, Tolstoi's *The Death of Ivan Il'ich* (see Danaher Forthcoming for a complementary study). The linguistic analysis of the network of conventional metaphors, which comprises the first part of this study, will serve as a point of reference for the analysis of Tolstoi's aestheticized representations of the same domains in the second part.

1. Conventional Metaphors for TRUTH and FALSEHOOD

Russian has two words corresponding to English "truth" (*istina*, *pravda*) and four words corresponding to English "lie" (*lozh', nepravda, vran'e, obman*). General accounts of the semantic and pragmatic differences between these terms are available in Arutunova 1991, Mondry and Taylor 1992, Shopen 1992, Krongauz 1993, and Arutunova and Riabtsseva 1995. The goal of the present study is to sketch the system of metaphors that Russians conventionally use to conceptualize these domains and to explore the difference in metaphorical conceptualizations of *istina* and *pravda*, a difference already surmised in Mondry and Taylor 1992 and Shopen 1992. My description of the metaphor network will focus on those underlying conceptualizations that are relevant to the literary analysis which follows; the treatment is not intended to be exhaustive. Analysis of conventional metaphors for these domains is based on systematic examination of the use of such metaphorical expressions in journalistic writing, memoirs, and a series of popular detective novels as well as on data from Lubensky 1995.

Research has determined that the domains are coherently organized and meaningfully understood through a small set of conceptual structures that are amenable to many kinds of extension and elaboration. The structures that make up this set are: the conceptual metaphor *Knowing Is Seeing*, itself a product of the more general metaphor *Mind Is Body* (Sweetser 1990: ch. 2), and the image schemas STRAIGHT, PATH, and CONTAINER. Since the STRAIGHT schema has been analyzed by Cienki (1998a, 1998b) and is not directly relevant for the subsequent literary analysis, I will focus attention on the remaining structures.

Metaphorical expressions motivated by these structures are not isolated from each other, but instead form a network of related meanings. Although a given metaphorical expression may partake simultaneously of more than one of the basic modes of conceptualization, mixing of metaphors which may occur is often meaningful given the coherence of the network. Moreover, the internal logic of the metaphor network provides rich potential for conceptual extension and elaboration, a potential exploited in aesthetic representations of these domains. The system of conventional metaphors for the domain TRUTH is grounded in a natural duality between location and object metaphors (Lakoff 1993: 225ff). Truth can be conceptualized either as a location in space, which may or may not be visible to us and toward which we journey on a truth-quest (*put' k istine*, "path to the truth"), or as an object that we may possess (*u kazhdogo Pavla svoia pravda*, "every Pavel has his own truth") and that itself may possess certain defining attributes (*golaja pravda*, "naked truth"). In Russian, *istina* tends to be conceptualized via the location metaphor while *pravda* tends to be understood more in terms of the object metaphor. Conventional metaphors also exist in Russian which blend the location and object duality, for example, the expression *dokopai'sia do pravdy*, "to dig to the truth", in which *pravda* is metaphorized as an object existing in a (hidden) location. Falsehood is generally understood as that which somehow constrains or delays movement toward the truth-location and/or obscures in some way the truth-object. Discussion of the three conceptual modes and their realizations in specific metaphorical expressions will clarify these considerations.

3.1 The Conceptual Metaphor Knowing Is Seeing

Lakoff and Johnson have noted that this conceptual metaphor

[. . .] is so firmly rooted in the role of vision in human knowing and is so central to our conception of knowledge that we are seldom aware of the way it works powerfully to structure our sense of what it is to know something (1999: 394).

In this conceptualization, TRUTH is understood as a location or an object that we can see and therefore know. It can be seen with varying degrees of clarity and from various perspectives and distances. Clarity of perception may depend on the nature of the truth-location or truth-object itself: for example, *istina*, as God's truth, can never be clearly seen by human eyes. It may also depend on whether the location or object is unintentionally or has been intentionally distorted, disguised, or blocked from our view. Whether the truth is hidden from view by nature or by human design is one important conceptual difference between *istina* and *pravda*. Arutiunova has written: "*Istina* is hidden from man by the nature of things, *pravda* is hidden by someone's will [. . .]. *Istina* is a secret guarded by the world, *pravda* a secret kept by man" (1991: 28). Metaphorical expressions for intentional concealment of *pravda* are abundant in both Russian and English: *zamaskirovat' pravdu*, "to mask the truth," *zavualirovat' pravdu*, "to veil the truth," and *priukrashivat' pravdu*, "to embellish the truth," are three possibilities.

Since manipulation of the truth-object is strongly associated with attempts to conceal it from view, it is possible that any kind of embellishment may come to be perceived as deceptive: note, for example, the negative connotations that frequently accompany the English word "embellishment." Genuine truth is typically understood, in English and Russian, as "pure and simple," "unadulterated," or "naked."

Visual perception of a location or object can be facilitated by its illumination. The source of illumination may be natural to the location or object or created by the observer. For instance, *istina* is prototypically understood as a blinding, natural light (*svet istiny*) originating with God (*bozhestvennyi svet istiny*). *Istina*, as God's truth, is unitary, and this may facilitate its conceptualization as a blinding source of natural light; *pravda*, which is multiple and relative, cannot be metaphorized as *svet*: the phrase *svet pravdy* was interpreted by native speakers as acceptable only jokingly as *svet Pravdy* (the light of the Communist newspaper *Pravda*).

More prosaically, we can "throw/pour light" (*brosat'/prolivat' svet*) on something in order to discover its nature or true essence. Another possible scenario in the metaphorical model equating knowledge and vision is that the truth-object may itself move from a hidden location out into the open and thereby become visible and knowable as such: thus, *pravda* can "come out in the open" (*vyiti naruzhu*) and secret matters can "swim up to the light" (*vsplyt' na svet*) from the depths. Truth is generally associated with openness, in Russian and other languages (Jongen 1985). We "uncover the truth" (*raskryt' pravdu*), "speak openly" (*govorit' otkryto*) about something, and even "open a secret" (*otkryt' sekret*; cf. English to "dis-cover" something). Even a lie can be "open" (*otkrovennaia lozh'*)

in the sense that the false nature of the statement is openly perceived: the lie itself is the truth that is clearly perceived.

In this conceptual metaphor, knowledge or truth becomes metonymically associated with light imagery and ignorance or falsehood with darkness. Note, for example, the English word "Enlightenment," which equates education with a process of filling people with light; the Russian equivalent, *Prosveshchenie* (*prosvetit' cheloveka*, "to enlighten someone"), metaphorizes knowledge as light (*svet istiny*) which spreads through (*pro-*) us and engulfs us in its radiance. *Pravda* can also be understood as a light image, for example, in the Russian proverb *Pravda glaza kolet*, "Truth stabs the eyes"; however, unlike *istina*, which is beyond our ability to perceive or control, *pravda* is a light that we ourselves can wield, like a weapon, for prosaic purposes. The association of darkness with ignorance, falsehood, or some form of illegality is so commonplace that the expressions instantiating it are not immediately perceived as metaphorical: in Russian, we have the proverb *Uchen'e svet, neuchen'e t'ma*, "Knowledge is light, ignorance darkness" and expressions like *chernyi rynok*, "black market," *tenevaia ekonomika*, "shadow economy," and *chernyelimnye dela*, "black/dark deeds."

A final extension of this conceptualization, which will prove relevant to our subsequent literary analysis, merits discussion. Since knowledge of the truth-entity depends on vision, active deception can be conceptualized as a force exerted to impair, obstruct, or misdirect the observer's sight: we can "throw dust in someone's eyes" (*pustit' pyl' v glaza*, that is, attempt to impress someone by spinning a fine yarn) or "distract attention" from a given matter (*otvlech' vnimanie*) by "directing away someone's eyes" (*otvesti glaza*). Even the light source illuminating the truth-entity can be tampered with for deceitful purposes: we may "present something in a distorted or incorrect light" (*predstavliat' chto-libo v iskažennom ili nepravil'nom svete*), which is equivalent to "rubbing something into someone's glasses" (*vtirat' komu-libo ochki*) in order to deceive. Compare the English idiom "to pull the wool over someone's eyes."

The force dynamic associated with deception appears in the etymology of the English word "deceive", which comes from Latin *de-* + *capere* with the root meaning "to take, seize, ensnare, catch in a trap" (cf. "captive"). The Russian word for deception, *obman*, has a different etymology, but one with a similar force dynamic. Preobrazhensky (1951) notes that the root *man-* (*manit'*, "to beckon, attract, allure") generally meant "to call someone by gestures, nodding, voice, or flattery" and that other Slavic and related non-Slavic languages associate the root with wizardry or supernatural forces (see similar treatments in Vasmer 1955 and Chernykh 1993). The signs or flattery are designed to be "captivating" through visual or aural dazzle: the object of the display is put under a spell and effectively ensnared.

1.2 The PATH Schema

Johnson has noted that the PATH schema "is one of the most common structures that emerges from our constant bodily functioning" (1987: 116); it underlies

a whole range of common literary archetypes. Stories Are Journeys, Common literary archetypes Through the Journey metaphor, common literary archetypes conceptual power.

In metaphorical conceptualization, the schema is not merely superimposed rather intertwined with it, in which we move (Emanation). Journeying toward the truth (search for the truth") requires have an ability to recognize be anything that hinders (sbit'sia s puti istinnogo, "to make a false step") or da okolo xodit', "to beat

One can lose one's way forced off the true path. Deception is associated with deceived in an attempt to her from the truth" (otda nos), or "catch" her in a Russian have a range of "trapped by lies," "imprison ourselves into a corner" directed toward us by of deception (*obman*) can be mat' na udochku) or by animal)", and which can at least in detective novel a fly in a drop of honey.

Deceptive force may do much upon us that we are tional phrase chuvstvovat tional lie," which is an in Burdens: we must "bear" neys (Lakoff and Turner image grounded in the same inherent in the policy of the same old heavy and l'zhi). Only we seem not to most' seem impossible: the open speech and effective

It has been suggested that conceptualizations in terms

a whole range of common conceptual metaphors, including Life Is a Journey, Stories Are Journeys, Commerce Is a Journey, and An Argument Is a Journey. Through the Journey metaphor, the PATH schema also gives us one of the most common literary archetypes, the "road of life" topos, which has undeniable conceptual power.

In metaphorical conceptualizations of TRUTH and FALSEHOOD, the PATH schema is not merely supplementary to the metaphor Knowing Is Seeing, but rather intertwined with it. Truth is a location (or an object in a location) toward which we move (Emanatian 1997 discusses aspects of this metaphor in English). Journeying toward the truth (*put' k istine*, "path to the truth," *iskat' istinu*, "to search for the truth") requires us to maintain our visual orientation as well as to have an ability to recognize obstacles along the way. Falsehood or deception can be anything that hinders the journey: for example, deviations from the path (*sbit'sia s puti istinnogo*, "to lose one's way on the true path," *delat' lozhnyi shag*, "to make a false step") or aimless, rather than goal-oriented wandering (*vokrug da okolo xodit'*, "to beat around the bush" or "skirt the truth of the matter").

One can lose one's way in quest of the truth on one's own, or one can be forced off the true path by the deceptive actions of others. In the latter case, deception is associated with a force dynamic that the deceiver exerts on the deceived in an attempt to "lead her into error" (*vvodit' v zabluzhdenie*), "distance her from the truth" (*otdalit' ot pravdy*), lead her around "by the nose" (*vodit' za nos*), or "catch" her in a trap. For the entrapment scenario, both English and Russian have a range of metaphorical expressions. In English, we can be "trapped by lies," "immobilized by lies," "knee-deep in lies," and we can "lie ourselves into a corner"; the lies that trap us can be our own or they can be directed toward us by others who may wish to deceive us. In Russian, active deception (*obman*) can be conceptualized as "catching someone on a hook" (*poi-mat' na udochku*) or by a trap (*ulovka*, from *lovit'*, "to catch or trap (an animal)"), and which can mean a "trick, ruse, or subterfuge"; people can also, at least in detective novels, get stuck in deception *kak mukha v kaple meda*, "like a fly in a drop of honey."

Deceptive force may direct us from the true path, trap us, or weigh down so much upon us that we are unable to continue the truth-quest. Note the conventional phrase *chuvstvovat' bremia uslovnoi lzhi* "to feel the burden of a conventional lie," which is an instance of the more general metaphor Difficulties Are Burdens: we must "bear" them, although they "weigh us down" on our life journeys (Lakoff and Turner 1989: 25). Solzhenitsyn (1990: 5) provides an elaborated image grounded in the same conceptualization in describing the contradictions inherent in the policy of *glasnost'*: "All of our *glasnost'* is laden with garlands—the same old heavy and fat clusters of lies (*prezhnie tiazhelye zhirnye grozd'ia lzhi*). Only we seem not to notice them." Solzhenitsyn's image makes true *glasnost'* seem impossible: the garlands weigh down so heavily that they both stifle open speech and effectively prevent movement to another policy.

It has been suggested in the literature on *istina* and *pravda* that *istina* favors conceptualizations in terms of the PATH schema while *pravda* does not. Mondry

and Taylor (1992: 136), for example, list several journey metaphors for *istina* and note that these metaphors "point to the status of *istina* as a distant, elusive goal that is typically beyond the reach of the average person." This is true, but not as a sufficient account of Russian metaphorical conceptualizations of truth. Both *istina* and *pravda* can be conceptualized as locations toward which we journey. We can say, for example, both *poisk istiny* and *poisk pravdy*, and both mean "a search for the truth"; however, these expressions imply different kinds of searches. The first implies a long and difficult journey, an indirect search which may bring us closer to the truth, but which will never be absolutely complete given the limits of human reason; *poisk pravdy* implies, relatively speaking, a short search that we expect may culminate in our reaching the destination since *pravda* is *dostupnaia vsem*, "accessible to all." The search for *istina* profiles the process of searching while the search for *pravda* profiles the expected endpoint (the solving of the riddle), which is why the process-oriented verbal phrase *iskat' istinu* ("to search for *istina*") is more or less conventional while *iskat' pravdu* ("to search for *pravda*") sounds, comparatively speaking, odd. Because they emphasize different kinds of questing, both terms can comfortably coexist in a Soviet propaganda slogan, which also partakes of a visual metaphor: "The sun of the Soviet Republic lights up (*osveshchaet*) the path to *istina*, knowledge, and *pravda*."

It might also be pointed out that since *pravda* is a knowable and relative form of truth, we are able to orient ourselves in relationship to it in order to eventually "get to it" (*dobrat'sia do nee*). Various subjective versions of *pravda*, which we can evaluate and compare, may even provide clues as to where the objective truth (*istina*) lies: *Ona byla uverena, chto gde-to mezhdu etimi raznolikimi pravdami lezhit istina*, "She was certain that somewhere between these various *pravda*'s lay *istina*." On the other hand, we do not know exactly where *istina* lies, even if we know that it is somewhere "out there." We can get closer to it (*priblizhat'sia k istine*) without being able to reach it, much like vassals who are permitted to approach but never touch the king.

1.3 The CONTAINER Schema

Like a path or journey, the notion of containment is "inherently meaningful to people by virtue of their bodily experience" (Lakoff 1987: 273; see also Johnson 1987: 21ff). It is a notion that we come to understand well as infants (Gibbs 1994: 415-6, Mandler 1992: 597) and serves as the basis for how we conceptualize a number of quite common abstract domains, including the opposition between "in" and "out", emotions (which are "contained" within the body), and even support (Mandler 1992: 597).

Like all image-schemas, the CONTAINER schema specifies little: an interior, an exterior, and a boundary between them. Metaphors produced on the basis of this schema exhibit a wide range of possible specifications: focus can be placed on the type of container, its contents, its parts, or the relationship between the interior and exterior. All these possibilities are realized in conceptual metaphors for TRUTH and FALSEHOOD grounded in this schema.

Aspects of the metaphor make reference to communication. As the known as the CONTAINER, the process of "transmission" is "contained" within the container. Since oral communication is conceptualized as a "path" which is transmitted, the PATH schema and privileges *istina* as an object and privilege does not entirely disappear. The potentially touchable CONTAINER schema. Containers are three-dimensional. Further into a container may also prove difficult either physically or virtually by nature or by design. The schema is linked to the idea of discovering the object's interior either by metaphors resulting from the metaphor. Lies Are Coverings of the Truth. In the Conduit metaphor, the Conduit metaphor takes the complex affixation of the verb *razgovor*, *razgovor'sia v razgovor*, *razgovor'sia v razgovor*, *razgovor'sia v razgovor*, "to think deeply in order to get to the essence (deeply) into the meaning of the verb -sia affix conceptually, *razgovor'sia v komnatu*, "to go into the phrases *priznatsia*, *priznatsia*, "to see through objects, a conceptualization of someone" (*vytjanut' iz kogo-libo kak obluplennogo* fruit"). An important Russian metaphor, and knowledge "in the depths of the soul." Truth Is Internal Depth. Truth is understood as "empirical."

Aspects of the metaphors for TRUTH and FALSEHOOD that will be considered here make reference to metaphorical conceptualizations of the process of communication. A principal metaphor underlying communication has come to be known as the Conduit metaphor (Reddy 1993) because it defines discourse as the process of "transferring" meanings between interlocutors; meanings themselves are "contained" inside words, sentences, ideas, or longer pieces of discourse. Since oral speech is a typical locus of discourse, meaning can also be "contained" within the body. Here I will discuss several ways in which truth can be conceptualized as an object or as an entity existing within a discourse "package" which is transferable between speakers.

If the PATH schema conceptualizes TRUTH primarily as a location in space and privileges *istina* over *pravda*, the CONTAINER schema profiles TRUTH as an object and privileges *pravda* over *istina*. Moreover, just as the PATH schema does not entirely dismiss the object side of the location/object dual (truth is a potentially touchable or possessible object existing in the truth-location), so the CONTAINER schema does not entirely deny certain nuances of movement. Containers are three-dimensional entities with depth, and it is possible to move further into a container in order to probe its depth. Movement into a container may also prove difficult since internal exploration requires passing through, either physically or visually, the container's boundary, and the boundary may be, by nature or by design, resistant to penetration. In this way, the CONTAINER schema is linked to both the PATH schema and the metaphor Knowing Is Seeing: to discover the essence of the truth-object, we need to gain access to the object's interior either by physical movement or visual "insight." Conceptual metaphors resulting from this conceptualization are: Truth Is Internal Depth and Lies Are Coverings of the Container.

In the Conduit metaphor, truth or true essence is inside the meaning container. The Conduit metaphor is covertly represented in the series of Russian verbs that take the complex affix *v- -sia*: *vchitat'sia v tekst*, "to read [oneself] into the text," *vslushat'sia v razgovor*, "to listen intently to the conversation," *vdumat'sia v smysl povesti*, "to think deeply about the meaning of the story." These verbs imply that in order to get to the essence or truth of some matter, we must insert ourselves (deeply) into the meaning container (the text, the conversation, the story). While the *v- -sia* affix conceptualizes this penetration in terms of spatial movement (cf. *voiti v komnatu*, "to go into the room"), it can also be accomplished visually, as in the phrases *pronzit' glazami*, "to pierce with the eyes" and *videt' kogo-libo naskvoz'*, "to see through someone." The body itself can be a container for truth-objects, a conceptualization illustrated by the phrase "to pull the truth out of someone" (*vytianut' iz kogo-libo pravdu*) as well as by the equally graphic *znat' kogo-libo kak obluplennogo* ("to know someone as if they've been peeled like a fruit"). An important Russian locus for personal truth and meaning is the soul (*dusha*), and knowledge of "deep" truths about oneself are said to be contained "in the depths of the soul" (*v glubine dushi*). One extension of the metaphor Truth Is Internal Depth is that false, misleading, or unsubstantial discourse can be understood as "empty" since it possesses no content: *pustye slova*, "empty

words," *pustoe obeshchanie*, "empty promise," *pustye razgovory*, "empty conversations." Compare English, in which words sometimes "ring hollow."

In this model, deception is conceived of as an attempt to cover (*skryt' pravdu*) or disguise (*zamaskirovat' / zavualirovat' pravdu*) the truth-object in order to prevent access to its interior. Different forms of covering allow for different kinds of lying: defensive, innocent, malicious, benevolent. An unpleasant truth might also be "packaged" to render it more "palatable," as in the phrase *priukrashivat' pravdu*, "to embellish the truth." Similarly, non-malicious exaggeration of the truth may be conceptualized as "not sparing the paints" (*ne zhalet' krasok*) or "thickening the paints" (*sgushchat' kraski*) in one's decoration of the core truth-object (compare the English phrase "to lay it on thick"). If truth is contained within the body, then the body's outward appearance can be manipulated to deny access to it: *delat' vid*, "to pretend" and *nadet' masku*, "to put on a mask."

Since falsehood is associated with covering and embellishing, truth is associated with openness (*obnazhennaia pravda*), cleanliness (*chistaia pravda*), and simplicity. We "discover" the truth (*raskryt' pravdu*, literally, "to uncover") in the same way that we discover the meaningful essence of a discourse container (*raskryt' idei / smysl*). People whose essential nature is easily apparent to all (who are "open books") in Russian have "everything on the outside" (*vse u nego naruzhu*) or "unbuttoned" souls (*u nego dusha naraspashku*). A particularly interesting Russian conceptualization of falsehood as decorative covering is the "weaving" metaphor implicit in the phrase *plesti chush'*, "to weave nonsense" or in the sentence *Vse, chto vy napleli—griaznoe vran'e*, "Everything you've woven up is a dirty lie." This metaphor seems to suggest that lies, like woven objects, are artificial constructions that can be used for decorative purposes. Compare the English expressions for exaggeration "to spin a yarn" and "to spin a tall tale."

The above analysis of the abstract domains TRUTH and FALSEHOOD demonstrates that Russians conventionally understand these domains through a small set of conceptual structures that are grounded in basic cognitive experience. The metaphors that comprise this set form a complex, coherent network that is open to potential extension and elaboration. By itself, this analysis illustrates the considerable explanatory power of Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor framework, but a cognitive approach to language has more to offer. In the next section, I will analyze the conceptual power of the central image in Tolstoi's novella *The Death of Ivan Il'ich*, namely, the metaphorical black sack (*chernyi meshok*) through which Ivan imagines he must pass in his journey toward spiritual rebirth. In doing so, I will suggest that the full power of this image cannot be appreciated without reference to conventional metaphorical conceptualizations of the domains TRUTH and FALSEHOOD.

2. A Case of Metaphorical Compression: Tolstoi's Black Bag

Addressing the failure of literary criticism to take into account the cognitive basis of language, Mark Turner has written (1987: 9):

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Modern literary criticism, because it is not concerned with [...] general cognitive capacities, rarely addresses the source of literature's power. Systematically, by misemphasis, it obscures literature's forceful connection to other kinds of human thought and knowledge.

In a cognitive approach, aesthetic language is grounded in conventional linguistic forms and relations, which, in turn, take much of their structure from basic cognitive experience. In his later polemical and fictional works, Tolstoi systematically uses conventional metaphorical conceptualizations of TRUTH and FALSEHOOD, grounded as they are in a small set of conceptual structures, as stepping stones for his own creative representations of the same domains.² His representations are literary extensions and elaborations; they are not pure inventions. His usages are already potential in the existing network of conventional metaphors, and the power of his images derives largely from their grounding in everyday cognitive experience (see Danaher Forthcoming for a schematic depiction of the relationship).

The systematic metaphorical reasoning evident in Tolstoi's thinking about TRUTH and FALSEHOOD with regard to society, religion, and art shows up in other contexts in isolated expressions derived from the same conventional network. A brief example will suffice to demonstrate this. One motif in Tolstoi's thought is that verbal expression is an inherently deceptive form of communication. If truth, as we have seen, is conventionally understood to be pure, simple, and unembellished, then falsehood begins where simplicity and brevity end. In a typical statement of this belief, Tolstoi writes: "The truest indication of truth (*istina*) is simplicity and clarity. Falsehood (*lozh'*) is always complex, fancy (*vychurna*), and wordy (*mnogoslovna*)" (1936, 45: 419). This same idea can be found in non-Tolstoian sources, for example, from a Marinina detective novel: "Remember, my child, the more words, then the greater the suspicions that behind them lies an attempt to deceive (*za nimi skryvaetsia obman*)."

Both Tolstoi and the author of the detective novel have made a similar extension: since truth is clear, open, and "naked," any embellishment—in this case, excessive verbalization—becomes a potential locus of falsehood. Verbosity is perceived as an attempt to cover up what should be a simple, direct truth. The difference between Tolstoi and the author of the detective novel in this regard is that Tolstoi develops the notion of falsehood as excessive embellishment into a coherent motif that resonates throughout his thought system whereas in the detective novel it is just an isolated observation by one of the characters. Tolstoi, in fact, repeatedly equates complexity of thought with deceptive intent:

To recognize and expound the truth no particularly extraordinary abilities are needed [...]. A special intellect (*osobennyi um*) and gifts are not needed to recognize and expound the truth, but are needed for dreaming up and expounding lies (*lzh'*) (1912: No. 76).

Tolstoy arguably founds a treatment of human psychology on this metaphorical extension (see Khrapchenko 1968, Etkind 1984, C. Turner 1995). Aspects of his belief system coherent with this extension include the following: feelings are more

true than conclusions derived from analytic thought and critical reasoning, words are less true than glances or gestures (Smith 1985, Helle 1997), and complex verbal discourse, as in the law or religion, is designed to mystify rather than clarify. For example, in his treatment of institutional religion, Tolstoi strongly insists that Christ's words are not meant to be interpreted but rather accepted in their "direct" (*priamoi*) meaning (Tolstoi 1936, 23: 329). Doctrinal interpretations of Christ's words represent "growths" (*narosty*) on his teachings (Tolstoi 1936, 23: 411) which "screen people off" (*zasloniaut liudei*) from God (Tolstoi 1936, 28: 55).

Having considered the way in which Tolstoi, among others, grounds his artistic metaphors for TRUTH and FALSEHOOD in the conventional network as well as the systematic nature of his metaphorical extensions, we are in a position to analyze a particularly dramatic case of coherent metaphorical blending that occurs in *The Death of Ivan Il'ich*. This work is generally accepted as one of the most artistically powerful meditations on death in the world canon, and it is arguably Tolstoi's most aesthetically dense work. On the surface, however, *The Death of Ivan Il'ich* is a very simple story: a conventional family man and a successful judge who is a member in good standing of high society develops a mysterious illness that causes him agonizing pain before eventually killing him. The story's deep subtext depicts a man who has no spiritual life, who is alienated from his family and colleagues, and who is eventually compelled by his suffering to seek and find true spiritual renewal. This subtext is characterized by a number of motifs that detail Ivan's journey from a conventional death-in-life to spiritual rebirth (Jahn 1993).

The story's dominant image, which acquires a haunting power over both Ivan and the reader in the final few chapters, is that of a black sack (*chernyi meshok*), which Ivan imagines he must pass through in order to save himself:

It seemed to him that he was being thrust into a narrow black sack, a deep sack, which he was being thrust further into but not all the way through. And this event, so horrible to him, was accompanied by suffering. He both feared it and wanted to fall through, both struggled and helped (Tolstoi 1936, 26: 105).

Ivan's ambiguous feelings about the sack are repeated again as his death is imminent, and we discover that what prevents him from falling all the way through the sack is the false belief that he has led a good life:

He struggled in the black sack into which he was being thrust by some invisible insurmountable force [...] and with each moment he felt that he was getting closer and closer to what terrified him, despite all his struggles. He felt that his agony was due to his being thrust into that black hole and still more to his not being able to get right into it. He was hindered from getting into it by his conviction that his life had been a good one. That very justification of his life held him fast and prevented his moving forward, and it caused him the most torment of all (Tolstoi 1936, 26: 112).

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Clinging to the self-deception that his life has been lived well, Ivan is stuck fast in the blackness of the sack and his inward journey is stalled. At this very moment he looks inside the sack and perceives a light at its deepest point:

Suddenly some force struck him the chest and side, he had still more difficulty breathing, and he fell through the hole and there, at the end of the sack, something began to shine (*zasvetilos' chto-to*) (Tolstoi 1936, 26: 112).

The next sentence in the story contains a spatial metaphor by which it is made clear that Ivan's true direction (*nastoiashchee napravlenie*) is toward the light lying deep at the center of the sack.

The action that causes Ivan to fall through the sack into the light, that is, to bring his spiritual journey to its logical end, is a spontaneous gesture of compassion (*zhalost'*) carried out by his school-age son:

It was at the end of the third day, an hour before his death. At that very moment his schoolboy son quietly crept up to him and approached his bed. The dying man was still screaming desperately and throwing his arms about. His hand fell onto his son's head. The schoolboy seized his father's hand, pressed it to his lips, and began to cry. At that very moment Ivan Il'ich fell through, saw the light; it was revealed to him that his life had not been what it should have been, but that there was still time to set things right (Tolstoi 1936, 26: 112).

Once Ivan orients himself to the light and falls through the sack, pain and death are no more. The text reads: "Instead of death there was light."

The sack has been seen by literary critics as symbolic of either a birth canal, which would cohere with the spiritual rebirth undergone by Ivan as he passes through it, or an intestine (the *slepaia kishka*, or "blind gut" referred to earlier in the story as the possible source of Ivan's illness), which would metaphorically turn Ivan into fecal matter. As far as they go, these interpretations are valid, but concrete interpretations fail to offer a general account of the power of the image, one which might both situate it in the context of the story's multiple subtexts as well as relate it to similar imagery used by Tolstoi in other contexts.

The black sack gains its conceptual power as the story's culminating image not only from the story's individual subtexts of light/dark imagery (Danaher 1995), "road of life" imagery (Salys 1986), and container imagery, all of which are componentially represented in the image of the sack, but also from the coherence of all the parts of the complex trope given the network of metaphors for TRUTH and FALSEHOOD. The text alone does not endow the black sack with its power; the sack gains its power from Tolstoi's masterful manipulation of conventional metaphorical conceptualizations within the structure of the text. In the image of the sack, Tolstoi blends together all three structures that underlie metaphors for TRUTH and FALSEHOOD in one overarching trope, highlighting their coherence in the final, climactic moments of the story.

The opposition between the black light at its end is consistent with the metaphorical association of darkness with deception and light with knowledge of the truth. The separate subtext in the story dealing with light and dark

imagery (Danaher 1995) that iconically maps Ivan's journey from a death-in-life to spiritual resurrection is itself iconically diagrammed in the description of the sack and Ivan's struggle with it.

Ivan's journey through the sack toward the light deep at its center, the "true direction" he must travel, evokes conventional notions of the truth-quest. He is stalled in this journey because he deceives himself into thinking that his thoroughly conventional life has been well-lived. It is this self-deception that causes him "the most torment of all" and traps him in the constricting confines of the sack, preventing his inward movement. Gustafson has noted that movement is a key concept in Tolstoi's religious thought (Gustafson 1986: 97ff). In this regard, Tolstoi himself wrote: "People do not stand in place, but are continually moving (*dvizhutsia*), gaining more and more knowledge of the truth (*istinu*) and getting closer to it (*priblizhaia's' k nei*) in the way they live their lives" (Tolstoi 1936, 28: 198). In Ivan's case, he moves closer to the truth in the depths of the sack in the way he relives and reviews his conventional life, and he is able to continue his inward journey only after he has admitted to himself, with some help from his son, the truth about it.

Admitting to himself that his life was "not right" (*ne to*) is equivalent to freeing himself from the heavy incrustations of conventional falsehood that have weighed down upon him and suffocated and immobilized him spiritually. This notion is succinctly captured in the text:

And suddenly it grew clear to him that what had been oppressing him and would not leave him was all dropping away at once from two sides, from ten sides, and from all sides. He was sorry for them, he must act so as not to hurt them, to release them and himself from these sufferings. "How beautiful and how simple it is," he thought (Tolstoi 1936, 26: 113).

The truth frees him from the pressure of the surrounding lies, and the black sack loosens its hold at the very moment that Ivan gives up his struggle with it, sees beyond it, and allows himself to be consumed by the light.

Ivan's struggles in the sack of lies are later relived, and in much the same metaphorical terms, by Nekhliudov, the hero of Tolstoi's last novel, *Resurrection*:

He remembered how he had once been proud of his straightforwardness (*priamotoi*), how he had made it a rule to always tell the truth (*pravdu*) and had in fact been righteous (*pravdiv*), and how now he was immersed in lies (*ves' vo lzhi*)—in the most horrible kind of lies, in lies which were accepted by all those surrounding him as truth. And there was no way out of this deception (*iz etoi lzhi*), at least he didn't see a way out. He had become mired in it (*zagriaz v nei*) [. . .]. "I will tear apart this falsehood which binds me (*Razorvu etu lozh'*, *sviaz'yvaiushchuiu menia*), no matter what the cost" (Tolstoi 1936, 32: chp. I, xxviii).

The difference between Ivan's struggle and Nekhliudov's is that Nekhliudov does not wait until his death to undertake it and takes a more active approach to "tearing apart" the bonds of falsehood than Ivan himself did.

Indeed, the whole image of the black sack is reminiscent not only of isolated moments in Tolstoi's writing that evoke the separate conceptual components

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represented in the trope of the sack, but of certain concrete images that coherently compress many of the same metaphorical structures. Take, for example, the world temple that Tolstoi imagines in a letter:

I imagine the world as an enormous temple, into which a light is falling from above, into the very center of it. In order to come together, everyone must move toward that light, and, there, all of us, having come from different directions, we all will meet (Tolstoi 1912: No. 56).

The temple trope repeats some of the most important elements of the sack trope, namely, the light at the center of the structure and the journey inward toward that light. Absent, however, in the temple image is reference to the deception and self-deception that entrap Ivan and suspend his journey through and into the sack. Moreover, like the detective novelist's mention of the suspect nature of wordiness which I cited earlier, the temple trope is merely an isolated image in the larger context from which it is taken.

In imagining his journey through the black sack, Ivan undertakes a spiritual struggle that fundamentally transforms him. Freeing himself from the thick atmosphere of conventional deceit, he regresses from a normal—and, as the text informs us, most horrible—adult life to a spiritual womb, and he is reborn, like the mythical phoenix to which he is earlier compared, in a dramatic merging with light. Throughout *The Death of Ivan Il'ich*, motifs of light/dark, journey, and containment imagery independently map out Ivan's journey in a series of interrelated subtexts. Tolstoi's black sack, the culminating trope of the story, brings together all these motifs in one powerful image and thereby serves as a metaphorically compressed microcosm or iconic distillation of Ivan's whole journey. The nature of his journey, a quest for the truth through a struggle to free himself from immobilizing encrustations of falsehood, is made apparent in Tolstoi's systematic grounding of both the sack and the tropological motifs leading to it in conventional metaphorical conceptualizations of TRUTH and FALSEHOOD.

Given his status as master novelist with a strong penchant for synecdoche (think of Karenin's big, protruding ears and Anna's red handbag), Tolstoi is generally regarded as a metonymic writer. This, however, may have more to do with definitions of metaphor that are oriented toward the rhetorical and away from the cognitive than with Tolstoi's actual use of metaphor as a conceptual structure. Jacques Catteau has argued that Tolstoi "suggère et donne à découvrir, à lire la métaphore dans le réel" (Catteau 1984: 24) and Krystyna Pomorska has written that Tolstoi "tried to present without the means of representation[,] to deal with language by avoiding language" (Pomorska 1982: 389–90). In applying discoveries about the cognitive nature of metaphor to an analysis of one of Tolstoi's texts, we are able to detail the mechanism used, at least in *The Death of Ivan Il'ich*, to achieve the effects noted by literary scholars and to begin thereby a more general reconsideration of Tolstoi's status as a writer of metonymic prose.

The analytical tools that proved necessary to reveal the embodied power of the black sack trope have been developed and tested in cognitive analyses of conven-

tional language structure, illustrating how a framework developed originally for linguistic analyses can prove useful in literary criticism. Much more work ought to be done in exploiting the potential of a cognitive approach to language for literary analysis of Slavic texts, and I offer this strategic study of one aspect of Tolstoi's aesthetics merely as a hint of what might be accomplished in the future.³

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NOTES

¹ For a summary of the main tenets of cognitive linguistics in a Slavic context, see Janda 2000 at <www.indiana.edu/~slavconf/SLING2K/pospapers/janda/pdf>.

² My analysis of Tolstoian metaphors for these domains is based on a systematic examination of the following works: selected letters from 1880 onward (Tolstoi 1912), *What I Believe* (Tolstoi 1936, vol. 23), *The Death of Ivan Il'ich* (Tolstoi 1936, vol. 26), *The Kingdom of God Is within You* (Tolstoi 1936, vol. 28), *What Is Art?* (Tolstoi 1936, vol. 30), *Resurrection* (Tolstoi 1936, vol. 32), and *The Way of Life* (Tolstoi 1936, vol. 45). Citations will be indicated by volume and page number; all translations are mine.

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